Author: NURANI
The fate of the OSCE Minsk Group is once again being discussed in the South Caucasus, particularly regarding Armenia's attempts to resurrect this repeatedly unsuccessful entity. Recently, the Armenian Foreign Ministry commented on the future of the OSCE Minsk Group, stating: "The Armenian side may consider continuing the Minsk process in the context of a comprehensive settlement of relations and, above all, the conclusion of a peace treaty."
This situation can undoubtedly be described as finita la comedia! In a brief commentary on the Minsk Group, whether intentionally or not, the Armenian Foreign Ministry revealed several unflattering aspects of Yerevan's official policy.
"The continuation of the war by diplomatic means"
The Minsk Group has not demonstrated significant effectiveness during its more than 25 years of activity, and its co-chairs have been viewed in the region as "diplomatic tourists." This assessment was validated after the 44-day Patriotic War by former American co-chair Richard Hoagland. According to him, "In the State Department, such a position was not regarded as a career move. The post was typically held by a diplomat awaiting a full-fledged ambassadorial position or someone who needed to work until retirement." Hoagland recounted, "We stayed in five-star hotels where we resided in executive floor suites, granting us access to a private dining room and full bar at no extra charge; we dined at the finest restaurants. But honestly, very, very little was accomplished."
The Minsk Group was established in the early 1990s, at the height of the First Garabagh War, as a tool for conflict resolution. However, now that the conflict has been resolved militarily, UN Security Council resolutions have been implemented, and Azerbaijan's territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders has been restored, Baku has repeatedly stated at the highest levels that it is time to turn the page. Consequently, there is simply nothing left for the Minsk Group to do. In this context, the President of Azerbaijan has consistently noted that it is time to dissolve the group. In early June, Ilham Aliyev stated unequivocally: "We have already proposed to the Armenian side that Azerbaijan and Armenia together make an appeal to the OSCE to abolish the Minsk Group. There is no need for it; it is not functioning now. We will not allow it to function de facto. As for de jure, legally it should be abolished, and this will demonstrate how sincere Armenia is."
If Yerevan responds by discussing a willingness to return "to the Minsk process," this clearly indicates that Armenia does not intend to end the conflict. They appear to still harbour hopes for revenge and are already preparing the necessary diplomatic groundwork. The brief comment from the Armenian Foreign Ministry, which could not be voiced despite the government's opinion, essentially nullified all previous statements made by Nikol Pashinyan, where he seemed to express readiness to recognize Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Armenia has not reconciled with its defeat and continues to formulate plans to reoccupy the territory of its neighbouring country.
The statement from the Armenian Foreign Ministry regarding its readiness to negotiate within the framework of the Minsk Group closely resembles an old deceptive scheme that Yerevan has employed more than once: seemingly constructive statements while disregarding genuine negotiation initiatives. This mirrors how the current Armenian Prime Minister behaved during the 44-day war. Ilham Aliyev then expressed his willingness to cease hostilities if Yerevan provided a clear timetable for withdrawing troops from Azerbaijani lands that were captured. Pashinyan did not provide any specific timetable, instead arguing extensively that Armenia was ready for compromises, depending on which ones Azerbaijan would accept. However, he never clarified what Armenia would agree to. Before the war, Pashinyan made a bold statement that a resolution to the Garabagh conflict should satisfy the people of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and "the people of Nagorno-Garabagh." The origin of these "people of Nagorno-Garabagh" is unclear, as they have never existed as a distinct entity. The region's population included both Armenians and Azerbaijanis before the conflict, but the latter were expelled during ethnic cleansing in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
With existing negotiation initiatives (the five principles proposed by Azerbaijan) and a roadmap to remove territorial claims to Garabagh from Armenia's constitution, Armenia suddenly suggests returning to the Minsk Group, knowing that Baku will not agree. This move aims to gain points and prestige, portraying Armenia as constructive while painting Azerbaijan as obstinate.
What lies beneath the Minsk Group?
The statement from the Armenian Foreign Ministry is not just about negotiations within the Minsk Group but also a return to the "Minsk process." Diplomacy is often called "the art of nuance" for a reason. Yerevan hopes to revert to the packages and proposals previously presented by the Minsk Group.
Most plans were based on the principle of "territories in exchange for status." Initially, Armenia would withdraw its troops from five districts surrounding the former NKAO, while the territory of autonomy, including Shusha and Hadrut, remained under Armenian control. Kalbajar and Lachin would also stay under its authority, with their fate decided "sometime later." Consequently, Garabagh would become a second Armenian state, with local occupying "authorities" granted legitimate status and rights to establish foreign relations and create "self-defense forces." There was no mention of withdrawing Armenian armed forces or returning Azerbaijani refugees. Azerbaijan could only station border guards and police without heavy weapons in liberated areas, not an army. This was assumed to be a "temporary arrangement," with later agreements anticipated concerning Garabagh's status. There was no clarity on how long these negotiations would last, risking reoccupation of liberated areas.
Now, by discussing the "Minsk process," Yerevan seems intent on reviving these proposals.
Azerbaijan did not agree to create a second Armenian state on its territory during its most challenging times of occupation and humanitarian crisis. After achieving victory in the Patriotic War, will it now acquiesce? Armenian diplomatic strategists believe Pashinyan's idea of rejuvenating the Minsk Group will inspire countries that delegate their co-chairs, thinking that the United States, France, and Russia will compel Azerbaijan to accept Armenian conditions.
Moscow, Washington D.C., and beyond?
Setting aside whether it is wise to formulate such plans, Azerbaijan did not "bend" during years of occupation and humanitarian crisis, with approximately 1 million citizens as refugees or internally displaced persons. Only a careless observer would not note during negotiations that Azerbaijan must consider war outcomes and acknowledge realities, etc. Moscow has long expressed its disapproval of the Minsk Group, and the reasons are clear—strained relations with both the US and France are key factors. When the Armenian branch of The Voice of America asked the State Department about the Minsk Group, they responded that the US was ready to work with Yerevan and Baku in any format agreed upon by both sides where progress can be made. They support efforts toward achieving a lasting and honourable peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, reading between the lines, this indicated that the US did not endorse Armenia's initiative.
The main issue is that Armenia cannot realize its idea even theoretically without Washington's backing. Yerevan cannot ignore that America considered Baku's position in its reply. It has become evident that despite all flirtations with Armenia—including notions of a "crusader mentality" and ethnic Armenian voting values—Washington is not prepared to ignore Azerbaijan's perspective or undermine its standing within that country.
France, Armenia's 'big sister', remains silent as well. They recognise that Azerbaijan has already sidelined French mediation efforts; any attempts to revive their involvement would likely lead only to further diplomatic humiliation. Thus, it is clear that France does not wish to find itself in such news headlines once again.
What does this imply? That Armenia will ultimately have no choice but to agree to Azerbaijan's terms, considering any "clarifications" that will follow in Baku after yet another attempt at political deception by Yerevan.
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