24 November 2024

Sunday, 20:23

SLEEPING BEAUTY

How Europe should behave

Author:

01.04.2022

Throughout its existence, the EU has been extremely cautious about military matters. In fact, there are institutions that coordinate the national defence agencies, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA), European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and so on. However, the idea of the widely discussed single European army is still not popular.

Some argue that defence is a matter for national governments, while the others claim that the EU is a peace project and should not be involved in the military. Many, however, wish that military and defence issues remain the prerogative of NATO.

 

No concept

However, as threats have increased, so has the number of supporters of greater EU military cooperation, who believe that Europe cannot always rely on the US or NATO. This was especially true during the presidency of Donald Trump, who threatened to leave NATO, which would eventually lead to its de facto dissolution. On the other hand, Britain’s withdrawal from the EU eliminated one of the biggest skeptics of increased military cooperation within the European Union.

In 2017, Jean-Claude Juncker, the then president of the European Commission, concluded it was time for the EU to invoke the Lisbon Treaty clause that takes European defence to the next level. “The time has come to wake up the sleeping beauty,” he said pompously unveiling the ambitious PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) project to integrate the armed forces of EU countries.

PESCO is an attempt by the EU to enhance its military capabilities without obliging all EU members to participate, as well as avoiding duplication with NATO. This is of particular concern to Eastern European countries, which see NATO as a crucial factor in countering threats from Russia.

Yet launched in 2018, PESCO has stalled badly since its inception. To wake up, the sleeping beauty lacked a pan-European defence concept.

Attempts to define the concept have been made before, but failed. One of such failures was a project called the EU Global Strategy launched in 2016.

According to EU leaders who mandated a new roadmap in 2020, the defence concept should be an analysis of the strategic environment. The concept is needed to bring greater coherence and a clear understanding of the EU's security and defence objectives. It is considered to be an action plan with concrete proposals and timelines for the next 5-10 years and covering the following four areas: more quick and decisive actions in crisis situations; protection of the EU citizens from rapidly changing threats; investment in the necessary means and technology; and cooperation with other countries and organisations to achieve common goals.

 

Inception. Russia

The EU's first draft defence strategy called the Strategic Compass was ready by November 2021. But after the war between Russia and Ukraine, it was hastily rewritten. The diplomatic approach of not naming the potential adversary was replaced by a wording designating Russia as an aggressor and a threat to European security.

In the first version, Russia was mentioned 6 times, only as a geographical neighbour. The final version referred to Russia 19 times, but in very strong terms mainly supported by Poland and the Baltic States. Section on ‘interaction with Russia on some specific issues’, which appeared in November, disappeared from the final version of the document altogether.

Definitions regarding nuclear risks have also been strengthened in the draft version, by and large, meaning a warning that "both Russia and China are expanding their nuclear arsenal and developing new weapon systems" and stressing that "the Russian leadership has used nuclear threats in the context of its invasion of Ukraine".

The final document endorsed at the EU summit on March 25 also states that "Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has confirmed the urgent need to significantly increase the military mobility of armed forces within and outside the EU".

After Russia and Belarus, named in the Strategic Compass as the main threats to the European Union, the next most relevant threats are China, unstable situation in the Western Balkans, terrorism in the African Sahel region (includes twelve countries from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea), and conflicts in the Middle East. European interests in the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific and Latin America are also noted in the document.

 

China, Turkey and others

The Strategic Compass indicates, albeit implicitly, that the EU thinks differently about China than the US and does not share all the views of Washington on combating China, hence using a more cautious wording. According to the EU, China is not an enemy, but a cooperation partner, an economic and systemic rival.

Nevertheless, the EU is critical of Beijing's actions: "China benefits from our differences, seeks to limit access to its market and seeks to promote its own standards on a global scale. It pursues its policies, including through a growing presence at sea, in space and on the Internet.”

Strategic Compass notes the tensions over the delimitation of maritime jurisdictional zones in the eastern Mediterranean, indirectly blaming Turkey. The EU also blames Turkey for using irregular migration as political pressure on Europe.

The EU Defence Concept mentions Turkey under the headings "partners" and "our strategic environment". There is also a statement there that can be interpreted as a cautious invitation to cooperation: "With Turkey participating in CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions and operations, we will continue to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. We remain committed to developing a mutually beneficial partnership, but this requires equal treatment from Turkey as well".

It is noted that maritime security in the Baltic, Black, Mediterranean and North Seas, as well as in Arctic waters and the Atlantic Ocean, is necessary for EU economic development, free trade, transport and energy security.

Africa's future is also of strategic importance to the EU, given the continent's economic and demographic growth.

Stability in the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa and the Mozambique Channel is indicated as an important security imperative for the EU, also because they are key trade routes.

In the Middle East and Gulf region, active conflict and instability threaten the EU's security and economic interests. Addressing nuclear non-proliferation issues in the region remains crucial, including through a return to the nuclear deal with Iran.

 

Difficult issues

Over the past couple of years, EU officials and leaders have consistently stated that they wanted the bloc to have more geopolitical weight in the world. However, the weeks leading up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine have seriously hit those expectations, as European countries have largely stayed away the US-Russian negotiations on European security.

Sceptics of the EU's centralised defence policy do not believe in the effectiveness of the rapid reaction force, which, according to the Strategic Compass, is planned to consist of up to 5,000 troopers only by 2025.

They argue that it is illogical to assume that the EU's federal defence policy will improve after more spending, pooling of resources or increased military procurement than the current institutions, including NATO.

They believe that after Russia's attack on Ukraine only timely and intelligent coordination by NATO allowed European countries to quickly organise the dispatch of weapons and military equipment from their national stockpiles.

If Brussels were to coordinate all these actions, the situation would be radically different. For example, it would take many meetings of the EU Foreign Affairs Council before the same decisions on arming Ukraine could be sanctioned. What if the EU member states supporting the Kremlin, such as Hungary, would block the actions? Or, could the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs supply arms on his own initiative or compel national ministers to do so? Would European citizens feel safer under such an alternative decision-making structure?

 

Appetite for power

"Europe has to learn to speak the language of power. Many people think of Europe as military power. Yes, but it is not only that. Europe has to develop an appetite for power, a desire to act, instead of repeating every day that 'we are concerned', 'we are very concerned', 'we are extremely concerned'. We have to be able to act," Josep Borrell, head of EU diplomacy, said back in 2020.

European states have so far effectively denied the establishment of authoritative organisation that would be responsible for EU’s foreign affairs and security policy. The first war on the continent in 77 years should finally show whether Europe is really capable of acting together or whether it is doomed to be only a "very concerned sleeping beauty".



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