Author: Tofigakhanim GASIMOVA
"It is fascinating to observe the changing attitudes of post-Soviet audiences towards EU summits. In the early days, when the term "Eastern Partnership" was just beginning to enter political conversations, hopes for European integration were at their peak. However, the latest EU summit in Brussels could now be aptly described as "the summit of diminished Euro-enthusiasm."
Ukraine will be supported, but...
Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky was invited to Brussels to present his so-called Victory Plan to European leaders, and there were ample promises of support. "We will stand by you for as long as necessary and do whatever it takes. We understand that you urgently need more military and financial support, and we will explore ways to expedite this assistance for the people of Ukraine," pledged European Council President Charles Michel ahead of the summit.
The EU's final statements endorse "swiftly increasing military support and accelerating the delivery of weapons, especially air defence systems, ammunition, and missiles essential for protecting Ukraine's population and critical energy infrastructure." Despite these pledges, Kiev has received considerably fewer arms than promised by the Europeans. The issue of military aid for Kiev is discussed across multiple platforms—NATO, Ramstein, and the European Union—yet the actual support falls well short of the rhetoric. Specifically, a proposed €65 billion package remains unresolved due to divisions within the EU. Some member states contend that Europe should refrain from providing direct military aid to Ukraine. In Brussels, it has been suggested that contributions to the Ukraine Support Fund be voluntary, though Eurobureaucracy expects a final decision on this issue only by year-end, even as Kiev remains in urgent need of European military assistance. Theoretically, one could dismiss this shortfall by noting that the EU is not a military alliance; however, corresponding assurances were still made to Kiev.
The status of the €50 billion loan pledged to Ukraine by the G7 is also in limbo. Of this sum, €35 billion was expected to come from the EU. However, differences between Brussels and Washington are again surfacing: Europeans are now urged to impose sanctions on Russia, not just for six months, but for 36. Yet, Europe remains mired in debate, while Ukraine continues to bear the brunt of these bureaucratic delays.
Doors Are Closing...
Recent events surrounding Georgia have also drawn significant attention. Relations between Tbilisi and Brussels are now described as "strained." This time, however, criticism of Tbilisi has intensified to a new level. At the summit, the EU officially accused Georgia of undermining European values, effectively stalling the country’s EU accession process. According to the summit's final documents, "the Council of Europe expresses serious concern over the actions of the Georgian government, which contradict the values and principles on which the European Union was founded. This course undermines Georgia's European trajectory and effectively halts the EU accession process." Conditions for re-engaging this process were also specified, with the requirement that Tbilisi "undertake democratic, comprehensive, and sustainable reforms consistent with European integration principles."
The EU’s demands for Georgia go beyond "democratic, comprehensive, and sustainable reforms." The most contentious issue for Tbilisi concerns EU demands related to LGBT community rights—an issue that remains divisive even within the EU itself. Thus, whether it is appropriate to insist on LGBT rights in negotiations with Tbilisi remains, at best, a matter of debate.
Another sticking point involves demands from the European Union and the United States for Georgian authorities to amend legislation regarding transparency in NGO financing. Tbilisi harbours reasonable suspicions that foreign grant-dependent sectors could be orchestrating provocations and potentially inciting a second "colour revolution." Consequently, they are reluctant to make concessions.
Moreover, leading powers in the West, primarily the European Union and the United States, are urging Georgia to more fully support sanctions against Russia. Tbilisi is hesitant to comply, believing such actions would severely harm its local economy and asserting that it is not an EU member.
Tbilisi does not wish to escalate tensions with Moscow. Memories of the 2008 Five-Day War remain vivid. At that time, Europe applauded the Georgian authorities under Saakashvili for their reforms; however, no military assistance was anticipated from the West during wartime, nor were sanctions imposed against Russia. Instead, Georgia was offered terms of a ceasefire agreement that were far from favourable. Subsequently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ceremoniously pressed a symbolic button labelled Reset, heralding a reset in relations between Russia and the West. This reset was short-lived; the struggle for Crimea followed in 2014, and tensions between Moscow and the West peaked after February 2022. Nevertheless, Georgia drew a predictable conclusion from 2008: it is unwise to provoke the Russian bear. Furthermore, without NATO membership providing a security umbrella, Georgia perceives EU decisions as overly eager to discipline and subdue the country.
Moldavian Warning
Formally, Moldova's presidential election is not directly linked to the EU summit. Concurrently with voting, a referendum was held asking voters whether they supported Moldova's accession to the EU.
Moldova has yet to receive an invitation to join the EU. The country is a member of the Eastern Partnership; however, EU membership remains a distant prospect. It can be inferred that Moldovan President Maia Sandu combined elections with a referendum to bolster her own approval ratings through reference to the “European dream”.
The referendum results were shocking—support for European integration stood at just over 50%. Formally speaking, this constitutes a victory; yet in reality, it represents a significant setback—not for Moldovan Westerners or Mrs. Sandu but for European bureaucracy itself. This indicates that disillusionment with European prospects is gaining traction throughout the post-Soviet space.
Once seen as near-magical concepts in post-Soviet countries, terms like "European integration" and "European prospects" are now often met with scepticism. For some, European integration was initially embraced as an alternative to Russian integration efforts, which many viewed as echoes of Soviet practices. For many others, however, Europe symbolised prosperity—a true "earthly paradise"—accompanied by political benefits such as democracy, human rights, generous pensions, and robust social support systems. EU membership seemed within reach, especially as Eastern European countries were quickly welcomed into the fold. In time, the Eastern Partnership programs were created for neighbouring countries—Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia—offering them a uniform vision of "European integration." Under these initiatives, loans were offered in exchange for implementing specified reforms, with the promise of eventual membership for those demonstrating good behaviour in the post-Soviet region. Many voters accepted these reforms, despite their social and political costs, in pursuit of a brighter future.
Not everyone, however, was captivated by this "European dream." Azerbaijan made clear that it had no intention of surrendering its sovereignty to either Moscow or Brussels. Meanwhile, Yerevan and Minsk chose to align with Moscow, while Kiev, Chișinău, and Tbilisi expressed support for European integration.
Today, "Euro-disillusionment" is growing in Moldova and Georgia—an expected shift, given the increasingly unclear prospects for EU membership and the increasingly stringent demands from the EU. The once-alluring concept of European integration is now giving way to pragmatism: What are the actual conditions for EU membership? Why did Great Britain exit the EU? What exactly are the costs and benefits of continuing down the path of European integration? When weighing difficult reforms and the risks of punitive measures from Russia against a mere "visa-free" allowance for two weeks as tourists—with no right to work—one must ask if it is worth pursuing.
European politicians must understand that the era when post-Soviet countries—especially those aspiring to European integration—were willing to wait passively at Brussels' reception, following every directive, has ended. In the post-Soviet space, diplomacy will require a more nuanced approach: genuine negotiation that considers local societal needs and traditions while also fulfilling the promises that have been made.
Otherwise, it is likely that more instances of what could be described as a "Moldavian warning" will follow.
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