FRENCH HOPES ON ARMENIANS

France and Armenia have continued their 'political embrace'. Prior to assuming the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sébastien Sejournet undertook a brief visit to Armenia, during which he reassured the Armenian government of France's continued support, irrespective of the political changes that had occurred. Simultaneously, he made several statements directed at Moscow that were perceived as stern, which prompted a sharp reaction from the spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova. She stated that it was surprising that the political leadership, officials, and representatives of the public in Armenia did not react to these statements.

France is seeking to expand its influence in Armenia, which was previously regarded as a Russian outpost. Sejournet has even pledged to protect Armenia from Russian "pressure." It may be argued that further expert analysis is required on the theme of whether Pashinyan's kebab revolution has received a foreign policy interpretation. However, is this interpretation entirely accurate? 

Napoleonic Hopes and Azerbaijan's Iron Fist

The historical context of the relationship between France and Armenia is significant. The term 'special relations' is used to describe the long-standing ties between the two countries. It is widely acknowledged that the foundation of these relations is the significant and influential Armenian community in France. French politicians have a tendency to lend an ear to the voices of Armenians. Consequently, there have been a multitude of visits and a proclivity to leave an imprint on matters pertaining to the Armenian genocide, among other issues. Consequently, Armenia has been successful in becoming a member of the Francophonie organisation, which is comprised primarily of former French colonies.

Nevertheless, during the tenure of previous presidents, Paris pursued a generally balanced policy despite the 'special relations' with Yerevan and successfully developed ties with Baku. While the Armenian track was characterised by largely symbolic gestures, the Azerbaijani track was marked by significant financial investments, including those from Total, as well as the launches of Azerbaijani satellites from the French space centre using French missiles.

Subsequently, Emmanuel Macron and his team arrived, which resulted in a notable shift in circumstances. The 'special relations' between Yerevan and Paris gave way to overt challenges to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and state sovereignty. The government of Baku was not indifferent to this turn of events. In the estimation of President Ilham Aliyev, relations with France have effectively ceased.

One might inquire as to the logic and reason behind France's decision to engage in such a manoeuvrer in the South Caucasus. In the recent past, Paris formulated a strategy for Armenia that could be described as "Napoleonic." A few years ago, Macron sought to restore France to its former position of greatness and influence. However, this endeavour ultimately resulted in a series of significant failures and setbacks. France's attempts to play an independent role in Libya and Syria ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of its forces in disgrace. In Africa, particularly in former French colonies, the influence of the French government is diminishing rapidly. Furthermore, an embarrassing failure was also recorded in the Pacific region. The United States initiated the formation of an anti-Chinese alliance, extending invitations to Britain and Australia but excluding France. Furthermore, Australia terminated several significant arms contracts with France and instead selected the United States as its preferred partner.

In this context, even prior to the commencement of the 44-day war, Macron commenced actively courting Pashinyan. The overtures to Yerevan seemed to offer Paris a chance to 'make amends'. France would significantly diminish Moscow's influence in the region by removing the Caucasian outpost that had been a key strategic asset for Russia. Many experts posited that, based on the experiences of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 1990s, the country with the most combat-ready army in the Caucasus would become its ally. Subsequently, it would be feasible to pose a threat to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran on behalf of Armenia. The least that could be done was to facilitate access to the South Caucasus for Armenia.

However, these ambitious aspirations regarding Armenia were ultimately thwarted by Azerbaijan's 'Iron Fist'. The realities of the 44-day war demonstrated with brutal clarity that the combat capability of the Armenian army had been greatly overestimated by experts. The Armenian Armed Forces continue to adhere to the victorious strategies and tactics that were employed during the early 1990s, whereas Azerbaijan has developed a modern military force that is evident on the battlefield. In lieu of a promising 'Armenian cudgel' that could be wielded as a threat against all and sundry, Paris was left with a vanquished aggressor and a demoralised army that requires substantial rebuilding. It is unlikely that reliance on Armenia as an 'intimidation factor' will occur in the near future. Indeed, France is providing Armenia with outdated military equipment. However, as has been repeatedly observed, such deliveries are insufficient to compensate for the losses incurred during the war and anti-terrorist operations of 2023. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain how effective this army will be when confronted by Azerbaijan once more.

