RECONCILIATION AS A NECESSITY

The incidents that occurred in the Turkish province of Kayseri, which were subsequently reflected in numerous cities throughout the country and then disseminated to northern Syria, constitute a provocation against the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation process that has accelerated in recent months.

What Prompted the Incidents?

On June 30, an individual of Syrian ethnicity raped a minor in Kayseri. The incident rapidly intensified, resulting in civil unrest, attacks on Syrian refugees, shoplifting, and vandalism.

It is important to note that this is not the first instance of large-scale riots with a migration context in Türkiye. In response, Syrian individuals initiated attacks on Turkish truckers and lorries traversing Syrian territory. In addition, vehicles transporting Turkish goods to Syria were targeted, and Turkish flags were burned. Furthermore, attacks were launched against postal facilities and military installations. In response to the unrest, the Turkish authorities were compelled to close border checkpoints. Following the detention of approximately 500 individuals involved in the unrest, the situation was brought under control.

Tensions between Turkish nationals and Syrian refugees residing in Türkiye have been a recurring phenomenon. Additionally, protests against Türkiye have been observed in northern Syria, particularly in Idlib province, which is under the control of Syrian opposition forces. Nevertheless, the swiftness with which public indignation disseminated, particularly within Syria, and the timing of the incident on the eve of the scheduled meeting between the Syrian and Turkish heads of state, indicate that this was a deliberate provocation, designed primarily to impede the process of rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

Slow Peace Progress

The restoration of relations between Türkiye and Syria commenced several years ago, with the process progressing at a gradual pace. Russia serves as a mediator between the parties. In the preceding year, Iraq had also become involved in the process. The Iraqi capital of Baghdad is now regarded as an appropriate venue for meetings and negotiations between the Turkish and Syrian governments.

The preliminary outcomes of the Syrian-Turkish rapprochement were discernible two years ago. In 2022, the defence ministers and intelligence chiefs of both states convened in Moscow initially, followed by the foreign ministers a few months later. Subsequently, however, the pace of work in this regard decelerated, but it accelerated once more this spring following Baghdad's designation as the venue for official deliberations.

In June and July, the presidents of Türkiye and Syria confirmed the possibility of a meeting at the level of heads of state. At the NATO summit held in the United States, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that preparations for reconciliation with Syria were underway in Ankara. Additionally, he stated that he had extended an invitation to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to meet in Türkiye or on the territory of a third country, emphasizing that this process requires substantial support.

The Need For Reconciliation

Both the Turkish and Syrian governments are interested in pursuing a process of reconciliation. There are, in fact, several reasons for this. From the perspective of the Syrian government in Damascus, the presence of a Turkish military contingent on Syrian territory remains a pressing issue. At the time of writing, approximately 10% of the territory in the north of the country is under the control of the Turkish army. The rationale behind this is the series of military operations that the Turks conducted in 2016 (Euphrates Shield), 2018 (Olive Branch) and 2019 (Spring of Peace) as part of the fight against ISIS and PYD/YPG terrorist organisations operating in Syria.

As you are aware, the Sochi Agreement of 2017 assigned Türkiye the responsibility of controlling the Syrian opposition in Idlib. In order to achieve complete sovereignty over the entirety of the country's territory, it is imperative that the Syrian authorities establish a common understanding with Türkiye.

A second significant challenge to the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) arises from the presence of Kurdish groups in the northeast of the country. This constitutes more than one-fifth of the territory of the Arab state, which is administered by the self-proclaimed "Kurdish autonomy" of the Syrian Democratic Forces, created by the PYD/YPG.

The Syrian capital of Damascus does not exercise effective control over this autonomous Kurdish entity, which is supported by Western countries. Furthermore, the potential for the emergence of an additional Kurdish autonomy in Syria, as occurred thirty years ago in Iraq, cannot be discounted, given that it is not a scenario that would be viewed favourably by the Assad government.

Ultimately, from a political standpoint, reconciliation with Türkiye would represent a significant stride for Bashar al-Assad in terms of legitimising his political authority and resolving the broader conflict.

From the perspective of the Turkish government, the pursuit of reconciliation with Syria is a matter of political necessity. This is due to a number of factors, including the presence of a significant refugee population (3.7 million), the unresolved conflict in northern Syria, and the ongoing Kurdish issue. It is evident that collaboration between Ankara and Damascus is vital for the repatriation of refugees.

