24 April 2024

Wednesday, 20:38

LEAVING WITH NUCLEAR FLAVOUR

Geopolitical struggle destroys Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate and Short Range Missiles

Author:

15.11.2018

Nuclear issues have been the main topic of geopolitical agenda of Washington and Moscow for nearly a month following the statement of President Donald Trump about his intention to withdraw the US from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) signed in December 1987 by the US President Ronald Reagan and the USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Trump said that the Russians had been violating the provisions of the treaty for many years. Yet it is not clear why the former President Barack Obama did not negotiate or withdraw from this treaty. Apparently, the US is going to develop such weapons until Russia, China and other countries make obeisance.

In fact, the two most powerful nuclear powers of the world have followed a thorny path before signing the INF Treaty. The fundamental disagreement between the two states was Moscow’s desire to consider the elimination of medium-range missiles (MRM) of the US and the USSR in Europe and a large-scale reduction of strategic nuclear forces, as well as the refusal of Americans to abandon the anti-missile program Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). But after the Reykjavik meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1986, Moscow agreed to discuss the problem without SDI, followed by the signing of the INF Treaty, which became effective in June 1988. After the collapse of the USSR, the agreement became multilateral and included the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

According to the treaty, which was the first document in history on the elimination of a multitude of weapons, the signatories agreed to eliminate all ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles of intermediate (1,000-5,500 km) and short (500-1,000 km) range. The terms of the INF Treaty have been fully met already by June 1991. The agreement also obliged the signatories not to produce or test new INF missiles. Moreover, the treaty is based on indefinite term, but with the right of the parties to terminate it, and permits the conduct of research work that does not lead to the production and conduct of flight tests of prohibited systems. Notice of withdrawal from the treaty shall be made within six months, should there be a convincing evidence that such a step is necessary. Therefore, Donald Trump instructed the relevant bodies to prepare a report for the Congress on the INF Treaty, which will reflect a possible response to the “violations” of the treaty by Russia.

In July 2014, the then American president Barack Obama sent a letter to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, which accused the Kremlin of the violation of the INF Treaty. Washington stated that in 2008–2010, Moscow conducted tests of a ground-based cruise missile with a range of more than 500 km. But the Russian side, arguing that the range of the said missile was less than 500 km, delivered the US information about the 9M729 missile tests and accused Washington of violating the terms of the INF Treaty. For example, Moscow believes that the technical characteristics of the unmanned aerial attack vehicles with a range of over 500 km, which have been produced and used by the US for quite a while, comply with the definition of land-based cruise missiles.

Incidentally, Moscow’s allegations of violation of the Treaty’s requirements have a longer history. Back in June 2000, Russian President V. Putin spoke about the possible withdrawal of Russia from the INF Treaty in response to the US announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). In mid-February 2007, a few days after Vladimir Putin’s famous Munich speech, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Y. Baluevsky, declared that Moscow could unilaterally withdraw from the INF Treaty in response to the deployment of elements of the US missile defence system in Eastern European countries. At the same time, he substantiated his position with one of the current arguments of the American side: "Today, many countries are developing and improving medium-range missiles. Russia fulfilled the terms of the INF Treaty and has lost many of these systems." Former Russian Defence Minister S. Ivanov, distinguished by his very tough stance on these issues, at the Governmental Hour held in the State Duma later said that the INF Treaty was a "relic of the Cold War" and a "“mistake", focusing on the fact that Russia could have such missiles "at least because India, Pakistan, Korea, China, Iran and Israel have them. These countries are located close to our borders, and we cannot ignore this fact. Only two countries are not allowed to own these missiles: Russia and the United States. This cannot go forever."

Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov also repeatedly mentioned a possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty, reacting to the prospect of deploying elements of the third missile defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland. In June 2013, Russian President V. Putin at the meeting with representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC) called the decision of the USSR to abandon medium-range missiles "at least controversial" and said that the Russian Federation could leave the INF Treaty. In October 2017, at the Valdai Forum, Putin stated that if the United States attempted to withdraw from this agreement, "the Russians would answer instantly with a mirror image."

Thus, the positions of Washington and Moscow regarding the countries not bound by this treaty and quietly increasing their own arsenal coincided. At the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly in October 2007, both countries put forward an initiative to expand the coverage of the INF Treaty but could not get support. If earlier Russia was increasingly exploiting this problem, voicing the possibility of leaving the INF Treaty, now it changed roles with the US, which uses the same rhetoric as one of its main arguments to leave the treaty. However, the chronology of the events of recent years shows that in fact this moment is only a pretext for the US and Donald Trump personally in the context of achieving more strategic goals in the geopolitical confrontation with Russia.

First, in mid-June 2002, Washington unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty, signed in 1972 between the USSR and the USA. The situation became even worse after the well-known statement of V. Putin at the International Munich Security Conference in February 2007, when he spoke out against the unipolar world under the auspices of the United States. The August 2008 war in Georgia exacerbated the situation. Washington initiated active efforts to deploy missile defence systems in some Eastern European countries (first in the Czech Republic, and then in Poland and Romania). This was followed by statements about a possible leave of the INF Treaty.

