Author: Kanan ROVSHANOGHLU
The second round of the fourteenth extraordinary presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), held on 28 June this year, saw the victory of the reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian, an ethnic Azerbaijani. The ninth president of Iran was elected following a vigorous electoral campaign and the highest voter turnout at polling stations in recent years.
In the initial round of voting, no candidate received a majority of the required votes. Consequently, only the two candidates with the highest number of votes, Masoud Pezeshkian (10.5 million) and Saeed Jalili (just over 9.5 million), proceeded to the subsequent stage of the electoral process.
The remaining two candidates, conservatives Mohammed Baghir Ghalibaf, who is the speaker of the Iranian parliament and was previously a general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Mustafa Pourmohammadi, who previously served as the Iranian minister of justice and interior, received a significantly smaller number of votes. The respective numbers were 3.3 million and 206,000. This indicates that, even in the initial phase of the voting process, the primary focus of attention was on the two leading candidates.
The official statistics published on the results of the second round indicate that Masoud Pezeshkian received 16,384,000 votes, while his opponent, conservative politician Saeed Jalili, received 13,538,000 votes. This represents an increase of approximately 10% in comparison to the initial phase of the popular vote. In the first round of voting, approximately 25 million individuals, or 40% of the electorate, participated. In contrast, the second round saw a voter turnout of 30.5 million, representing approximately 50% of the electorate.
"Unstable" Reformers VS "Stable" Conservatives
A consistent level of support for the conservative candidates was observed. It became evident that the number of citizens who voted for Saeed Jalili in the second round was almost equivalent to the total number of votes cast for the three conservative candidates in the first round.
It is noteworthy that in the same second round, Jalili was only able to narrow the gap marginally, while the number of those who supported Masoud Pezeshkian increased by almost 6 million, or nearly 54 per cent.
To rephrase, approximately six million individuals who had previously abstained from the electoral process participated in the Pezeshkian campaign. It appears that the reformers were able to garner greater support for the decisive round. It is similarly conceivable that a considerable number of those disgruntled with the conservatives' policies – predominantly supporters of the erstwhile Shah and groups advocating a boycott of the incumbent government in its entirety – participated in the elections with the express intention of ensuring their defeat.
Therefore, the decisive triumph of the reformist candidate can be regarded as a civic response to the conservatives, who have consolidated their influence across all branches of government. Furthermore, the elections have illuminated numerous additional issues.
The presidential elections in Iran can be considered a referendum on the Iranian political system. It is evident that there was a notable decline in voter participation at the national level. Accordingly, the 48 per cent turnout in 2021, when Ebrahim Raisi was elected, was interpreted not only as a loss of confidence in the Iranian political system, but also as an increase in the influence of the opposition both within and outside the country. The protests that commenced following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 were regarded as evidence of a dearth of popular support for the authorities.
Consequently, during the elections for the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts in March of this year, as well as during the extraordinary presidential elections, the religious-political leadership of the country placed the primary emphasis on ensuring an increase in voter turnout. Almost all representatives of the Iranian political elite, from the country's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, to influential generals and theologians, who have repeatedly appealed to the people to participate in the elections, have spoken openly about this.
The calls to action by the political elite were only effective in the context of the presidential elections. In this instance, only six candidates were permitted to participate, of whom only one was a reformer. This strategy enabled him to secure a substantial advantage in the second round of voting.
A further noteworthy aspect of the presidential election was the heightened level of engagement from ethnic minority groups. Pezeshkian's alignment with the reformist faction and his appeal to the Azeri electorate contributed to his success in those constituencies. To illustrate, following the conclusion of the initial voting phase, he secured a majority of over 75% of the ballots cast in East and West Azerbaijan, in addition to Ardabil. Furthermore, in regions with significant Baluchi and Kurdish populations, Pezeshkian garnered the support of approximately 60% of the electorate.
Both candidates placed a particular emphasis on campaigning in ethnic regions during the five-day run-off election campaign.
It appears that following Pezeshkian's electoral success, the use of ethnic appeals will become a prominent feature of Iranian elections. It is to be expected that presidential candidates will pay special attention to Azeris and other ethnic groups, which will represent a new stage in the history of Iran, particularly during the electoral period.
One positive outcome of the recent elections is the elimination of divisions in the political arena. Consequently, the schism between the reformist and conservative factions in the political sphere has diminished. Masoud Pezeshkian's victory is anticipated to reinvigorate the political processes in Iran, reinstate the reformers to the executive branch and place the responsibility for the country's future on their shoulders, which is crucial for the current religious-political regime.
Concurrently, a significant and tangible impediment emerged for conservatives and ultra-conservatives, who had assumed control of all branches of government. It is evident that, despite its opposition, the reformist wing encompasses a diverse political spectrum of figures who were active participants in the events of those years and who form part of the core of the Islamic Revolution. Nevertheless, the collective reputation of this group will not be adversely affected if they engage in dialogue with the West to lift sanctions and ease tensions with the U.S. and Europe, particularly given the heightened tensions over the past two decades.
On the other hand, and similarly, there is a diverse conservative movement that has developed an anti-Western sentiment. This has led to the justification of rapprochement with countries such as Russia and China, which is seen as a means of counterbalancing Western actions in the region. The deterioration of relations between Iran and the United States, and the subsequent violation of the terms of the nuclear agreement reached by the Obama administration, has had a significant impact on the viability of reformist ideas in Iran. This criticism was swiftly and effectively leveraged by conservatives, who accused the West of failing to fulfil its commitments and perpetuating "exploitative policies." Consequently, in nearly every subsequent election, the reformists were unsuccessful, while their opponents seized upon every opportunity to portray them as traitors and accuse them of bribery. These developments have contributed to the erosion of the Islamic Revolution system from within. In this context, Pezeshkian's electoral success can be viewed as a form of rehabilitation for the reformists.
Pezeshkian's Promises
The Iranian electorate has demonstrated substantial and unambiguous confidence in Masoud Pezeshkian. The newly elected ninth president will be required to address a number of significant challenges, including the impact of numerous sanctions and embargoes that have effectively isolated the Iranian economy.
New president asserts that it is feasible to mitigate sanctions and enhance the socio-economic milieu in the country through diplomatic engagement with the West. Indeed, the new administration, which includes former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, may be able to establish common ground with the Washington administration. However, should conservative Donald Trump be elected President of the United States in the autumn, it would represent a significant setback for his Iranian counterparts.
It would be erroneous to anticipate that Iran will alter its current political trajectory. There are rumours that the Supreme Leader of Iran has sent a letter to the President of Russia via the latter's Deputy, Mohammad Mokhber. The content of this letter is said to assure the Russian President that the course of bilateral relations will remain unchanged in the future. The veracity of this information remains to be seen. However, Pezeshkian, who enjoys the favour and trust of Iran's Supreme Leader, is unable to renounce the political course he currently endorses.
The election of Masoud Pezeshkian may provide a new impetus for Iranian politics and revitalise the struggle between political factions.
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