TARGETING CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia has long been on the radar of major international actors. This is due to the region's exceptional natural wealth and its stability amid the turbulent waters of international politics. Germany is among those seeking friendship with the Central Asian states. 

The official visit of German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz in September to the two largest countries in Central Asia—Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—underscored how important this distant land, located in the heart of Eurasia, is for Germany. It is noteworthy that during his tour, the German chancellor also participated in a summit in the C5+1 format alongside the leaders of five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

Paris and Berlin struggle for Central Asia

It is worth recalling that exactly a year ago, Berlin initiated and hosted the first Central Asia + Germany summit, which defined the priorities for cooperation within this framework. Berlin's interest in collaborating with Central Asian countries is further fuelled by the growing attention from major extra-regional players such as the United States, the European Union, and France. All these nations view the region as a promising platform for expanding their presence, primarily as an important resource base for their economies against the backdrop of sanctions against Russia and increasing trade and economic rivalry with China. 

This situation is particularly relevant for the EU, whose economy is critically dependent on supplies of key commodities from Russia and China, especially rare earth metals. Under certain conditions, Central Asia could serve as the closest source of raw materials for the EU and potentially replace China and Russia to some extent. This shift is already partially occurring; for instance, Kazakhstan provides more than a quarter of the EU's demand for uranium raw materials. The main recipient of this supply is France, whose leader visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in November 2023. 

However, the positions of France and Germany are not comparable here, at least in terms of trade turnover. By the end of 2023, Germany's total trade turnover with Central Asian countries reached $11 billion, nearly twice that of France. The only similarity is that for both Paris and Berlin, Kazakhstan remains the leading economic partner, accounting for over 80 percent of trade turnover with both countries. 

Overall, there is a certain element of competition or even rivalry between these two leading European nations for the title of most important partner of the Central Asian five within the European Union. So far, Berlin appears to be leading this competition, not only because its trade volumes are double those of France but also because it has already institutionalized its relations with Central Asian states and has successfully held two summits. In contrast, French President Emmanuel Macron has adopted a selective approach, favouring relations primarily with the two largest Central Asian states. 

However, everything is relative. After all, fourteen years have passed since a German chancellor last visited Kazakh soil. Chancellor Angela Merkel made two visits to Astana in 2010: once on an official visit and once on a working trip. The last German chancellor to visit Uzbekistan was Gerhard Schroeder back in 2002. 

Among current European leaders, Emmanuel Macron, Mark Rutte, Viktor Orban, and Charles Michel have all visited the region before Scholz. To be fair, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and President Walter Steinmeier also visited Central Asia in 2022 and 2023. 

Berlin between Astana and Tashkent

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the demographic and economic centres of the region and Germany's most significant trading partners in Central Asia; hence, Scholz was accompanied on his trip by a large business delegation. 

Kazakhstan became Germany's third-largest supplier of crude oil after Berlin ceased oil imports from Russia in 2023. Ironically, however, this oil flows through Russia's Druzhba pipeline, providing Moscow with transit fees. During the visit, Berlin and Astana extended their contract for transporting Kazakh oil through this pipeline for another year. Meanwhile, despite proposals from Kazakhstan's side, Germany decided to only slightly expand the supply volumes. 

Overall, trade between Germany and Kazakhstan grew by 41 percent in 2023, and President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed a 64 percent increase in German direct investment. He expressed hope that German companies will broaden their presence and produce goods "in Kazakhstan with German quality." 

In this context, business and government agencies signed 36 agreements and declarations valued at $6.3 billion, covering projects from financing green hydrogen production to developing rare earth metals to joint agricultural machinery production. Kazakhstan's Ministry of Transport signed a $500 million agreement with a Kazakh-German consortium to construct a cargo-passenger airport in Khorgos, a significant logistics hub near the Chinese border. 

It should be noted that in Uzbekistan as well, discussions primarily focused on cooperation in developing critical raw materials and producing green hydrogen. During the second Central Asia plus Germany summit, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon also presented his country’s hydropower potential and aspirations to produce "green" ammonia, copper, and lithium to the German delegation. 

