TURKISH STREAM

By the end of the year the geopolitical stand-off between Russia and the West, or to be more precise, Russia and the US, will become more intensive and uncompromising. And whereas all year the main arena for this great game has been Ukraine and the emphasis shifted to Asia in the autumn, in December there emerged the "Turkish factor". During Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Turkey it was reported that the South Stream project had been abandoned and Russian-Turkish energy agreements on the construction of a nuclear power station and a new gas pipeline had been signed. The new pipeline from Russian territory, along with the TANAP [Trans-Anatolia Pipeline] and TAP [Trans-Adriatic Pipeline] projects, would turn Turkey into a key link of European energy security with all the ensuing geopolitical advantages. According to the Russians, the first branch of the gas pipeline could be built within two-three years. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is already proposing to call it "Turkish Stream".

So long as there has been mutual understanding, and not inter-action, Moscow and Ankara have been forced to focus on being both allies of these countries and their enemies. Turkey has been reminded that it is still a member of NATO and a candidate for membership of the EU. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has sent a clear signal that he would like as many countries as possible to join in the sanctions against Russia. Ankara has also been visited by EU diplomacy chief Federica Mogherini, two European commissioners - for European neighbourhood policy, Johannes Hahn, and also for humanitarian aid and crisis management, Christos Stylianidis - and British Prime Minister David Cameron. The attention of the Turkish media was also drawn to Resolution 758 of the US House of Representatives, calling on the Barack Obama administration to continue its policy of sanctions against Russia which was seen as all but the start of a "new Cold War". It was noted particularly that in the document the US was essentially proposing that its partners define their preferences and interests.

However, Cameron's visit to Turkey did not have the same repercussions as Putin's. This doesn't mean that Ankara has changed the direction of its foreign policy - on the contrary, it has become more multi-directional. As Turkey's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz stated, Ankara is not facing a choice between Russia and the EU, but is acting out of its own interests. This, incidentally, means not only a desire to own the keys to the pipelines to Europe, but also a desire to increase the exports of its agricultural produce, as well as the desire next summer not to be deprived of solid revenue from Russian tourists. On the other side of the scales lies the long-awaited possibility of becoming a part of the European Union. European officials have started talking about a possible resumption of negotiations on Turkey's membership of the EU in January next year when Latvia is in the chair. Brussels has kept Ankara on tenterhooks for a long time, putting forward demand after demand, but in fact the main reason is the fear that the "Old World" has for a young, ambitious and, what's more, Muslim Turkey. The EU is in a state of financial and systemic crises and is unlikely in the near future to be ready to expand at Ankara's expense, especially without having solved the question of the annexation of Serbia and the possible withdrawal of the United Kingdom. But the European landing force on Ankara, of course, speaks volumes in itself and could be regarded as "gingerbread diplomacy".

The question is: will the whip be applied? Some experts feel it is possible that the sides that have no vested interest in any forms of alliance between Russia and Turkey will apply pressure on the weak aspects of their mutual relations - the different points of view on the Syrian, Cyprus and Ukrainian questions. So, unfortunately, one can expect things to get worse in all these areas. At the same time, Turkey is too close to the frontline of the struggle against Islamic State, and the situation with the refugees on the Syrian border still gives rise to serious fears. And it was with good reason that the EU promised to allocate 70m euros for the upkeep of 1.9m refugees, and Cameron, during his visit, laid special stress on coordinating efforts in the struggle against IS.

Returning to the subject of energy, the Bloomberg agency reports that the EU has contemplated purchasing Israeli natural gas from offshore fields.  In these circumstances, this is a very significant statement, because the field in question is a controversial one. According to various assessments, Lebanon, the Palestinian Autonomy, the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is not recognized by the international community, are interested parties. One payment alone is enough to abandon any investments. Besides, Israel and Cyprus have virtually no gas transportation infrastructure. Among possible alternatives there is even mention of gas supplies to Egypt where there are LNG plants in Alexandria, or the construction of similar plants in Cyprus. But for all this to become a reality, a number of questions have to be settled, including those of a political and military nature, which is scarcely possible in the near future. A weak area when it comes to gas supplies from the Mediterranean will always be security, because this whole zone is literally saturated with territorial, religious and ideological conflicts.

This could be precisely why Bulgaria has again offered its country for the construction of a pipeline from Russia. According to the republic's Prime Minister, Boyko Borisov, if an "energy hub" [with EU money] is built in Varna, gas can then be redistributed from there [under EU control] to other countries. It is not yet clear whether this proposal by Borisov suggests penitence to Brussels or just Sofia. At any rate, some of the western media are saying that Moscow is clearly bluffing in its rejection of South Stream. Indeed, this possibility is also not ruled out, because the Kremlin is making big concessions to Ankara. As far as Russia is concerned, cooperation with Turkey is just one option. Moscow, squeezed by sanctions and the rapidly tumbling rouble, is vigorously seeking a way out of the situation. So Putin, who recently signed a "huge gas agreement" with China, abandoned South Stream with the aid of a promise to create a "Turkish stream", and immediately afterwards set off on a state visit to India where a major contract on oil supplies was signed. What is presented in Russia as the birth of a new "Eurasian Union" could simply be desperate attempts by Moscow to find a solution to this situation.

But the EU, too, fears the time when a country such as Turkey, which cannot be pressurized in the context of the EU, finds itself at the gas distribution lever.

As a matter of fact, Brussels now finds itself in a strange position. Europe has always expressed its dissatisfaction over the fact that Moscow uses energy for its foreign political aims. Now, Ankara, too, could get the opportunity for such influence on the EU. The stand-off between the West and Russia is actively changing the status quo in international relations, as a result of which countries such as Turkey, which have experience of applying a multi-vector policy, are able to champion their own interests and where necessary not be afraid of taking a risk, have a good chance of strengthening their position in the world.