CONTROVERSIAL TOUR

The visits of Russian President Vladimir Putin to North Korea and Vietnam attracted global attention. However, the outcomes of these trips were interpreted in starkly contrasting ways. Russian political analysts and the media concurred that Moscow had taken a significant step in establishing a new geopolitical space in Eurasia. Concurrently, Michael Carpenter, senior director for Europe at the White House National Security Council, asserted that Putin was forming an alliance against the West. Some commentators have suggested that Russia's actions represent a further challenge to the existing world order and that the Kremlin is preparing for a potential third world war. In Pyongyang, the Russian side emphasised that Moscow was fighting against what it views as the "hegemonic, imperialist policy of the United States and its allies".

Alliance or Pact?

Both countries have a history of significant disagreements with the United States, yet they have also maintained long-standing and multifaceted ties with Moscow that date back to the Soviet era. Currently, Pyongyang has openly expressed its support for Russia, whereas Hanoi has adopted a neutral stance in the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West. Concurrently, while North Korea is a global pariah, subject to numerous sanctions and one of the most closed and ambiguous countries on the world map, Vietnam is a dynamically developing, relatively prosperous state in its region, with which everyone wants to do business – both neighbours and Western countries, including the United States.

For the first time in 24 years, Vladimir Putin travelled to North Korea, where he received an unprecedentedly large and pompous reception. The principal consequence of the visit was the conclusion of an open-ended treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and North Korea. This included a section on joint defence in the event of aggression against one of the signatories. The aforementioned assistance is to be provided in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and in accordance with the legislation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. This would appear to indicate that Russia and North Korea have in fact concluded a military alliance. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un described the agreement as a pact and asserted that the two countries had reached a high level of allied relations.

The West is convinced that North Korea has already provided (and continues to do so) Russia with large quantities of munitions and military components. However, it is unclear what the Kremlin is giving Pyongyang in return. NATO member states are most concerned about the possibility that Russia may be providing support to North Korea's nuclear, missile, and satellite programmes. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller asserted that Russian arms supplies to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would "destabilize the Korean Peninsula." Western politicians also expressed discontent with Russia's "violation of the UN Security Council resolutions, which Russia itself supported".

Indeed, the overwhelming majority of North Korean weapons originate from the USSR, thereby rendering the compatibility, as it is commonly referred to, self-evident. Moreover, Pyongyang is said to have a military-industrial complex that is quite advanced for its capabilities. Furthermore, if Moscow is now interested in the quantity of what has already been produced, Pyongyang is certainly interested in technical innovations. The resources of North Korea have recently been concentrated on the resolution of the most pressing issues, namely the advancement of space rocket technology, the development of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of ground forces equipment. It is evident, therefore, that other areas require significant advancement to reach the current standard. As has been observed in the Russian media, the areas requiring improvement are aviation equipment, air defence equipment and the navy. For the United States, the necessity of cooperation between Russia and North Korea implies the necessity of concentrating even greater forces in the region. Furthermore, it has been suggested that Russia and North Korea may have discussed the possibility of sending North Korean volunteers to the Ukrainian front. These volunteers could be well-organised and motivated, as well as extremely interested in gaining real combat experience in a war against U.S./NATO weapons.

Concurrently, the collaboration between Pyongyang and Moscow extends beyond the military domain. Furthermore, the agreement encompasses matters pertaining to food, energy, and information security. North Korea is in need of a significant quantity of Russian oil and grain. Conversely, Russia requires a workforce. Russian experts have postulated that the negotiations in North Korea may have encompassed the potential arrival of several thousand specialists from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Russia. It is also important to note that North Korea possesses significant deposits of precious metals, rare earth metals, zinc, copper, nickel, titanium, and other minerals.

Moscow has emphasised that the treaty concluded with North Korea is an exclusively defensive position. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko has stated that the treaty is not directed against South Korea or other countries. In other words, Seoul has no cause for concern if it refrains from initiating hostilities against North Korea. The diplomat further observed that the primary source of regional tension is the United States' foreign policy.

In contrast, Western media sources have noted that Soviet leaders and high-ranking officials had never sought state visits to Pyongyang, and that Putin himself had not been particularly interested in such close friendship with the North Koreans in the past either. Consequently, the visit to North Korea can be regarded as a gesture of desperation that "brings Russia definitively closer to the North Korean model of a paramilitary, brutally repressive dictatorship." Russian political analysts respond by noting that circumstances have changed, and the so-called "Russian macro-region" is developing, which consists of such countries as Syria, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. This is set against the backdrop of the Kremlin's rather active involvement in some African countries. With regard to North Korea, it is pertinent to note that Southeast Asia represents an area of direct U.S. interest.