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Zhaparov highlighted the importance of "green" potential and emphasized a regional approach to tackling climate change and drinking water shortages by proposing the establishment of a centre for energy-efficient and resource-saving technologies in Bishkek. Simultaneously, he urged the German Chancellor to forgive his country's debts to finance "green" projects. 

Beyond trade and energy issues, Scholz also discussed migration matters with regional leaders, particularly Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This has been a pressing topic for Germany recently, especially against the backdrop of detentions and expulsions of Syrian and Afghan migrants. 

Notably, the German Chancellor was accompanied on his trip to Uzbekistan by German Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser. Here, both parties signed a memorandum titled "Comprehensive Partnership on Migration and Mobility," which had been under negotiation for about a year and a half. This agreement is part of a broader system of bilateral migration accords wherein partner states commit to accepting back citizens who do not have the right to remain in Germany. Just a few days prior, Berlin signed a similar document with Kenya. 

In Uzbekistan's case, however, the issue is not about Uzbek migrants but rather about Afghans. Although the German government declined to comment on negotiations, initial reports regarding attempts to reach an agreement with Uzbekistan emerged during the summer. Like most countries, Berlin does not recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan and thus rejects any formal cooperation with it. Given that Tashkent has recently developed a stable working relationship with Afghanistan, Berlin has found in it a potential partner for anticipated (possibly large-scale) deportations. In August, Germany deported Afghan citizens for the first time since the Taliban took power with assistance from Qatar. Additional deportation flights are also being planned. 

According to media reports, the signed agreement includes provisions for transferring criminal offenders from Afghanistan via Uzbekistan. The Afghan airline KamAir will operate direct flights to Uzbekistan. In return, Germany offered to ease restrictions for Uzbek citizens wishing to visit the country. 

In theory, this agreement addresses Germany's acute shortage of skilled labour. Sectors such as construction, health care, and IT are mentioned as areas that could benefit from hiring Uzbek workers. However, no figures or programs have been presented so far to illustrate how many Uzbeks could be included under this agreement. Furthermore, there have been no plans disclosed regarding integrating Uzbek workers into the German labour market, which raises questions about whether Berlin genuinely seeks to hire skilled workers or if it is merely using relaxed rules as leverage for readmission.

Central Asia, Afghanistan, then everywhere else

Overall, visa regulations between Europe and Central Asia are highly asymmetric. While most Central Asian countries permit European citizens—including Germans—to travel within their borders for up to 30 days without a visa, their citizens face significant travel restrictions. This disparity has led to considerable discontent among Central Asian nations as they urge the EU to commence negotiations on visa liberalization. This sentiment was reflected in a joint declaration following Scholz’s visit to Kazakhstan, where Germany pledged support for negotiations with Kazakhstan on this topic through the European Commission. Additionally, it was announced that the inaugural meeting of the German-Kazakh working group on readmission would take place in 2025. 

Arrangements with Uzbekistan include regular consultations on international and regional issues such as Afghanistan’s situation and developing a roadmap for training Uzbek specialists in Germany in areas of demand as well as expanding language and teacher training programs across Uzbekistan's regions with Berlin's support. 

As for discussions on other international topics, it appears that Presidents Tokayev and Mirziyoyev avoided sensitive issues publicly as they did not hold joint press conferences after their bilateral meetings with Scholz. 

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s cooperation with Russia and China underscores their preference not to choose between Moscow and the West; they willingly engage with any acceptable partner, especially when it aids them in modernizing their economy and infrastructure. For them, Europe holds importance but remains just one among many partners that include the United States, Türkiye, the Arab East, Japan, and South Korea. 

Significantly, both Presidents Tokayev and Rakhmon called upon the German chancellor to normalize relations with Afghanistan and adopt a more pragmatic stance toward the Taliban-ruled nation. 

From Germany’s perspective, Scholz appeared more inclined to listen to his Central Asian counterparts rather than advocate his own positions. Critics argue that more political performance is necessary to demonstrate that Central Asia is a genuine priority rather than merely an interim stopgap in realizing foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, there will still be opportunities for German leadership to articulate a more defined political stance regarding cooperation with this region soon. Notably, the summit concluded with an announcement about an upcoming civil society conference in Berlin scheduled for November and a meeting of foreign ministers planned for spring 2025. The crucial aspect remains not to overlook these opportunities.