Secondly, the rigid position of Moscow in the Syrian issue, as well as the Ukrainian events could be a catalyst for the passions around the INF Treaty. Why was it necessary to wait at least three years instead of a quick response then? Maybe Washington was waiting for the appropriate moment to bargain its awareness, announcing its intention amidst the events taking place in Syria and Ukraine? Perhaps, they consider the issue of withdrawal from the INF Treaty an appropriate theme for exploitation.

Thirdly, Russia’s demonstration of its military and technical potential in 2018 including the unique types of weapons could well be a reason that made the United States and its allies to attempt to catch up, particularly through the withdrawal from the treaty, which has long been chilling their actions.

Donald Trump also pursued certain personal goals, which can be considered a supplement to the national interests of the United States.

First, as promised during the election campaign, he once again demonstrates his greater rigidity towards Russia than his predecessor Barack Obama. By the way, by "misunderstanding" Obama's reluctance to leave the treaty, Trump implies that he is going to prove his more pragmatic and decisive stance as a politician, unlike the Democrats.

Secondly, Trump is trying to convey to the American public a message that he is not a protégé of Moscow and won the presidential election in a fair fight, without any external interference.

Thirdly, withdrawal from the INF Treaty fully corresponds to his political course, within which he is committed to denounce all agreements that currently do not correspond to the American national interests. Incidentally, his commitment can play in his hands during the next presidential elections, in which he has already expressed a desire to participate.

Fourthly, Trump's statement about leaving the INF Treaty was made just before the mid-term elections to the US Congress, which theoretically was to provide support to voters of his party members.

Fifthly, the exit from the INF Treaty will result in serious state orders in the military-industrial complex, which will help create new jobs, which Donald Trump promised to American voters.

Sixthly, the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty will naturally cause reciprocal steps from Moscow, which, in turn, actualises the problem of the 'Russian threat' for Europeans.

It turns out that in this scenario, Europe has no choice but to agree to the deployment of the INF on its territory.

By the way, in this whole puzzle, it is Europe that turns out to be in the most unenviable position, which again can turn into a testing ground for a potential nuclear collision, as warned by Russian President V. Putin: "If European countries accept weapons, they should understand that they will put their own territory under a threat of a possible retaliatory strike."

Apparently, Paris and Berlin were the two capitals where the danger was best seen. French President Emmanuel Macron said that the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty would endanger the security of Europe. German Foreign Minister H. Maas, commenting on Trump’s statement, noted that the US intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty is regrettable and the German authorities will try to convince Washington to think about the possible consequences of this step.

But D. Trump is unlikely to listen to the opinions of Paris and Berlin, which have long been annoying him with attempts to be independent and flirt with Moscow behind-the-scenes. On the contrary, in order to break their timid "courage", Washington will cooperate with some countries of Eastern Europe, which are very willing to agree to almost all US proposals before the "Russian threat". In addition, the British Secretary of Defence G. Williamson immediately supported the decision of D. Trump to withdraw from the INF Treaty. NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg, in turn, also supported the US position, placing the responsibility for this on Moscow. Although he noted that, despite the actions of Moscow, NATO is not going to increase the arsenal of nuclear weapons in Europe, which is hard to believe. Because, most likely, the will of Washington dictates a different reality.

Surprisingly, the discontent of Russia, where the majority of experts and representatives of the political elite (especially during the 2000s) used to reiterate the incompliance of the INF Treaty with the Russian national interests, looks paradoxical. Mainly because the treaty extended only to missiles and ground-based installations, which is why the USSR had to sacrifice more than the Americans, who for the most part had such sea-based weapons and retained their leading position thereafter. In addition, according to the majority of generals, M. Gorbachev was playing up to the Americans so much so that he let even the unique newest missiles that did not fall under the terms of the INF Treaty be eliminated. Then what is the reason for such concern about Washington’s intention to withdraw from the Treaty? Perhaps it is due to two important reasons.

First, by deploying INFs in Europe, the US may get closer to Russian borders, which would reduce the potential of the Russian nuclear deterrent forces to zero due to an acute shortage of time required for retaliatory missile strikes. At the same time, Russia can reach the US mainly through the New START Treaty, which Washington intends to preserve for the time being. This agreement expires in February 2021, and it allows the US to carry out total control by inspectors of the current state of the Russian nuclear triad.

Secondly, most likely Moscow fears being drawn into another arms race, which will be unbearable for Russia given the current state of the national economy. According to many venerable economists, the main reason for the collapse of the USSR was the insane arms race, which turned out to be too heavy for its economic potential. But there is another threat: a loss in the geopolitical struggle. Perhaps that is why the countries have to confront each other for their ultimate survival, even if this confrontation has a nuclear flavour.



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