RELIABLE PARTNER AND PRETENDED ALLY

Dialogue between Azerbaijan and Russia based on equal partnership terms is claimed to be one of the key factors of regional geopolitics. High level and great prospects for the development of the Azerbaijani-Russian cooperation have become even more evident following serious problems in the current relations of Russia with Armenia. Evidence of these realities at the strategically important Eurasian crossing is confirmed by the results of the official visit of the Azerbaijani President and the working visit of the Armenian Prime Minister to Russia in the first ten days of September.

Equal partnership

On September 1, the heads of Russia and Azerbaijan, Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev, held a meeting in Sochi thus demonstrating again the high level of Azerbaijani-Russian relations. Following the talks, the parties signed 16 documents concerning the expansion of cooperation in virtually all areas of interstate cooperation, including economy and military-technical sphere.

For the first time, both presidents defined a long-term agenda based on the statements of Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin on the urgency of expanding bilateral "integration ties" to ensure closer partnership. They also signed an Action Plan covering the period until 2024, which is basically a set of "road maps" in such promising areas as the creation of the most favorable conditions for the development of mutually beneficial trade, economic and investment cooperation, increasing transit and transport potential in the Russian-Azerbaijani sections of international transport corridors using technologies of intellectual transport systems, creation of joint ventures in the promising sectors of national economies and exports for their diversification and solving existing problems in the field of innovation development, etc.

Experts believe that in the future, until 2025 and considering the new technological and digital revolution, Moscow and Baku will find incentives to launch relevant modernisation projects, create new types of production, and strengthen the previous level of long-term cooperation in various fields, in particular in the agrarian sector.

In fact, the Azerbaijani-Russian cooperation is mainly based on a truly equal and confidential dialogue that takes into account the interests of both sides. Relations with Russia is one of the priorities of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is Russia's leading partner in the region. It is enough to note that Russian investments in the Azerbaijani economy have reached almost $4 billion, while Azerbaijani business invested more than $1 billion in the Russian economy. Over the past year, Russian-Azerbaijani trade increased by almost 35% to $2.5 billion.

Undoubtedly, we expect that bilateral cooperation will receive even greater impetus following the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Azerbaijan on September 25.

Exemplary relations between Baku and Moscow, as they are often characterized by the political leaders of both states, once again confirm that despite the long-standing Armenian aggression, Azerbaijan has established itself as the leader of the South Caucasus region, the main hub of integration processes at the intersection of Europe and Asia, the West and the East, the North and the South.

Relations between Baku and Moscow have reached so high, indeed allied level, that media discusses even the possibility of Azerbaijan's membership in the CSTO. By the way, Armenia pretends to be a party, which is supposedly capable of preventing such a turn of events. But it is clear that if this issue is fundamentally negotiated between Moscow and Baku, then no one will ask for Yerevan's opinions, especially since the CSTO, in addition to Russia and Armenia, also includes countries friendly to Azerbaijan: Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The question, however, is not whether Azerbaijan will become a participant in strategic structures in post-Soviet Eurasia, including the CSTO or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In fact, Azerbaijan has really established itself as Russia's key and reliable partner in the South Caucasus, an ally from which Moscow does not expect any unpredictable actions, especially those that can harm the interests of its policy and security. After all, Armenia, which is deprived of any influence whatsoever and is a country with a collapsed economy, which is isolated from the regional integration processes, cannot offer anything in lieu of the cooperation of Russia with self-sufficient Azerbaijan.

Relations are not as they were before

The visit of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian to Moscow on September 8 confirmed that relations between Russia and Armenia are going through a very difficult period. Even Pashinian's outwardly optimistic statements cannot deny such a reality, which, in essence, is nothing but an attempt to put on a good face in a bad game.

Following the meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinian said that his country's relations with Russia were "brilliant" and that "there is not a single problem in either direction."

The following statement in the Armenian newspaper Hraparak is remarkable: "According to information coming from the Russian lobby, Nikol Pashinian tried to do everything to win the confidence of Vladimir Vladimirovich and convince him of the purity of his intentions. He directly or indirectly made it clear that he had no intention to enter into confrontation and he was ready to cooperate and make concessions on all issues of concern."