Strategic Partners

The visit to Vietnam is of particular significance. For instance, the visit to Vietnam afforded the Russian leader an opportunity to demonstrate that the West's attempts to isolate Russia had not been as successful as anticipated. For Vietnam, the visit of the Russian president served to demonstrate the country's independence in foreign policy, indicating that it has the strength and space to conduct multilateral diplomacy.

The discussions between Vladimir Putin and Tho Lam resulted in the signing of 11 documents and the adoption of a statement entitled "On Further Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership". It is widely acknowledged that Vietnam has been one of the world's largest purchasers of Russian arms. To date, Russian equipment constitutes approximately 60 to 70% of the country's defence arsenal, a figure that the Kremlin is evidently seeking to reinforce and strengthen. Since the second half of the 2000s, Vietnam has been procuring individual weapons from the EU and the US, and has not made significant purchases from Russia for an extended period. Furthermore, there have been suggestions in expert circles that Moscow may be interested in reviving the naval base in Cam Ranh.

Moreover, Russia has a considerable interest in Vietnam's oil and gas sector. Furthermore, Putin's visit to Hanoi is part of Russia's de-dollarisation efforts and its desire to utilise the country in import substitution schemes. Vietnam is one of the few countries where Russia's "soft power" is particularly evident, although this is more a consequence of its Soviet experience, given that the Soviet Union hosted tens of thousands of Vietnamese students during the Cold War.

The visit of the Russian president to Vietnam served to reinforce the country's regional and international standing. Washington, of course, offered a mildly critical response to Hanoi. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink, who arrived shortly after Putin, asserted that the partnership between the United States and Vietnam has reached its most robust point to date.

Vietnam, which improved relations with Washington last year, is regarded as a counterweight to Beijing's growing influence in the region and is utilising this position to its advantage, employing a strategy of "bamboo diplomacy" with notable success. It is to Vietnam that American companies are actively relocating their production facilities, including Apple. The trade turnover between the two countries is approaching 140 billion dollars. Conversely, Hanoi is engaged in close collaboration with China, serving as a major trading partner for the latter. In other words, Vietnam has exploited the fact that its region is home to significant interests of major immediate neighbours and external players. It is home to a wealth of mineral deposits and a network of vital trade routes. In addition to these factors, the availability of a large pool of human resources, the existence of territorial disputes, and the diversity of state structures further contribute to the complex nature of the region. Concurrently, the prevalence of intense competition and intricate networks of interrelationships affords considerable scope for strategic manoeuvre. This is not limited to Vietnam; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) can also exploit the contradictions between the United States, China and Russia. 

Food for Thought

It is worth considering the implications of the recent visit of the Russian president to Vietnam and North Korea. This visit demonstrates the evolving dynamics of international relations, which are now at a pivotal point. The future trajectory of these relations is not yet clear. It remains to be seen whether the new architecture for a secure Eurasia, as Russia believes it to be, is in fact being constructed. Or is it merely a strategy of intensifying the existing system, which, despite modifications, will persist in its current form in the future? One might inquire as to the genuineness of the alliances and agreements in question. Is there a genuine desire to cooperate or is it merely a desire to take advantage of the situation? 

For the purposes of reflection, the following information is presented. Putin's visit to North Korea and Vietnam occurred shortly after his trip to China. On the one hand, the shadow of the Middle Kingdom casts a menacing presence behind the Kremlin, giving Russia's actions a threatening connotation for the West. Conversely, the visits of Putin to Hanoi and Pyongyang may be intended to persuade his ally, Xi Jinping, that Russia has more to offer than the West perceives as Moscow's growing dependence on Beijing.

However, it remains unclear whether Russia possesses the requisite "something" to offset the perceived imbalance. It remains unclear whether the leaders of Russia and China genuinely trust each other. It remains unclear whether the leaders of the Russian Federation and North Korea genuinely trust each other. One might inquire whether Putin can be confident that his Vietnamese partner will remain steadfast in the face of Western pressure. Furthermore, is the West still sufficiently powerful to exert influence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East when it deems it necessary?

Finally, the most crucial question remains: Has the authority of the UN Security Council been irreparably compromised? Has the UN ceased to exist, or has the principle of the "right of the strong" finally prevailed?