WHEN THE FURIOUS WOMEN RISE

Protests in Iran have not subsided in the past month. However, the scope of the popular outrage is much lower than in the early days of unrest. Before the protests slow down in one city, they suddenly erupt in others, as if guided by a hidden hand. And each region has its own reasons for expressing discontent.

This time, it was the so-called women's issue that triggered the protests in the Islamic Republic, following the death of a twenty-two-year-old Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini. It is known that she had arrived in Tehran from Sakkez, her native city, and that on September 13 she was detained by the Gashte Irshad (Morality Police), who took Amini to a police station on the charge of failing to observe the dress-code. There, Amini's condition suddenly deteriorated and she was taken to hospital, but died three days later.

Triggers among the four nationalities

The incident became viral through rumours in the social media about the brutal beating of Amini by police officers, which caused her death. It initially sparked mass protests in Kurdish regions of the country. The facts of police violence against women and Amini's ethnicity soon widened the scope of actions, leading to violent clashes between protesters and the law enforcement. Shootings with government forces in Kurdish areas of the country claimed the lives of several local residents.

Meanwhile, protests spread to other cities and regions of Iran. It was no longer the Kurdish issue, but the violence against women, in particular the forced dress code obligation, that was the cause of unrest in this case. Protests by Iranian women against the enforced dress code were observed in almost every Irannian city. In Iran itself and abroad, women began taking off their headscarves and cutting their hair in protest. In Turkey, many prominent artists, politicians and media figures followed their example.

On September 23, in response to the protests, Iranian authorities held a demonstration in support of the government. After hardly containing the protest wave in the second week of the unrest, authorities had to deal with another incident that could easily lead to another mass action of protest. This time it was the news about the killing of poetess Hadith Najafi in Karaj by police officers. It is rumoured that she received nine bullet shots. Najafi's death drew a wide response, mostly from the Azerbaijani population of Iran, because of her ethnicity—she was from the city of Meyaneh, East Azerbaijan. Government media tried to deny the incident, but interviews with Najafi’s family members later emerged, raising tensions.

On September 28-29, the arrest of a Mehrnush Tafiyan, a media activist from Ahvaz, the capital of Iran's Khuzestan province predominantly populated by Arabs, contributed to another wave of protests.

Another protest by women took place in the province of Sistan-Baluchistan, another ethnically sensitive region of the country. And on September 30, after the traditional Friday prayers in the provincial city of Zahedan, clashes broke out between the local residents and government troops. The incident is reported to claim the lives of 60 or more than 90 people. The reason for confrontation was again the women's issue. For instance, on the eve of Friday, there was a rumour that the chief of police in Chabahar had raped a 15-year-old Baloch girl. The outraged group of local residents attacked the police station in response, causing the death of a large number of police officers and protesters.

Remarkably, over the past month, the protest mood in Iran has been fuelled by reports of violence against women and their murders. It is even more interesting that the events took place within Iran's most vulnerable ethnic groups. Mahsa Amini's Kurdish background, for example, sparked the first violent protests in Iran's Kurdish regions, later spreading across the country.

In the following days, reports of deaths or violence against women spread across Iran's four ethnically sensitive regions, with a large population of Baloch, Kurds, Arabs and Azerbaijanis. Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini was beaten to death by police, Azerbaijani poet Hadith Najafi was shot dead by police, a Baloch teenager was raped by a police officer in Chabahar, and Mehrnush Tafian was detained by state authorities. Again, this time the first three ethnic groups were more active. The Azerbaijanis were not particularly active, except for a few protests. Although it was the female factor that triggered the unrest among Azerbaijanis, reports of the shooting of Hadith Najafi did not cause the expected violent and widespread national outcry.

Authorities have own position

Since the first day of the protests, the Iranian authorities have consistently claimed an external force behind the unrest. In early October, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, after a protracted public disappearance, attended the graduation ceremony at one of the police schools and made his first comments on the incident. Calling Mahsa Amini's death a sad event, he bluntly accused Israel and the US of fomenting protest in the country. At the same time he supported the law enforcement involved in suppressing the unrest.