However, the very discussion in the political and expert circles claiming that the relations between Russia and Armenia are "not what they were before" is an indicator of the existence of serious problems in the dialogue between the two countries. Even pro-Armenian Russian experts openly acknowledge that the policy of the new Armenian leadership is against the allied relations with Russia, forcing it to reconsider Yerevan's position in the context of its regional interests. This indeed sounds reasonable.

Pashinian and his entourage openly advocated extrusion of Russia from the Armenian "platform" before coming to power. Using all-round support from Western geopolitical centres, they in every way contributed to the purposeful and large-scale anti-Russian campaign in Armenia. After coming to power, Pashinian significantly reduced the intensity of anti-Russian rhetoric, but Moscow, obviously, understands well that such an adjustment in the approach of the new Armenian authorities to Russia is solely a tribute to political necessity. That is, Pashinian and his team are compelled to reckon with Russia, but, in fact, are eager to quickly withdraw Armenia from the Russian influence and completely transfer it to the control of the West.

The symptoms of such an intention are quite obvious: Russian business is oppressed in Armenia caught by "velvet revolution", Russian cultural influence is finally destroyed, the propaganda hysteria against the Kremlin has reached an unprecedented culmination, politicians known for their proximity to Moscow are being pursued.

During the meeting of the leaders of the two countries, Pashinian's apparent attempt to please Putin could not obviously mislead the latter regarding the aspirations of the anti-Russian-oriented, essentially new Armenian leadership. Undoubtedly, the Kremlin, which does not have any reason to support Pashinian and consider him as a long-term factor in Armenia, will increase pressure on Yerevan, as well as assist the opponents of the new Armenian authorities in the internal political field of Armenia in order to create counterweights to "the public leader". It is clear that the matter is not about personal dissatisfaction. Russia, like any other great power, is interested in at least loyal, and most predictable governments in the countries of its traditional influence. Today, however, Armenia does not show any sign of predictability due to despair and the social and economic crisis that has created a state of revolutionary euphoria.

Meanwhile, the state of despair in Armenia is a direct result of its aggression against Azerbaijan, which lasts almost three decades. Without cooperation, the state currently overwhelmed with revolutionary euphoria is unable to overcome the systemic crisis.

The Karabakh factor

Russia, as a "guarantor of security" of Armenia, which has tried to present itself as its "only Transcaucasian ally", is aware of Armenian realities better than others are. As well as a number of factors that prevent Yerevan from the full transition to anti-Russian rails, the first of which is the conflict in Karabakh.

In fact, the current Armenian authorities adopted the idea of struggling against "Russian domination", which contradicts their intention to continue the policy of occupation of the Azerbaijani territories. After all, the policy of "getting rid of Russia" will certainly deprive Armenia of the guarantees of its security provided by Moscow. Armenia wants to rush into the arms of the West, but at the same time it does not mind further using the Kremlin as a "guarantor of security", in the hope to continue the occupation of Azerbaijani Karabakh. However, the practical impossibility of such a combination puts Pashinian in a vicious circle, where he has no choice but to come up with new options for delaying the Karabakh settlement. Also, as a precondition for the continuation of the talks, Armenia demands that Azerbaijan and international mediators recognise the so called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as a party to the negotiations. Then it is trying to threaten the peace process with statements that "Nagorno-Karabakh in the future will have to become a full-fledged part of the Armenian territory." That was Pashinian's statement during his last visit to Russia.

During his meeting with Russian businessmen of Armenian origin in Moscow, Pashinian noted in particular that Armenia will not make concessions on the issue of the territorial affiliation of Nagorno-Karabakh. In other words, he practically confirmed his inconsistency as a policy maker whose coming to power caused certain expectations about a possible change in Yerevan's position in terms of constructive negotiations.

The "velvet-revolutionary" regime continues making the same mistakes of the previous Armenian authorities. Yerevan's reluctance to admit the inevitability of liberation of Azerbaijani lands has negative implications on the overall situation in the poorest country of the South Caucasus, which has deprived itself of the opportunity for decent development thanks to its aggressive policy against Azerbaijan. On the other hand, desperate, but ultimately unpromising attempts to keep Azerbaijani Karabakh under its control make Armenia disrespected in the international arena and force it to literally "sell" its independence to certain global centres. This well explains Armenia's recent attempts to "get away" from Russia to the West and shows Russia how unreliable and, in fact, corrupt its "Transcaucasian ally", the security of which Moscow continues to guard so strongly, is.