The prospect of Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria is a source of concern for both Ankara and Damascus. Türkiye views the region as a haven for the Syrian wing of the recognised terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and a potential threat to its own security, despite Western support for the Kurdish entity. Furthermore, the eradication of the vestiges of "autonomy" along the banks of the Euphrates necessitates collaboration with Damascus.

In light of the political significance of reconciliation, both parties are pursuing active measures in this regard. To illustrate, the Syrian government, which previously demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish army from its territory, no longer imposes this condition, leaving it open for discussion.

Conversely, Türkiye is no longer insisting on a political solution to the conflict in exchange for the withdrawal of its own army from Syria and the inclusion of the Syrian opposition in the negotiation process. Furthermore, the Turkish government has not prioritised the issue of the return of refugees.

In other words, those in opposition have indicated their willingness to engage in discussions pertaining to contentious matters at the negotiating table. It is widely acknowledged that a solution to the Kurdish question in northern Syria, the restoration of the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic, the return of Syrian refugees to their homes and the resolution of other vital issues can only be achieved through negotiations.

Moscow-Baghdad Axis, Without Tehran

It is notable that Moscow is attempting to facilitate a peace agreement between Ankara and Damascus without the involvement of Tehran, despite the fact that it has been engaged in seven years of cooperation with Tehran. While Turkish and Syrian officials previously engaged in discussions in Moscow, such meetings have recently been held in Baghdad.

In light of the intensifying confrontation with the West, Moscow is endeavouring to align Türkiye with its position and assume control over the course of reconciliation in Syria. The Kremlin's efforts to exclude Tehran from the process can be attributed to a desire to prevent Iran from imposing its own terms, as it did during the Sochi process. It is evident that Iran has its own interests in Syria, the safeguarding of which could potentially impact the prospects of reconciliation. However, it seems unlikely that Moscow will succeed in preventing Tehran from becoming involved in the situation. Indeed, in recent months, it has been preoccupied with addressing domestic political concerns. Furthermore, the intensified pressure from the United States and Israel in Syria has compelled Iran to adopt a more cautious approach. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that Tehran will become more active in Syria in the near future, due to the same circumstances.

The Syrian opposition continues to represent a significant impediment to the prospect of reconciliation. It is reasonable to posit that opposition groups are interested in undermining this process, given that they control the northern part of Aleppo and Idlib province. Furthermore, the heightened tensions in northern Syria subsequent to the developments in Kayseri also serve to illustrate this. Furthermore, the armed strength of these groups serves to exacerbate the already volatile situation. The initial indication of this was the assault on Turkish military personnel on 2 July. It is therefore inevitable that an armed conflict will emerge in northern Syria unless the Turkish government is able to offer an alternative that will satisfy the opposition groups.

Consequently, the reliance on Türkiye and the existence of Syria and Iran as inherent rivals diminish the potential for resistance by the Syrian opposition. It seems likely that Ankara will seek to secure certain rights for it during the course of the negotiations. Nevertheless, it will remain essential to engage in negotiations with Damascus in order to advance the resolution of the impasse in northern Syria.

It is evident that negotiations conducted under the auspices of Moscow are not aligned with the interests of the United States. In July, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State publicly declared that the White House was not backing the negotiations between Damascus and Ankara. In other words, the continuation of the current trajectory also implies continued support by Washington for the Syrian Kurds.

The war in the Gaza Strip, which commenced on 7 October of the previous year, has also attracted considerable attention with regard to developments in Syria. The elevated risk of a comprehensive military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah in recent months has prompted a heightened level of activity on the part of the United States in the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR). Photographic evidence circulated last month appeared to indicate an increase in the size of the US contingent in Syria. The deployment of concrete barriers along the Syrian-Iraqi border is intended to impede the inflow of Iranian military supplies into Syria, which in turn are utilized to arm Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is anticipated that the United States will not be withdrawing from Syria; rather, it is expected that the country will become a more prominent military and political presence in the region in the coming period. Given that the United States' principal allies in Syria are the Kurds, it is understandable that the situation is a cause for serious concern in Ankara.

Therefore, the intricate situation in Syria persists, particularly in the northern region, where developments are entering a new phase. The discussions between Ankara and Damascus on the de-escalation of tensions are laying the groundwork for the establishment of peace and stability in northern Syria. Furthermore, it is presumed that the majority of refugees will return to Syria without any prior stipulations, and that Türkiye will engage in anti-terrorist operations against the PYD/YPG.