PAX RUSSICA IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS?

-Clearly, the South Caucasus was not at the centre of American foreign policy during President Obama's first term. Should we expect any changes in US policy in the region after Obama's re-election as president and the renewal of his team?

-  I'm not sure I fully share your opinion. The US has shown interest in the South Caucasus, as evidenced by the secretary of state's visits to countries in the region. Along with this there has been a certain reduction in the degree of intensity of this interest. The US is going through a searching process of reviewing its foreign policy and its security policy. This process is essentially being undertaken so that it can become one of the main players. However, even if Washington does not accept this or doesn't want to accept the current economic problems, the US is no longer a super-power in the diplomatic and political sense, although it remains so in the military sphere. At the same time, there are limits to the possibilities of using military force.

This picture hardly comes as a surprise as it was predicted back in the mid-1990s. For your readers who may be interested in this subject I can recommend a book by Zbigniew Brzezinski, published in 1998, "The Grand Chess Board", in which he talks about a window of opportunity for the US as a super-power to re-create the world as it thinks fit.

I attribute the absence of an intensive interest of the first Obama administration in relation to the South Caucasus to the US' failure to maintain the advantage it had for some time after the collapse of the USSR. Even if you are a super-power you cannot wage an unlimited number of wars at one and the same time. The more wars you become involved in the less effective you tend to be.

-  Matthew Bryza, the former co-chairman of the OSCE's Minsk group and former US ambassador to Baku, said that US President Obama will never be as active in a Karabakh settlement as former Russian President Medvedev was. Do you agree with this opinion?

-  Bryza is right, but not because Obama is indifferent to the South Caucasus. As I have already said, it is a question of restructuring in world affairs. Obama was not as active even in the Palestine-Israel question, which is much more important for US foreign policy than the South Caucasus. Washington had to become less active. The US is still looking for an opportunity to further its agenda wherever this is possible and where it has a chance of success. If we look at what is happening in Georgia, the US' closest ally in the South Caucasus, then we can understand the lack of enthusiasm in very many questions of American foreign policy.

-  Incidentally, as far as former president Dmitriy Medvedev's personal involvement in a Karabakh settlement is concerned, Vladimir Putin is clearly not continuing his predecessor's policy in organizing direct contacts between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents. Does this mean that a settlement to the Karabakh question is no longer on the list of Moscow's priorities? What should we expect from Russia's mediation in the next few months?

-  I don't think that the two latest Russian presidents - Medvedev and Putin - have been conducting a policy which one of them didn't share. It is Putin who is the policy conductor. The difference between them is mainly one of style. We can expect much of the same in the next few months. In other words, very few real moves or none at all. That's if we are talking about the short-term aspect. Besides, I would expect at any moment an attempt by Moscow to impose a Pax Russica ("Russian peace"), with or without the help of a resumption of military operations, when it feels that the time for them has come. Unfortunately, the parties to the conflict are moving away from a settlement, and further and further from the best, albeit the most difficult solution - direct talks.

-  What about another, relatively new regional player - the European Union? Can Brussels breathe "new life" into the settlement process?

- The European Union is so occupied with trying to solve problems of its own survival that I cannot imagine how it could contribute to a significant change in the situation in the South Caucasus. France prefers to act single-handedly in Mali, Britain is thinking about withdrawing from the EU and a comedian triumphs in the Italian elections. Nor can one speak about the old harmony in relations between France and Germany, and Germany thinks that it is bearing all the burden of the EU's economic crisis and, consequently, may impose its disastrous policy of a rigid economy on all the rest. Need I carry on? I have to say that at this moment in time the EU is not a convincing player.

-  Finally, I would like to ask your opinion about the prospects for a normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. During his election campaign Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan threatened Ankara that he would annul the Turkish-Armenian protocols if there were no effective steps from the Turkish side. Might the Armenian president really do this and what might the consequences be?

-  The Armenian president could indeed withdraw his signature to the Turkish-Armenian protocols, but there would be no political consequences for him. Sargsyan may talk about withdrawing his signature but is unlikely to do so unless Turkey takes any steps which would leave the Armenian president no alternative.

I don' think that withdrawing his signature would create a situation significantly worse than the one we have now which constitutes a deterioration in the general atmosphere since before these protocols. This doesn't mean that there should be an annulment of the protocols. I personally do not believe that the wording in those protocols was the best that could have been found, diplomatically speaking. Unfortunately, for some reasons the parties that signed the protocols and the mediators were too obsessed with searching for simple answers - even if months of negotiations are needed for this - and easy formulae for certain very complex questions which were emotionally, historically and politically extremely sensitive. One might like to believe that in these circumstances this was the best of the possible options of the protocols. I disagree. More favourable conditions should have been created to begin this process. A whole range of old and thorny issues deserves to have another chance. And maybe that chance exists.