29 March 2024

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ANOTHER FUTURE

War for Karabakh: collapse of negotiations, or a new military-political reality

Author:

15.10.2020

Military actions of this magnitude have not been observed in Nagorno Karabakh since 1994, when the conflicting parties reached an agreement on a ceasefire. The main reasons for the tension were the continuing provocations of Armenian troops against Azerbaijan and the lack of progress in the 25-plus-years-old negotiation process.

Unfortunately, these endless and fruitless negotiations only contributed to the preservation of the status quo that had developed by the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, the real situation in and around the conflict zone was changing rapidly. The economy of Azerbaijan, largely due to the implementation of large energy and transport projects, developed rapidly, while the economy of Armenia lagged significantly in terms of the level of income. This allowed Baku to significantly increase its defense potential and the level of preparedness of the Azerbaijani army. Armenian side continued to ignore the four resolutions of the UN Security Council, which demanded the unconditional liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories by the Armenian Armed Forces and created conditions for the development of the peace process.

In contrast to unsuccessful negotiations, the situation worsened every year both in the military and political spheres. The first serious aggravation occurred in April 2016, when the Azerbaijani army, in response to yet another provocation of the Armenian side, launched a counteroffensive on the front line and recaptured 2,000 hectares of its territory.

The negotiation process resumed primarily due to the unwillingness of the Armenian side to change the current state of affairs. But this did not bring any results either. At the same time, active preparations were made for war. The Armenian side, in view of the difficult internal political situation, has repeatedly attempted to provoke Azerbaijan on the border and front lines in order to divert the attention of Armenian public from internal problems.

By the end of September, the situation had escalated to the limit. On September 27, after another shelling of its positions, the Azerbaijani side launched a counterattack. Full-scale hostilities began.

 

General focus of the negotiation process in recent years

One of the key topics of discussions in recent years has been the return of the regions adjacent to the Nagorno Karabakh region under the control of Azerbaijan. Contrary to international law, Armenia considers these territories as "liberated territories". According to the logic of Armenians, the transfer of the “liberated territories” is possible only for a certain payment - the independence of Nagorno Karabakh. Although no one in the world, except Armenia, disputes the ownership of these territorial by Azerbaijan.

Remarkably, even the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group do not question the identity of the lands surrounding the perimeter of Nagorno Karabakh. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at a press conference in Moscow in December 2017 that there are a number of decisions on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, primarily UN Security Council resolutions, which demand the liberation of the occupied territories.

Later, in 2018, the US Ambassador Richard Mills expressed his bewilderment to the Armenian media about the attitude of Yerevan towards the return of the occupied territories to Azerbaijan. “When I first came to Armenia, I was surprised that most of the Armenians I met with were categorically against the return of the occupied territories within the framework of the negotiation process. I am surprised that there are practically no discussions in Armenia about acceptable solutions or possible compromises. For many years, my government believed that these territories were taken for further use under the formula "territories in exchange for peace." I was very surprised to learn that there is no support for this option,” Mills said.

Basic international legal documents should define the framework of the negotiation process and play a decisive role in shaping its agenda.

It was these approaches that formed the basis of the negotiation process after 2016. At the meetings held in 2016 in Vienna and St. Petersburg, the parties discussed specific topics. Apparently, Baku and Yerevan have even reached preliminary agreements.

 

The truth comes out

In early 2020, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan shed some light on the discussions that were held between Azerbaijan and Armenia at that time. He revealed some details that could be on the agenda of the negotiation process.

Speaking on January 25, 2020 this year at a press conference in the city of Kafan, Armenia, Pashinyan said that a document that he received from the Sargsyan government is on the negotiations table on the Karabakh settlement.

According to the document, the text of which was leaked to the press, the ultimate goal of a comprehensive settlement of the Karabakh conflict is to transfer to Azerbaijan seven regions - Aghdam, Fuzuli, Jabrail, Zangilan, Gubadly, Kalbajar and Lachin, provided that the status of the corridor between Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh region is agreed once the Azerbaijani settlers return to Nagorno Karabakh.

Azerbaijan was offered to unblock the communication routes leading to Armenia, agree to an intermediate status of two regions outside the territory of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (Kalbajar and Lachin) and agree on the date of the referendum in Nagorno Karabakh to determine its future fate. At the same time, at the stage of liberation of five regions in the conflict zone, peacekeeping forces should be deployed, the status of which should be agreed upon in advance.

All these measures have to be realized before the final agreement on the political and legal status of the region through the free expression of the will of Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Nagorno Karabakh. Moreover, defending its vision of the referendum, the Azerbaijani side stated that the referendum could not challenge the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. At the same time, it should be the referendum that determines the nature of the status of the region and the specifics of interaction between the two communities on equal basis.

