24 April 2024

Wednesday, 13:31

ISOLATION OF TURKEY FAILED

Athens’s plan fails, while Cairo and Tel Aviv send warm messages to Ankara

Author:

15.03.2021

The long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece over the territorial waters of the Eastern Mediterranean is entering a new phase. Over the past two years, the course of processes against Turkey has unexpectedly changed. Especially after Cairo took certain steps to normalize relations with Ankara.

 

It all started with...

At various times, oil and gas fields have been discovered in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. According to the US Geological Survey, the volume of hydrocarbon deposits in the Levant region off the Syrian coast is estimated at 3.5 trillion cubic meters of gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil. And in the Nile Delta (Egypt), there are 1.8 billion barrels of oil and 6.3 trillion cubic meters of gas.

In addition, two natural gas reserves with 3.5 trillion cubic meters have been discovered in the Herodotus Basin near the Crete Island. In total, oil reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean are estimated at 30 billion barrels.

However, the development of such large volumes of natural resources is facing serious obstacles due to tensions between the countries of the region, including the long-standing disagreements and conflict over Cyprus between Turkey and Greece. Tensions between Ankara and Athens gradually affected their relations with other countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, which still cannot reach a common decision on the exploitation and distribution of the region's energy resources. In particular, the prevailing political tensions hinder mutual understanding between the regional states.

There are several countries around the Mediterranean Sea, including Libya, Egypt, Israel (with Palestine), Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, divided into South and North. This list also includes the territories and zones of influence in an indivisible or disputed parts of the maritime area of Turkey, Greece and the island of Cyprus.

 

Two poles or a course of approach

Discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean has further exacerbated the cooled relations between Turkey and Greece over coastal areas. As a result, we have two opposing regional fronts. The Greeks were the first to get involved when the government of Southern Cyprus signed agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010) on the delimitation of maritime borders. Turkey did not recognize these agreements, claiming that they did not take into account the position of Northern Cyprus.

The situation is further complicated since Turkey has problems with many coastal countries of the region. Relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv deteriorated sharply after the Israeli army attacked the Mavi Marmara vessel in 2010, as well as several accompanying ships carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza across the Mediterranean. As a result, both countries recalled their ambassadors.

The situation further deteriorated between Ankara and Damascus following the outbreak of the conflict in Syria. Finally, relations between Ankara and Cairo worsened sharply after the military coup in Egypt in 2013. Both countries have recalled their ambassadors, while the competition between them is observed on almost all platforms.

Egypt, along with Turkey, is the country with the longest coastline border in the Eastern Mediterranean. Taking advantage of the cooling relations between Egypt and Turkey, Greece, like Israel, wanted to get closer to Egypt.

Remarkably, Turkey reacted to the ongoing events only on November 27, 2019, when Ankara signed an agreement on the demarcation of maritime zones and cooperation with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). The agreement has hindered Greek-Egyptian energy cooperation in the Mediterranean. However, the change of situation in Libya last year, the establishment of control over the military-political processes in the country by the United States and the announcement of ceasefire actually jeopardized the implementation of the November 27 agreement.

But now Egypt has made an unexpected positive gesture towards Turkey. Thus, in a tender for the production of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cairo defined its borders to the eastern part of the 28th meridian. In other words, Cairo, unlike Greece, took into account Turkey's territorial claims.

In response to this step, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu spoke positively about Egypt and the possibility of restoring interstate ties. It is noteworthy that Egypt has previously not agreed to consider the island of Meis as the starting point of the maritime border between the two states, although Greece insisted on this. This is despite the agreement signed between Cairo and Athens on August 6, 2020 on the demarcation of borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. This clearly prevented Greece's plans to include the islands in its own coastal waters. Recently, the Egyptian president even announced his government's readiness to begin negotiations with Turkey on the demarcation of maritime zones.

Eventually, Cairo’s latest move caused serious concern in Greece. Thus, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had a telephone conversation with the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias traveled to Cairo to discuss "energy cooperation between the two countries and processes in the Eastern Mediterranean" with his Egyptian counterpart Samih Shukri. It is clear that Athens is trying to preserve the terms of the agreement reached with Egypt in August 2020, or not to lose its ally in the Mediterranean.

Greece has partially achieved this. After the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Cairo, the Egyptian government made some changes on the map, hence taking into account the position of Athens.

 

Important reasons

But now it won't be so easy to do this. For Egypt, despite its cold relations with Turkey, is more inclined to seek common ground with Ankara. There are several important reasons for this.

The first one is related to the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the distribution of energy resources in the region. In Egypt, many believe that it would be much more profitable for Cairo to sign a similar agreement with Turkey than with Greece and southern Cyprus. In other words, it is economic, political and state interests that push Egypt to improve relations with Turkey.

The second reason is related to regional political interests of both countries. Turkey and Egypt are two powerful states of the region, and cold relations between them harm the interests of both.

The third reason is the reconciliation of Egypt and its allies (Saudi Arabia and UAE) with Qatar. Undoubtedly, the agreement with Qatar paves the way for reconciliation with Turkey, and Egypt wants to seize this opportunity.

At the same time, there are three main reasons that prevent the improvement of relations between Egypt and Turkey. First, there is a political crisis between the two countries. The 2013 military coup in Egypt resonated most tangibly in Turkey. Ankara strongly condemned the incident, calling it a crime against humanity. This rhetoric continued and subsequently resulted in a mutual recall of ambassadors between the two countries.

Egypt demands Ankara to change its rhetoric, as well as to stop activities against Egypt on regional and international platforms. In this sense, we can observe that mutual positions of both countries are softening. For example, criticism of the Egyptian government has noticeably weakened in Turkey, while the special services of both countries have held secret negotiations in the past two years. Last year, the foreign ministers of Turkey and Egypt met at the conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Turkey has also cancelled its veto on Egypt's participation in the NATO conventions.

Egypt's second claim to Turkey is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. After the military coup in 2013, some active members of the organization left Egypt and settled in neighbouring countries, including Turkey. Cairo demands to limit their anti-Egyptian activities in Turkey, which confirms the main topic of discussions between the intelligence services of the two countries – the fate of the immigrant members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The third reason for the disagreement between Turkey and Egypt concerns Libya, or rather the interests of both countries in Libya. The Egyptian government, along with other Arab allies (Saudi Arabia, UAE), supports the Libyan government of the House of Representatives headquartered in the city of Tobruk. Turkey, on the other hand, supports the Islamist Government of National Accord in Tripoli. If Egypt and Turkey find a common language on Libya, this will also become a pretext for reconciliation between the two countries.

It seems that the current political situation in the region brings the positions of Egypt and Turkey closer together. In recent months, despite Greece's attempts to involve Israel in the anti-Turkish alliance, Tel Aviv made certain gestures addressed to Ankara.

Obviously, it is the national interests that define the actions of each state. In this context, the two powerful states of the region – Israel and Egypt – unlike Greece, view the distribution of Mediterranean resources in the context of national and regional interests, not in terms of ideological enmity. Everyone understands that a sharp confrontation within such a regional project cannot be beneficial. On the other hand, enmity with Turkey, one of the most influential states in the region, in the distribution of marine energy resources will only do harm. In this sense, Greece, whose current policy is justified only in terms of ideological and historical competition with Turkey instead of economic and energy interests, is likely to remain alone in this process.



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