28 April 2024

Sunday, 10:45

UNDISPUTED VICTORY

Iran's parliament and Assembly of Experts back in the hands of the conservatives

Author:

15.03.2024

As anticipated, the conservative wing of the Iranian political elite secured yet another victory in the March 1 elections. However, the Council of Guardians barred numerous prominent reformist politicians from participating.

Consequently, 245 deputies were elected to the 290-seat Iranian parliament. The remaining 45 seats, lacking candidates who met the required 20 percent quorum, are slated for separate votes.

 

Undisputed Victory for the Conservatives

The twelfth parliamentary and sixth Assembly of Experts elections of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) were predominantly won by radical conservatives and individuals aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Notably, these elections saw the lowest voter turnout in Iran's history, with official figures indicating only 41 percent participation (approximately 25 million people) out of 61 million eligible voters.

This historic low in voter engagement has become a pressing issue. For context, 42.5 percent of voters participated in the 2020 parliamentary elections, and 48 percent in the 2021 presidential elections. Despite various initiatives by the government to engage the electorate, even the calls from religious and socio-political leaders failed to resonate, with Western media reporting no more than 34 percent voter turnout.

The 45 vacant parliamentary seats further underscore the diminished voting rate.

Nevertheless, the conservative faction of Iran's political elite responded optimistically. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei characterized the March 1 vote as a "jihad." President Ebrahim Raisi also expressed contentment, labelling the elections "a powerful blow to the opponents of the Islamic Republic." This sentiment likely stems from the authorities' concerns over a potential widespread election boycott. Thus, they view the 41 percent turnout as a triumph, countering Western media's forecasts of mass protests due to voter apathy.

 

A Split Among Boycotters

From the onset, it was evident that factions discontent with the current government—including monarchists, supporters of the Mojahedin Organisation of the Iranian People, and regime critics—intended to boycott the elections, a recurring theme in past elections. Observers largely attribute the low turnout to the Council of the Guardians of the Constitution's decision to permit only a select few reformist candidates to run, including long-standing figures like Hassan Rouhani, a 25-year member of the Assembly of Experts.

Despite this, there was no concerted movement among reformists to formally boycott the elections. While some, like former President Mohammad Khatemi, abstained from voting, others, such as his ally and former head of state Hassan Rouhani, actively encouraged citizens to vote.

Discontent was particularly pronounced in major urban centres, especially Tehran. Out of 30 candidates, only 14 were elected, necessitating a run-off for the remaining 16 seats. These run-off elections are predominantly in larger cities with minimal sectarianism or central government sway.

 

Choice of Azerbaijanis

In a compelling turn of events, the majority of voters from East and West Azerbaijan, particularly in Tabriz and Urmiye, cast their ballots for reformist candidates. However, the electoral enthusiasm was not uniform across all constituencies. For instance, in East Azerbaijan province, only 13 out of 17 candidates secured enough votes, necessitating a second round to determine the fate of the remaining four seats. Among the elected, four belong to the reformist faction, three to conservatives, and six seats were claimed by independent candidates in Tabriz.

West Azerbaijan province mirrored this trend, with five reformists and three conservatives elected, while independent candidates captured the remaining four mandates.

In Ardabil province, the split was three mandates each for independent candidates and conservatives, with the final seat's outcome pending the second round's conclusion.

These results suggest a burgeoning appetite for reform among the Azerbaijani populace of Iranian Azerbaijan. Except for Ardabil, there's a notable decline in conservative influence, possibly due to the deteriorating economic conditions and resultant dissatisfaction with the Raisi administration. The inclusion of influential Azerbaijanis in former President Hassan Rouhani's team likely swayed votes towards reformist choices.

 

Stability in the Assembly of Experts

Contrasting with the parliamentary elections, the Assembly of Experts saw no candidates left standing for a second round—all 88 were elected in the initial voting phase. This indicates a prioritization by Iranian authorities on the Assembly, where the majority of newly elected members are conservatives, some fervently so. This election reflects the government's recognition of the impending need to elect a new supreme leader within the next eight years, given the current leader's advanced age (85). The conservative faction's proactive approach suggests a strategic positioning for future leadership transitions.

 

What's Next?

The Iranian authorities were relieved as concerns of election-related unrest did not materialize. It's important to consider that these elections unfolded against the backdrop of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, with Iran being a direct or indirect participant. Tehran's recent diplomatic successes have bolstered Iran's regional power status, capable of challenging the United States. Historically, heightened external tensions have tended to eclipse domestic issues.

The upcoming US presidential election could significantly influence Iran's policies, particularly if Donald Trump, known for his hardline stance against Iran, is elected, potentially entangling the country in further Middle Eastern conflicts. Conversely, Iran will also conduct its own elections shortly after the US inauguration. In such a scenario, the likelihood of domestic instability amidst Middle Eastern tensions may diminish in the ensuing months. The next year is poised to be intriguing, with the prospect of both Washington and Tehran ushering in new presidential leadership.



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