OVERESTIMATED OPTIMISM

How quickly can diplomatic optimism fade into pessimism? The answer largely depends on the specifics, but even in the bleakest situations, diplomacy typically calls for a veneer of optimism.

Recent events in Armenian-Turkish relations exemplify overly optimistic expectations. Initial predictions of imminent border openings, embassy establishments, and promises of peace and friendship have given way to a stagnant reality.

"Remember how it all started?.."

Retracing the origins of this situation, Türkiye was the first nation to acknowledge all 15 newly independent states following the USSR's dissolution. However, due to Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territories, Ankara withheld diplomatic recognition and sealed the Armenian-Turkish land border. Armenia's subsequent complaints about a "blockade" – which they dramatically likened to a continuation of the Armenian genocide – ignored the fact that nations have the sovereign right to manage their own borders.

This impasse gave rise to the concept of "negotiations without preconditions." Armenia insisted Türkiye reopen the border without requiring the liberation of occupied Azerbaijani lands. Garabagh stood as the primary obstacle to Armenian-Turkish normalisation.

The landscape shifted after Azerbaijan reclaimed its territories during the 44-day Patriotic War. The resulting trilateral statement included provisions for reopening regional communications. This development fuelled expectations of an imminent border reopening between Armenia and Türkiye. Both nations repeatedly expressed willingness to normalise relations. Armenia's humanitarian aid following Türkiye's devastating earthquake in February 2023 sparked discussions of "seismic diplomacy," with talks even extending to the restoration of an ancient bridge near Ani.

A pivotal moment came with the June 19, 2024 phone conversation between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Their reported advocacy for unconditional normalisation raised hopes further. Media announcements of a planned border meeting between Armenian and Turkish representatives in early July seemed to confirm this positive trajectory. Azerbaijani audience recalled that it was during that meeting that it was possible to agree on the liberation of four villages of Gazakh district—in a peaceful and bloodless way. The Armenian Foreign Ministry did not deny this fact and promised to "inform in a timely manner".

Azerbaijani reactions remained measured, with Erdogan consistently emphasizing Ankara's coordination with Baku on Armenian matters. The conclusion of active hostilities had somewhat tempered the urgency of these issues for the Azerbaijani public.

Yet, the anticipated breakthrough failed to materialise. Yerevan reported that Turkish representatives had declined to attend the meeting, bringing the promising dialogue to an unexpected halt.

Unresolved Issues

The normalisation process between Armenia and Türkiye has reached a critical juncture. While extra-regional experts previously focused on Garabagh – specifically, Türkiye's reluctance to open borders while Armenian forces occupied Garabagh and surrounding regions – Armenia's direct conflicts with Türkiye have now taken centre stage.

Armenia's current border with Türkiye, inherited from the USSR, was long considered settled. However, Armenia has historically claimed six vilayets of Eastern Anatolia, designated as "Western Armenia" in the Treaty of Sèvres. This claim persisted even after the USSR's collapse, enshrined in Armenia's constitution despite attempts to downplay it during Levon Ter-Petrosyan's tenure.

The situation escalated under Nikol Pashinyan's leadership. As noted by Armenian-American historian Zhirayr Libaridian, statements by Armenian leadership in 2020 regarding the Sèvres Peace Treaty anniversary could be interpreted as territorial claims against Türkiye.

While Türkiye, boasting NATO's second-largest military, likely isn't threatened by these claims, the potential for conflict on its borders is concerning. Armenia's stance also serves as a potential tool for those pursuing anti-Turkish policies.

Türkiye demands Armenia cease its rhetoric surrounding the events of 1915. Ankara has made overtures, opening its archives and proposing joint historical commissions, but Yerevan has rebuffed these offers. Now former Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan banned Armenian scientists from working in Turkish archives. Nikol Pashinyan left the ban in force. Armenia does not want to hear about the joint commission and any evidence. Armenia's insistence on "responsibility for genocide and overcoming its consequences" implies potential territorial compensation from Türkiye.

Armenia's glorification of individuals involved in violence against Turkish officials further complicates relations. While it's unclear if Ankara will demand the removal of monuments to figures like Soghomon Teylerian, Türkiye will likely require Armenia to formally recognize current borders as a precondition for normalisation.

Entrenched in the Past

Armenian territorial claims against Türkiye predate the Garabagh conflict, forming a core element of Armenian national identity. While the so-called notorious "Garabagh movement" began in Armenia back in 1988, the "lost lands" narrative that have yet to transform into what Armenians call "Western Armenia" has been in speculation for over a hundred years.  This "land hunger," once exploited by the USSR in its tensions with NATO, persists in modern Armenia. Unlike other nations with historical maps depicting larger territories, Armenia's fixation on lands promised but never delivered under the Treaty of Sèvres presents unique challenges.

A significant number of countries possess historical maps of their territories, which often encompass a much greater expanse than that currently recognised. In Hungary, the loss of territories resulting from the Treaty of Trianon is a topic of historical awareness. Schoolchildren in Lithuania are well-versed in the extent of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's borders, while in Poland, the history of the Rzeczpospolita is a subject of considerable interest. However, the phenomenon of "land hysteria" manifests in Yerevan in a distinctive manner. Firstly, Armenia did not exist within the borders that would include the six Turkish vilayets. These territories were promised to Armenian businessmen, but the handover did not occur in a timely manner. Following the victory of the Turkish War of Independence, the Treaty of Sèvres was superseded by the Treaty of Kars and the Treaty of Moscow, which were subsequently replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne. However, Yerevan persists in insinuating that these territories can still be obtained.

It would be superfluous to examine the "zigzags of mentality" in detail were it not for one factor. In order to normalise relations with Ankara, Pashinyan will be required to renounce, in principle, the age-old aspiration of the Armenian people for Turkish territories. The rejection of the designation Artsakh has never been rectified. Furthermore, should this aspiration for Turkish territories also be renounced, the consequences may be unpredictable. Furthermore, the coat of arms will have to be altered and the image of the "sacred Ararat" will have to be removed.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether Pashinyan possesses sufficient domestic political strength to implement these changes. Indeed, he demonstrated resilience in the face of the 44-day conflict and the anti-terrorist operations. However, this is not the case when the phrase "everything that does not kill makes stronger" is applicable. It is evident that Pashinyan's position has not been reinforced by these events.

The governments of Armenia and Türkiye were able to engage in constructive dialogue until the point where the government of Yerevan was compelled to relinquish its claim to territories currently under Turkish control. At this juncture, the process has reached a standstill. It is not possible to determine how long this situation will persist.