TEHRAN'S DILEMMA

The assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, occurring just a day after the inauguration of the newly elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, can be interpreted as an unfortunate start for the new head of state. Another confrontation between Iran and Israel could jeopardize the already fragile steps taken by the Iranian government to ease relations with the West. It is on this still unstable ground that the reformist Iranian president intends to build his foreign policy.

Nevertheless, Pezeshkian has expressed a desire to resume dialogue with the West, although this announcement came amid calls for revenge for the Arab leader's death. Interestingly, according to Western media reports, Washington dispatched a special delegation to Tehran to prevent a potential military conflict. Despite the bellicose statements from Iranian officials, an immediate retaliatory strike was postponed. During a meeting between Pezeshkian's newly formed government cabinet and Iran's religious leaders, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei green-lit the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the West.

He stated that the new Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abbas Araghchi, would be open to discussions with all parties and nations involved. However, the main condition from the Iranian side remains unchanged: "One cannot rely on the enemy, and government policy cannot be dependent on the West."

The current head of Iran's foreign ministry previously served as Deputy to Javad Zarif in Hassan Rouhani's administration and participated in negotiations regarding the nuclear program. In this context, Araghchi's appointment can be seen as a significant first step towards renewing nuclear talks between Iran and the West. His predecessor and former chief Javad Zarif, who held this position for only a few days, was forced to resign amid growing public criticism. However, it is quite possible that Zarif, even if remaining on the sidelines, will orchestrate the foreign policy of the new government team. 

Pezeshkian's Stronghold

Despite being part of the reformist wing of Iran's political elite, Masoud Pezeshkian has managed to secure full support from the country’s Supreme Leader, who has become his main patron both during and after the election campaign.

It seems that Iran's highest leadership deemed it necessary to place at least one branch of political power under Pezeshkian and the reformist wing's control. The objective is to halt the growing influence and takeover of key state positions by generals from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In fact, during the election campaign, it was Khamenei's support that prevented attacks on Pezeshkian from the IRGC and its affiliated circles.

It is clear that the military elite is not inclined to retreat. At the same time, the highest religious-political leadership may withdraw its support for Pezeshkian at any moment. The assassination of Haniyeh on Pezeshkian's inauguration day was a significant blow for him. However, postponing a retaliatory strike against Israel and receiving approval from the Supreme Leader for nuclear negotiations with the West can be viewed as a blank check for the president in his confrontation with the military. Yet, as noted earlier, a military conflict could disrupt all of this.

Naturally, the permission for negotiations was not granted to strengthen the position of reformists. Tehran understands that prolonged confrontation with the West diminishes its manoeuvrability and gradually pushes it towards alignment with Russia and China. Iran aims to position itself as a leading power in the region due to its ideological and military-political strength. Meanwhile, Western sanctions increasingly take a toll on Iran’s economy each year. To escape its current isolation and become a player respected by major powers, Tehran must maintain a transparent negotiation process with all interested parties. It is also crucial to consider Israel's current government's stance regarding Iran. As Tehran's principal regional rival, Tel Aviv aims to isolate it from the West, making it their primary target. This is why the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran feels an unprecedented urgency to break free from stereotypes like "rogue state" and expand opportunities for dialogue with all who are interested in cooperation.

An Emerging Positive Trend

At the end of August, national leader and former president of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov visited Iran, where he met with President Masoud Pezeshkian. The most notable outcome of this meeting was an agreement for exporting Turkmen gas to the European market via Iranian territory. An agreement was reached for gas transit to Turkey and Iraq with subsequent exports to Europe. This move can be seen as a form of political and economic support from the West for Pezeshkian. In any case, Western powers understand that for strengthening the authority of the new president and implementing his foreign policy, external support is essential. This goodwill gesture towards Tehran—more specifically towards Pezeshkian—was represented by the agreement for transporting Turkmen gas to Europe through Iran.

Trump and the IRGC

The main internal threat to Pezeshkian's government comes from the IRGC. The military is dissatisfied with the strengthening position and successes of the reformist president, particularly during such a turbulent period. Criticism directed at him is already emerging in conservative media known for their proximity to the country's military elite. However, since Pezeshkian has only recently begun assuming his presidential role and enjoys the backing of the Supreme Leader as well as public support in Iran, generals have so far hesitated to take serious action against him. Nonetheless, everything could change in an instant—should he falter.

Another threat for Pezeshkian is Donald Trump's potential victory in the US presidential elections. Trump has already stated that if elected president, he would sit down at the negotiating table with Iran—provided that Iran does not possess its own nuclear weapons. However, Trump's previous actions during his earlier administration remain fresh in everyone's minds, and there is no guarantee he would not revert to his old foreign policy stance upon re-election.

For instance, Trump's first actions as president in 2017 included efforts to create a Middle Eastern Arab coalition against Iran, withdrawing from the nuclear agreement reached by Barack Obama's administration in 2015, and subsequently signing a new package of harsh sanctions against Iran. As a result, tensions in the region escalated; Hassan Rouhani's government lost all its diplomatic achievements, and arguments from Iran's reformist wing advocating for negotiations with the West soon faded into obscurity. It was after this that Iranian conservatives gained powerful leverage, quickly succeeding in pushing reformists out of parliament and state positions. Thus, there is a significant likelihood that similar events could repeat themselves under Trump.

In this context, the upcoming US elections in autumn are crucial for Pezeshkian as well. Therefore, Trump and the IRGC are equally formidable enemies for the Iranian president.

Pezeshkian's Roadmap, or What to Expect in the Future?

The primary task for the new reformist president is to ease sanctions wherever possible and revitalize the economy. It is clear that both goals are interrelated. According to Pezeshkian, reviving Iran's economy will require $200 billion, half of which could be secured through external resources—in particular, foreign investments. Interestingly, Pezeshkian hopes to attract investments from Iranians living abroad, including in the US, rather than relying on China or Russia. In other words, Pezeshkian's government appears more hopeful for an agreement with the West. Additionally, delays in implementing a $400 billion investment project agreed upon with China in 2016 compel Tehran to seek alternative financing avenues for its economy.

Pezeshkian’s plans may also be hindered by another military conflict in the Middle East. Therefore, delaying a retaliatory strike against Israel can be considered a personal achievement for Pezeshkian and his administration.

However, it is important to remember that it is precisely the IRGC that holds control over missile launch capabilities. And generals are not particularly interested in reducing military tensions. In this context, the risk of a new conflict with Israel remains high. In other words, Pezeshkian's administration is poised for a series of significant challenges.