NO LESSONS LEARNED

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated: "Since 1994, that is, after the ceasefire, the negotiation process has been about returning Garabagh to Azerbaijan... In this context, I made a significant mistake."

Prior to this, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan announced that Yerevan and Ankara had reached an agreement on the railway border crossing. Pashinyan also mentioned a resolution regarding the resumption of railway communication that would be acceptable for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Instead of addressing Azerbaijan's logical and justified demands for a peaceful agreement, these statements merely create noise and mislead the global community. Achieving a sustainable, long-term, and effective peace agreement is only possible by resolving key issues.

Despite the tragic chapters of its history, Azerbaijan remains committed to a peaceful agenda. This path is not easy, especially for Armenians burdened by the weight of their past criminal acts, but it is a path that must be taken.

Unagreed Articles of the Peace Treaty and the Acquisition of Arms

Repeated attempts to derail the negotiation process reflect Armenia's lack of desire for peace and the persistence of revanchist sentiments. This is evident from its accelerated acquisition of offensive weapons.

The prolonged negotiation process, accompanied by an arms race fuelled by Armenia's supporters, explains the topics raised by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during his interview with Dmitry Kiselev, Director General of the International Information Agency Russia Today. The President unequivocally stated: "The peace treaty and the simultaneous armament of Armenia against us are two incompatible courses." Armenia's patrons, unable to delay or obstruct the negotiations through other means, have begun arming it 'at an alarming pace'.

The previously undisclosed contents of the unagreed articles have now been made public. To finalise a peace treaty with Armenia, consensus must be reached on two disputed points out of 17: the abandonment of mutual lawsuits and the commitment not to deploy foreign forces along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

The 'lawsuit war' would require financial resources better allocated to economic development—something beneficial to both parties. The provision regarding the non-deployment of foreign forces pertains to Armenia's actions. Under the guise of European observers at the border, NATO infrastructure has effectively been established. According to the agreement between Armenia and the European Union, an EU mission operates there to conduct "planned patrols and report on the situation, contributing to stability in border areas." The presence of representatives from opposing state security structures on Armenian territory creates a volatile situation, endangering the entire South Caucasus.

Two additional requirements for concluding a peace treaty are amendments to Armenia's Constitution and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group (MG). The first requirement addresses Armenia's fundamental law, which references the Declaration of Independence from August 23, 1990, asserting Garabagh as part of Armenia. Baku regards this as a territorial claim. This Declaration, along with Armenia's Constitution and related legislation and international agreements aimed at annexing territories of neighbouring countries, renders any documents signed by Pashinyan within the peace process incompatible with Armenia's domestic laws.

The desire to revive the Minsk Group stems from the geopolitical interests of certain countries aiming to maintain influence in the South Caucasus and interfere in the internal affairs of regional countries. Armenia's lack of sovereignty and continued territorial claims against Azerbaijan facilitate these efforts. Armenia views the MG as preserving the Garabagh issue. However, the Minsk Group is defunct, with no legitimacy to function without Azerbaijan's consent. Attempts to resurrect it are futile and illegitimate.

'Binocular Diplomacy' and Demarcation

Remarkably, Pashinyan has proposed a condition for Armenia to relinquish European observers. He stated that the Armenian side suggested extending the peace treaty provision with Azerbaijan on the ‘non-deployment of foreign forces at state borders' to include demarcated sections. According to him, after demarcation, third-party observers at the border would no longer be necessary."

All attempts to link Western security forces at the border with the border demarcation process are baseless. Demarcation is a protracted process that may take years, during which there remains a risk of conflict involving security forces from opposing states on Armenian territory adjacent to Azerbaijan.

Armenian Statements and the Western Zangezur Route

Ararat Mirzoyan announced that Armenia and Türkiye reached an agreement on assessing requirements for border crossings via the Gyumri-Kars railway. At the 49th meeting of foreign ministers of the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Mirzoyan mentioned simultaneous proposals to Türkiye and Azerbaijan concerning mechanisms to restart Armenian railway infrastructure, simplify border and customs procedures, and ensure additional security measures. He also claimed the Gyumri-Kars railway and railway communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan would ensure effective connectivity between the Persian Gulf and the Black, Caspian, and Mediterranean Seas.

Based on this narrative, Armenia presents itself as a peaceful state pursuing economic cooperation with Azerbaijan. However, reality paints a different picture. Azerbaijan has adopted a measured approach to fostering long-term and sustainable peace in the South Caucasus. Armenian-Azerbaijani relations remain a decisive factor in stabilising the region, but Armenia's current actions undermine confidence in its stated intentions.

What are these actions? First, Armenia's actions include the acquisition of offensive weapons, raising doubts about whether it is preparing for peace or war. Acting on the instructions of its backers jeopardises progress in the peace process, which means futility of efforts to hold peace talks and misleading the global community. Weapons—especially offensive ones—are being sold, gifted, or supplied to Armenia in order to disrupt the peace process and exert control over it while interfering in South Caucasian affairs.

Second, Armenia refuses to amend its Constitution and related documents containing territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

Thirdly, Armenia has failed to meet its obligation to open ground transportation links between Eastern Zangezur in Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Discussing the establishment of railway communication is impossible without guaranteeing safe and unimpeded access from Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan. For many years, Armenians have denied the Azerbaijani people their right to transport connectivity with Nakhchivan.

The connection between Nakhchivan and other regions of Azerbaijan must be secure and uninterrupted. This commitment was formally undertaken by Yerevan in the trilateral statement of November 9/10, 2020. According to this agreement, neither border control nor customs procedures should apply to railway communication between Nakhchivan and the rest of Azerbaijan. The movement of individuals, vehicles, and cargo between these two parts of Azerbaijan should occur without stopping on Armenian territory. Consequently, what is transported and who is moving have no relevance to Armenia. Vehicles should pass through Armenian territory without checks or stops, as they are merely in transit. Customs and border procedures should logically apply only to those entering Armenia and stopping within its borders. 

Point 9 of the trilateral statement specifies that a section of territory with a special regime will be designated to facilitate these processes. This territory will be clearly defined, and various modes of transport—railway, automobile, and, if necessary, pipelines—will operate along this route. 

Additionally, the final paragraph of the statement states: "By mutual agreement of the parties, new transport communications connecting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be constructed." Legally, this means that after the signing of the statement, the implementation of Point 9 should no longer depend on Armenia's consent. Armenia's input will only be relevant during the construction of new transport links.