Furthermore, the 'open door' strategy has also been demonstrated to be ineffective. Armenia represents a cul-de-sac. While there can be extensive discussions about the 'Armenian crossroads', for this crossroads to function effectively, it is essential to normalise relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and for Georgia to resolve conflicts in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. This remains a distant prospect. France's objective of dislodging Armenia from its alliance with Russia also appears uncertain.

Between Moscow and Paris

The government of Yerevan has made its discontent with the policies of the Russian Federation known in no uncertain terms, a development that has undoubtedly encouraged the French government to adopt a more assertive stance on the matter. Nevertheless, Yerevan has not taken any action to disassociate itself from the Kremlin. Armenia continues to maintain its membership in both the CSTO and the EAEU. It is of particular significance that Yerevan's economic reliance on Moscow has not diminished. The current economic growth in Armenia is largely attributable to the circumvention of Western sanctions imposed on Russia. Russia continues to supply Armenia with oil, gas, and rough diamonds at domestic prices. Consequently, the total fiscal impact on the budget is estimated to be at least one billion dollars. It seems unlikely that the frugal Macron is prepared to provide compensation to Armenia for these financial losses.

Should Armenia become too closely aligned with France, Russia may be inclined to sever oil and gas supplies, regardless of the circumstances. Armenia's lack of access to the sea renders the importation of oil and gas from Azerbaijan an unfeasible proposition, at least until such time as a peace treaty is signed. In the absence of such a treaty, any mention of the proposed importation is premature. In theory, Iran could provide hydrocarbons; however, the requisite infrastructure is lacking in this scenario. Moreover, Iran would likely demand global prices for these resources, which may exceed Armenia's economic capabilities. These considerations collectively necessitate a cautious approach on the part of Pashinyan within the Moscow-Yerevan-Paris triangle.

In practical terms, the entirety of Armenia's infrastructure, encompassing electricity and gas networks, railways, and cellular communications, is subject to Russian concession management. This suggests that Russian oligarchs, companies, and natural monopolies are investing considerable sums to maintain this unprofitable infrastructure. It is unclear whether France is prepared to assume these costs.

Moreover, there is scepticism regarding the extent of Paris's political will and its preparedness to engage in a confrontational stance with Moscow for Armenia's sake.

Since the onset of hostilities in Ukraine, French President Macron has been characterised by a proclivity for making bold statements while simultaneously espousing views that are at odds with the prevailing Western consensus. He has discussed the importance of allowing the Kremlin to maintain its dignity, which, of course, has resulted in the loss of territory for Ukraine. Furthermore, he has proposed the deployment of military personnel to Ukraine. However, these suggestions have not yet resulted in concrete action. Furthermore, Defence Minister Sebastian Lecornu's expression of condolences to Sergei Shoigu following a terrorist attack at Crocusa was regarded by the majority of experts as a mere 'trial balloon'.

It is noteworthy that Michel Barnier was appointed prime minister. He had previously visited Khankendi in December 2021, accompanied by Valérie Pecresse, who was accused of having "special ties" with the Kremlin and even Russian security services.

France's commitment to its allies is frequently perceived as inadequate. France's "special position" vis-à-vis the Kremlin is perceived by many as a direct betrayal of Ukraine and its allies. Furthermore, Macron's repeated assertions of 'NATO brain death' and discussions about establishing a 'European army' do not demonstrate fidelity to allied commitments. The ease with which French interests are being expelled from former colonies in Africa is indicative of this reality. Therefore, it seems somewhat optimistic to expect that Macron will demonstrate strength on Armenian issues and successfully disengage a country from Russian influence, given that Moscow still has the capacity to exert control.

It is possible that Pashinyan himself may act in a surprising manner, which would not be the first occasion on which he has demonstrated an ability to act in an unpredictable way. According to informed sources, following the signing of the trilateral statement on 10 November 2020, Macron anticipated that Pashinyan would approach him and was even prepared to offer advice on how Armenia's prime minister might 'extricate' himself from his obligations. It is unclear whether Macron fully comprehended the potential risks for Pashinyan, who was compelled to sign the document under duress. Nevertheless, in the face of significant challenges, Pashinyan opted to maintain his connections with Russia. As indicated by sources, Macron made a disparaging remark about the individual in question, characterizing him as "inadequate."

Nevertheless, in light of the pervasive failure across numerous domains, Macron is compelled to seek Armenian support. Consequently, he must engage with Armenia in a multitude of ways while navigating the complexities of relations with an 'inadequate' leader. It remains to be seen whether these French overtures will prove beneficial for Armenia. Such an outcome seems unlikely.