COMPANIONS IN MISFORTUNE

The restoration period in Russian-Turkish relations is over, said the Russian President Vladimir Putin after the talks with his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both presidents met in in the Bocharov Residence in Sochi, for the second time during the current year. Erdogan visited Moscow back in March 10 to take part at the Russian-Turkish Cooperation Council. In May, Putin and Erdogan will see each other again at the BSEC summit in Turkey. Many events has taken place since the Russian bomber was shot down in November 2015, and both sides have done a lot to restore the full-format dialogue amidst the swiftly sloping relations. Both Moscow and Ankara urgently needed to restore bilateral relations as economic partners and the states with geopolitical interests closely adjoining in the Middle East and in the South Caucasus. However, no one, including Russia and Turkey, does not believe that they can trust each other to the end. Rather, Russian-Turkish relations are an example of a rational intertwining of economic and geopolitical interests exceeding all other possible factors.

According to the official version, the meeting in Sochi was required to talk about the current state of economic relations and urgent international issues, first of all Syria. Putin and Erdogan have very ambitious goals - to bring the trade turnover between the countries to $100 billion annually, which has hardly reached $40 billion previously and during the crisis fell below $20 billion. The implementation of energy projects, the Turkish Stream Gas Pipeline and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, may help to achieve this strategic goal. On May 7, the Russian Gazprom started construction of the offshore section of the pipeline. The completion date for the laying of two sea lines is planned by the end of 2019, and preparations for the construction of the first power unit of the nuclear power plant have also been completed. The Akkuyu plant should be commissioned by 2023. The situation is more complicated with the lifting of restrictions on trade in agricultural products and issues related to the abolition of visa-free regime. At the end of April, the Russian side stated that it would not remove restrictions on Turkey unless the latter abolished duties on Russian grain. Ankara fulfilled this condition in early May. But Moscow said that it intended to leave restrictions on the supply of tomatoes to Russia, because, as Putin explained, at the time of the embargo, Russian agricultural producers "took significant amounts of loans and credit resources." However, it is clear that tomatoes will not become a stumbling block in relations between the two countries.

After all, these relations largely depend on whether Russia and Turkey can adhere to the agreement on Syria. It is hardly possible that incidents similar to downing of the Russian bomber will occur in the future but there are still some fundamental disagreements between the both states. Ankara still insists on the departure of Bashar Assad and supports all U.S. actions in Syria unacceptable for Russia. However, Turkey cannot turn a blind eye to the Russian interests either. Thus, the guarantor states represented during the Astana talks by Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement on the establishment of four zones of de-escalation in Syria (Idlib and neighboring areas of Latakia, Aleppo and Hama, the zone along the southern border of Syria with Jordan, eastern suburbs of Damascus, and the central province of Homs), where a truce seems to be preserved. This agreement has been re-confirmed in Sochi. However, its fate remains vague because the Syrian government has reserved the right to fight throughout the country against those it considers terrorists, and a lot of opposition groups ignored the document altogether. The U.S. reacted to the establishment of zones with caution noting that they would "prevent the persecution of terrorists." In light of the American missile strike in April, Washington’s intentions are clear. Thus, everything remains as is: the presence of the Islamic State (IS) and its allied groups in Syria, inability to determine their exact location. Plus, the absence of clear identification marks enable all parties of any agreements to act as they see fit. Therefore, the positions determined in any agreements is not a way to achieve peace in Syria but serve as a way of expressing one's priorities.

For example, Erdogan has long insisted on establishing the zones of de-escalation in order to prevent the actual creation of the Kurdish state in the north of Syria. For Turkey with a constant Kurdish conflict in the southeast of the country, such a scenario would be a nightmare. Well-armed Kurdish rebels with great combat experience and fighting simultaneously against both the terrorists and government forces are much more evil for Ankara than the IS. Therefore, Ankara is worried and annoyed by the fact that the Kurdish detachments enjoy the U.S. support, which greatly complicates relations between the two NATO allies. It went so far that the adviser to the Turkish President, Ilnur Cevik, announced the possibility of an accidental strike against the U.S. Special Forces, which interacts with the Kurdish forces of People's Self-defense (YPG, the wing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party) in the north of Syria. It is not surprising that in recent years there has been increasing talks about the expediency of Ankara's further stay in the North Atlantic alliance. In early March, Turkey suddenly announced its intention to buy S-400 anti-missile systems from Russia, and since NATO has its own unified air defense system, this step can be regarded as a "mutiny". Amidst the significant cooling in the relations between Ankara and Brussels due to the lack of progress in the negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU, as well as Brussels' discontent with the results of the April referendum in Turkey, the ongoing events force Ankara to lean towards Moscow.

Yes, this is a forced turn, yet some Western observers believe that this is Turkey’s maneuver to confuse both Washington and Brussels. Moreover, Russia is also playing the Kurdish factor in order to press on Turkey. On March 20, the media reported that the Russian troops landed in the province of Afrin in northwestern Syria, next to the Turkish border, which is controlled by the YPG. At the talks in Sochi, Erdogan handed Putin photographs of military personnel from the Russian Federation filmed along with Kurdish fighters from YPG. Earlier it was noted that the Russian military reached an agreement, which enables the construction of Russian military posts near the Turkish border to prevent attacks by the Turkish army on Kurdish positions in this region. Meanwhile, in another part of the Kurdish-controlled territory, Rojava, the American forces are patrolling the Turkish border. This is an excellent example of the fact that Russians and Americans can differentiate interests and agree if they really want to. Moscow makes it clear that if Turkey disagrees with the behavior of the Russian side in Syria, the Kremlin can strengthen the support of the Syrian Kurds. On the other hand, Russia itself cannot do without Ankara, as the Turkish presence remains significant both in Syria and in the Russian economy. And Moscow does not have many true friends, let alone rational rivals.

That is why both countries are doomed to bear this forced friendship, which looks occasionally like an enmity, yet demonstrates the tremendous ability to maintain even a minimal level of dialogue. At the same time, much in the relations between Russia and Turkey is based on the personal ties between Putin and Erdogan. But since no changes are expected in this aspect during the coming year, the dialogue between Moscow and Ankara will apparently continue holding true in this cold but reliable framework.