According to Iranian media, it was opposition groups abroad and their local supporters that incited people to unrest. The autopsy report of Mahsa Amini indicated that the woman had undergone brain surgery when she was eight years old and was experiencing headaches, which intensified at the time of her arrest and caused her death in the hospital three days after the arrest.

But it seems the indignant crowd of protesters is not willing to accept all these statements and explanations, continuing to shake Iran. The ongoing events is neither a special operation conceived and directed by foreign powers, contrary to what the Iranian authorities have repeatedly claimed, nor actions by disgruntled citizens, as insisted by the Western media. The events in Iran can only be interpreted as anarchist protests supported supported externally.

Every sensitive incident in the country subsequently turns into protests against the authorities. Over the past ten years, similar events have been observed in Iran once or twice a year (and sometimes more). This can be briefly explained by several factors.

Iran has a population of over 80 million people, most of whom are young people. Due to the accelerated rate of urbanisation, especially since the Islamic Revolution, most of the population lives in cities. Since the revolution, sanctions imposed on Iran have significantly weakened the country's economy, considerably decreasing oil and gas exports, while the price of hydrocarbons sold mainly on the black market is below-market rates. Consequently, the country has high unemployment and poverty rates, especially among the younger generation.

Secondly, at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution 43 years ago, Iran had a population of only 37.5 million people and a higher level of religiosity than today. At that time, the leaders of the revolution, using their enormous influence on the population, could impose all sorts of prohibitions and force women to wear headscarves. Now the situation has changed dramatically. The population has more than doubled and the level of religiosity among the younger generation has significantly weakened. Influenced by the propaganda of the Western lifestyle, Iranian youth is now against all sorts of government bans on clothing and headscarves. There are even groups of young people known to be loyal to the monarchical regime of the last Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, who was expelled from the country over forty years ago.

Thus, the Iranian authorities now face the daunting challenge of countering a powerful youth opposition group ready to erupt at any moment. This critical mass can be mobilised at any time, both at home and abroad.

Women have been at the epicentre of recent protests, both as victims and as symbols of these actions. Similar mass demonstrations with social demands were last seen in Iran about four months ago. They too were radical in nature, culminating in armed clashes with government forces. This suggests that the internal and external opposition in Iran is planning armed action against the incumbent regime. And it is likely that the next phase of turmoil could be even more violent.

In addition, the state authorities apparently demonstrate a certain level of weakness confronted with the unrest. It seems that they were indifferent to the actions from the outset and were not prepared to take decisive actions, without clearly coordinating the work of the relevant agencies. As a result, the state authorities were unable to take the necessary measures to prevent the escalation of events. Perhaps this was also influenced by competition between power groups within the government itself.

After the first Kurdish protests, the bombing of Kurdish areas of Iraq by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah) and the counter-attacks by government forces in response to possible risks, it was very clear that the authorities were unprepared for the current situation. On the other hand, it was obviously that the incumbent government expects a serious external threat. Therefore, we can expect a resumption of military and political operations abroad to maintain stability inside Iran.

With regard to the domestic political and economic situation, authorities do not have many options to choose from. Following in the Saudi footsteps, Iran has taken certain measures in recent years to loosen some strict religious bans. Over the past four years, for example, both countries have allowed women to attend sport tournaments in stadiums. But a complete repeal of the headscarf ban does not seem realistic. However, it is likely that the activities of the Morality Police in Iran—amid excessive number of complaints as reported by government officials—will be curtailed to a certain degree, even if the authorities do not abolish the agency altogether.

Tehran realises how important it is to remove the economic embargo and US sanctions from the country in order to somewhat stabilise the domestic socio-economic situation by restoring the notorious nuclear agreement.

Finally, a tried-and-true method of preventing external threats—confrontation with the enemy outside Iran—can be reanimated as well. This means that tensions in the conflict regions of the Middle East can soon increase, with the likelihood of new conflicts in the region. Recall that a few years ago Iranian officials said that if they had not fought against ISIS in Baghdad, they would now have to fight them in Tehran.

In general, recent protests in Iran have demonstrated that there is a strong opposition potential within the Iranian government, ready to reactivate and blow up the country at any moment.