At the same time, the conditions and date of the referendum must be determined by a special political act. It should also be agreed between the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno Karabakh in the context of their coexistence within the framework of the temporary status of the region.

The fact that Pashinyan confirmed the existence of such a document shows that the parties were close to come to an agreement on a phased settlement plan, which Azerbaijan has always insisted on and which the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs treated with understanding. But, unfortunately, Yerevan was unable to overcome its own fears associated with the implementation of phased actions to deescalate the conflict. Thus, the Armenian side returned to the idea of simultaneous implementation of the entire plan as a whole (the so-called package agreement).

Such conditions are unacceptable for Azerbaijan. They imply the transfer of the occupied regions around the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region to the Azerbaijani side simultaneously with the granting of independence to Nagorno Karabakh, with the uncertain future of Azerbaijani refugees who were forced to leave the areas located between Armenia and the territory of the former NKAO.

The return of five districts on these terms could become a de facto consent to the loss of sovereignty over the rest of the occupied territories, including the districts of Lachin and Kalbajar, which, according to the package plan, should be assigned a special status.

 

Yerevan impedes the negotiation process

Over time, it became obvious that for Yerevan any progress in the negotiations could mean the loss of control over the occupied territories without a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh problem in favour of Armenia.

In July 2020, after the aggravation of the situation on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border in the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov actually accused Yerevan of provoking tensions. He noted that Armenia tried to "revive the old border checkpoint located 15 km from the Azerbaijani export pipelines."

By the way, Russian representatives were actively preparing a platform for negotiations and hoped that at the next meeting of ministers, approximately in early autumn, an agreement would be reached on the continuation of substantive negotiations. However, the practical steps of the Armenian side have shown that Armenia is not going to achieve real results and intends to delay this process in every possible way.

Just before the September battles, media reported that after coming to power, Pashinyan was interested in reaching an agreement with Azerbaijan and suggested that President Aliyev organize bilateral negotiations.

Azerbaijan hoped that the new leadership of Armenia, not related to the "Karabakh clan" and not participating in the seizure of Azerbaijani lands, would take a more constructive position than the previous leaders of Armenia. However, this did not happen. N. Pashinyan used the time and the negotiation process to strengthen his positions, as well as to strengthen his own political influence in Nagorno Karabakh.

Over the past weeks and months, Baku has officially made it clear to the Armenian leadership that it has lost confidence both in it and in the negotiation process as a whole. The turning point in the position of Baku was Pashinyan’s statement "Karabakh is Armenia, period" in Nagorno Karabakh in September 2019. Subsequently, a challenge for Azerbaijan was the inauguration ceremony of the so-called president of the separatist regime in the city of Shusha, which is the political and cultural center of the Azerbaijani population of the region.

 

Military and political denouement

On the morning of September 27, in response to the shelling of Azerbaijani positions by the Armenian Armed Forces, Azerbaijan began large-scale actions along the entire front line in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone, thereby resuming full-scale counteroffensive for the liberation of the occupied territories.

The negotiation process was completely suspended. In the context of the offensive actions of Azerbaijani troops and the recapture of territories under the control of Armenia more than 26 years ago, negotiations with Yerevan on the return of the occupied territories are losing their practical significance. It also makes no sense to negotiate with the Pashinyan government, who showed that he is an unreliable negotiator and is not responsible for his words and actions.

Pashinyan also actually framed up the OSCE Minsk Group, which hoped that with the implementation of the peaceful scenario, the war would be avoided. The leadership of Armenia made it clear that it did not accept any plans that provide for the return of lands to Azerbaijan. The only thing that Yerevan is counting on in the negotiation process is the partial return of the occupied territories (excluding the Lachin region and, possibly, Kalbajar), provided that Azerbaijan recognizes the independence of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno Karabakh.

At present, Baku is concentrating its efforts on liberating all occupied lands, including Nagorno Karabakh itself.

Military actions create a new military-political situation in the region. It is obvious that the settlement process will have a different future. At the same time, it can be predicted that as the military situation changes, Azerbaijan will toughen its demands on Armenia. According to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenia must leave the occupied territories, withdraw its troops, and provide the Azerbaijani side with a schedule for withdrawing its forces. The Armenian authorities must recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and apologize for the aggression against our country.

There is no doubt that Yerevan, in conditions of constantly growing material costs and loss of image, will be forced to make concessions. Nikol Pashinyan's government is demoralized and faces growing discontent in Armenia. It is not excluded that in the near future, Armenia will again face internal political unrest. In this case, the responsibility for the future of Armenia will be borne by another political leadership.



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