THE CAUCASIAN VECTOR OF GLOBAL MARATHON

The outcome of the unprecedented election marathon taking place around the world will have a serious impact on the global balance of political forces. This will undoubtedly affect the dynamics of political processes in various regions, including the South Caucasus. In the past six months alone, presidential races have been conducted in Russia and Iran, elections for the European Parliament and the parliaments of France and Great Britain have taken place, and the election marathon in the United States is currently active. Presidential elections have also occurred in Azerbaijan, where preparations for extraordinary parliamentary elections are underway. In neighbouring Georgia, these elections are scheduled for autumn. Even the municipal elections in Türkiye this March influenced the internal political dynamics in this critical country.

The balance of power at the conclusion of these processes may impact the nature of the negotiating dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as the prospects for a peace treaty between them.

Peace agenda as part of the US electoral process?

At this stage, the United States is keen on achieving a peace agreement as soon as possible. The State Department is making vigorous efforts to bring Baku and Yerevan to the negotiating table and actively moderate their discussions to facilitate the signing of a final agreement. This urgency is likely connected to domestic political and electoral objectives, along with a desire to significantly undermine Russia by resolving one of the longest-standing ethno-territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet space. As the elections draw nearer, these efforts are becoming increasingly persistent and intense. Concurrently, Washington tends to create an information narrative suggesting that both parties have reached concrete agreements during negotiations, portraying this as progress, which is also crucial for illustrating its significance as a moderator.

On July 15, US State Department spokesman Matthew Miller stated that (with US mediation) "both sides have made remarkable progress and come a long way." He added that "although an agreement has not yet been reached, the United States will not cease efforts until it is achieved." It is known that the electorate of the Democratic Party is quite diverse, encompassing representatives from various demographic groups, including national minorities. Among these, the Armenian Diaspora stands out prominently. It is the only national Diaspora represented in the legislative body of the USA by a coalition of over 100 congressmen and senators who advocate for Armenian interests. Among them are several notable individuals—prominent politicians within the Democratic Party. Notably, President Biden himself was a member of the Armenian caucus during his tenure as a senator. It is no coincidence that he became the first President of the United States to refer to the events in Ottoman Turkey in 1915 concerning Armenians as "genocide" in his address commemorating the anniversary.

This context explains why, on the eve of critical elections for themselves, Democrats are particularly eager to appeal to Armenian voters and demonstrate their commitment to supporting Yerevan in the negotiation process wherever possible. There have been blatant attempts by the United States to apply pressure, primarily on Azerbaijan, to alter its positions on some of the most challenging topics in negotiations.

When discussing the influence of the US electoral process on political dynamics in the South Caucasus, it is essential to highlight the unprecedented deterioration of US-Georgian relations following Tbilisi's adoption of the controversial "foreign agents law." The visit to Tbilisi by Uzra Zea, US Deputy Secretary of State for Civil Security, Democracy and Human Rights, was significant in this context. While in the Georgian capital, she met with representatives from both the Georgian opposition and authorities and reiterated her view that she considered the law anti-democratic, making its repeal a condition for restoring US-Georgian relations.

In general, Democratic administrations have traditionally prioritized "human rights" in their policies. They often accuse their Republican counterparts of neglecting this issue, thereby violating what they see as fundamental tenets of American foreign policy. Followers of President Donald Trump are known for pursuing so-called "isolationist" foreign policy approaches that tend to focus more on domestic political matters. In contrast, Democrats emphasize a foreign policy agenda centred on supporting democracies worldwide as a cornerstone of their approach. Here too, Uzra Zeya's demonstration of support for Georgia's "democratic forces" aligns with her party's overarching strategy, which currently requires concrete achievements that showcase the effectiveness of this policy amid heightened pre-election tensions.

Europe is not yet interested in the South Caucasus

Regarding other players, it seems that the EU will not prioritize Armenia and Azerbaijan in the near future. Additionally, Georgia appears to be off Brussels' radar for now, particularly while processes aimed at forming EU power structures and clarifying updated foreign policy priorities are underway. The new parliament began its work in July; however, Azerbaijani-Armenian normalization is not among its top priorities. There have been no statements concerning Tbilisi either.

The change of government in France and potential contradictions within the new coalition government—despite its pro-Armenian leanings—have pushed regional issues to a lower priority. Elections in other countries, particularly in the UK, will not influence the regional agenda at all. For London today, it is far more important to repair strained relations with the EU and optimize its support for Ukraine.

British interests in the South Caucasus currently appear relatively stable. Yet, the European Political Community summit held in England following the election of the new British government indicated that London aims to play an active role in shaping the European political agenda. In this regard, new British Prime Minister Keir Starmer's initiative to arrange a meeting between President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the summit in Oxford is noteworthy; however, it is known that Armenia declined to participate. Regardless, while "the first attempt did not succeed," it can be anticipated that the new British government will persist in efforts to foster dialogue between Baku and Yerevan in order to avoid allowing potential rivals to gain an advantage in this matter.

Concerning European priorities related to South Caucasus countries, it can be expected that as post-election fervor subsides in some European capitals, Brussels will start paying closer attention to developments in this region. The EU still has a stake in remaining within European interests. The recent European Parliament elections demonstrated that overall power dynamics have not shifted significantly; thus, existing priorities are likely to remain unchanged.

Brussels' recent contradictory actions—in particular, allocating €10 million from the European Peace Fund to support Armenian Armed Forces—raise questions about how effective it is to continue unilateral support for Yerevan while building divisions in the region that increase tensions with Baku. Moreover, an open confrontation with Georgia hardly aids in promoting European interests within this area.

Pezeshkian and the South Caucasus

The outcome of presidential elections in Iran may also influence political dynamics in the South Caucasus, especially regarding Azerbaijani-Armenian relations. The victory of Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist candidate and ethnic Azerbaijani, has raised concerns among segments of Armenian society and presumably among members of its political elite. During his campaign, Pezeshkian frequently emphasized the need to grant greater rights and opportunities to Iran's Azerbaijani-speaking population to use their language—particularly concerning education. This led Armenian society to speculate about potential deterioration in Armenian-Iranian relations; conversely, Azerbaijani society expressed hopes that Pezeshkian's presidency would result in a substantial warming of Azerbaijani-Iranian ties.

Meanwhile, the new Iranian president appears eager to pursue a policy aimed at reducing tensions along Iran's borders and is likely focused on fostering closer cooperation with regional states. This development opens up opportunities for implementing regional cooperation initiatives within a "3+3" format involving Tehran, Baku, and Yerevan. Moreover, there is a possibility that Tbilisi may join this format soon; such assumptions are already being discussed.

Baku seems optimistic about this prospect, and it appears that Yerevan—insisting on realizing its "peaceful crossroads"—is also willing to engage in regional initiatives. However, practical outcomes often depend on specific actions taken by various players.

The elections held in these countries are shaping a renewed political agenda. In particular, new foreign policy priorities will undoubtedly influence political processes within the South Caucasus. As this region distances itself from its conflictual past, external actors will find fewer opportunities to exert critical influence over events within its borders."