FROZEN DRAMA

The situation around the so-called Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR), a separatist entity in the Republic of Moldova, has become more complicated by the end of 2022. Events are unfolding amid the escalation of struggle between Russia and the West for influence over Chisinau, which is directly related to the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Amendments against separatism

An indicator of escalation was the Moldovan parliament's adoption in first reading of a bill introducing a batch of new articles into the Criminal Code (CC), including Separatism and Conspiracy against Moldova. In parallel, the Moldovan Criminal Code will now define new terms, such as anti-constitutional entity, self-proclaimed power and illegal information structure. From now on "collection or stealing of information that may prejudice the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Moldova" will be subject to criminal punishment.

The aim of these reforms is to curb separatist activities in Transdniestria. In response, the Supreme Council Commission for Foreign Policy and International Relations of TMR sent an appeal to the Moldovan parliament urging not to approve the draft law in its final reading. The same commission also signalled the readiness of TMR to take "possible retaliatory measures" if the amendments to the Moldovan Criminal Code were approved.

Moscow also criticised the initiative of Moldovan MPs. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that the amendments on separatism and anti-constitutional entity "will not add to the mutual understanding of the Moldovan-Transdniestrian negotiation process" because, in Moscow's view, they "erode the basic principle of negotiations between Tiraspol and Chisinau - the principle of equality of the parties".

Russian reaction only confirmed the obvious fact: the event around Moldova are part of a fierce geopolitical confrontation in the European part of the post-Soviet space. It is impossible to consider these events in isolation from Moldova’s foreign policy orientation, as well as from the war in Ukraine, which has become the main arena of conflict between Russia and the West.

Since Maia Sandu assumed the presidency of Moldova, the country has made even more steps toward the EU and the US. Chisinau also confirms its Euro-Atlantic stance by increasing cooperation with the West in the military and technical areas. In 2022, the EU has allocated almost €50m for the armament of Moldova. Moldova is also strengthening cooperation with NATO. Besides the information centre and the bureau for liaison with the alliance operating in Chisinau, military contingents of the NATO member states conduct regular military exercises in Moldova. At the end of November 2022 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova Nicu Popescu joined the meeting of NATO foreign ministers held in Bucharest. In mid-December an international conference Development of NATO Partnership in the Changing Security Environment was held in Chisinau. Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoana said at the event that his organisation "will continue to help Moldova to increase its resilience amid the growing pressure from Russia". Reportedly, Moldova is also modernising its army as part of the Defence Capacity Building Initiative (DCBI). Specific military assistance to Chisinau is provided by the US, the UK, Germany and Romania.

Western support for Moldova's defence capacity both in Chisinau and in Euro-Atlantic capitals is explained by the likelihood of Russian aggression. In parallel, there is a special emphasis on a possible attempt of the Russian army "to break through a land corridor" to Transnistria, meaning through the territory of Ukraine.

Moscow does not confirm such plans but comments on Popescu's recent statements that Moldova needs to strengthen its defence potential by relying on military cooperation with Western countries, in particular Romania, Germany and France. Thus, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said that Chisinau's intensified cooperation with NATO members in the military and technical fields is "a factor that to a greater extent undermines Moldova's own security."  “As experience shows, reckless pumping of a country with Western weapons or the deployment of NATO troops on its territory does not add to its security and sovereignty, but on the contrary brings it closer to disaster,” Galuzin said.

In other words, Moscow made it clear that it would not accept Moldova's rapprochement with the West and was ready to counteract the process. And the key instrument of Russian counteraction is TMR.

At the crossroads

TMR is predominantly located on the left bank of the Nistru River and populated by Russians, Ukrainians and Moldovans. The unrecognised republic was created back in 1990 amid Soviet propaganda about the alleged threat of Romanian invasion. Moldova did not accept the de facto secession of part of its territory, which soon led to hostilities with the direct involvement of the Russian military. The conflict has claimed the lives of over thousand people and ended with the signing of the 1992 Agreement on the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova. Pursuant to this agreement, Russia began to act as a peacekeeper and dispatched its military troops to the region. This period also saw the inception of the still-ongoing 5+2 negotiation format including Moldova and TMR as parties to the conflict, Russia, Ukraine and OSCE as mediators, and the EU and the US as observers.

However, the talks have so far been unsuccessful, especially in terms of the comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Therefore, Transnistria has been virtually outside Chisinau's control for thirty years.

The incumbent President of Moldova Maia Sandu is clearly a pro-Western politician who seeks to weaken, if not completely eliminate, the pro-Russian vector of Chisinau's policy. Moldovan authorities see the very existence of TMR, with Russian troops and a pro-Russian administration in place, as a serious obstacle to country's integration into the European Union. That’s why Sandu has repeatedly made statements about the necessity of withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. In response, the separatist authorities of TMR don't hide their intention to join this unrecognised formation to Russia, eventually with appropriate support from the Russian Federation.

Incidentally, Russia directly points to the escalation around TMR. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has sharply criticised the "unwillingness of the Moldovan authorities to conduct a dialogue with Transnistria", adding that Chisinau "relies on non-diplomatic settlement" of the conflict.

However, there is no practical evidence of this thesis or Chisinau preparing to establish control over Transnistria by force. The main reason is simple: as President Sandu frankly admitted recently, Moldova has no combat-ready army. Apparently, even the Western military assistance  will not change this situation, at least in the short term. In general, the Moldovan society supports exclusively peaceful reintegration of Transnistria. There is no reason to believe that the current Moldovan leadership has a different agenda.

Finally, there is another important point that keeps Moldova from the military escalation—energy dependence on Russia. Although President Sandu is trying to diversify gas purchases, Russian Gazprom remains Moldova's key supplier of natural gas.

However, all these factors do not mean that Chisinau is not willing to restore its territorial integrity. If it advocates a purely peaceful path of reintegration and does not express an intention to liberate its lands by force, it does not mean that Chisinau agrees to give up its sovereign rights over Transnistria. For example, it continues to give negative response to Moscow's occasional signals of readiness to support Moldova's territorial integrity in return for its inclusion into the orbit of Russian influence.

The pro-Western segment of the Moldovan political elite believes that the resolution of the Transdniestrian problem depends on the outcome of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. According to Maia Sandu, the victory of Ukraine can set conditions for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict as well. At the same time, Chisinau is mainly interested in the withdrawal of the Russian military contingent from Moldova, provided that Russian peacekeepers could be replaced by the UN or EU mission.

The Kremlin makes no secret of its harsh rejection of President Sandu's policies, such as the introduction of new articles in the Criminal Code, especially amid Ukraine's expressed readiness to assist Moldova in the de-occupation of Transnistria.