MORE THAN A VICTORY

A smear war, mutual accusations, clashes between supporters… Not for two decades has Turkish society been as polarized as it was in the run-up to the 30 March local elections. Leaders and representatives of political organizations have probably never been noted for such a degree of intolerance towards their opponents as they are now.

Despite their local nature, a whole number of factors have given the municipal elections nationwide importance, and this was mainly because  presidential elections will be held this summer, followed by parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2015. For that reason they were being described as seminal long before the March elections.

Pre-election situation

The protests of last summer, which began after the felling of trees in Gezi Park, became a test for the 12-year rule of the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi; AKP) and its permanent leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The way these protests were suppressed and the barrage of criticism from the Turkish and the world community, analysts believe, should have created the first cracks in the country's leadership. Relations were soured between the Turkish leadership and the heads of the western establishment which until now had always supported the AKP's policy. But the main blow for the ruling party was arguably its quarrel with its old ally, Fethullah Gulen, leader of the Hizmet international network movement.

The "Big Bribe" operation, which led to the arrests of relatives of high-ranking officials and influential businessmen, is believed to have been directed against the AKP leadership by Gulen's followers in Turkey's law-enforcement bodies. Erdogan took up the challenge and accused Gulen's movement of attempting a coup d'etat and creating parallel structures of state power. The confrontation got nasty after a whole number of reports of a compromising nature appeared on the Internet, including telephone calls unveiling a complex system of corrupt schemes within the government's bureaucratic apparatus, interference in the work of the media, and so on. The authorities, having accused Hizmet's representatives of interfering in the private lives of citizens, still did not deny that such facts existed.

At the same time a rapprochement was evident within the opposition parties. The left-wing Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi; MHP), analysts believe, in some way united around the Hizmet movement.

And shortly before the elections Turkish society was rocked by another outbreak of sleaze. An audio recording of a secret meeting involving Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, his advisor Feridun Sinirlioglu, the head of intelligence Hakan Fidan and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Yasar Guler, appeared on the Internet. But this time, Erdogan's opponents claim, they exposed a secret government plan to provoke an armed invasion of Syria. Davutoglu himself and Erdogan described the opposition's actions as "immoral and mean", after which the government embarked on the unpopular step of closing down the social networks Twitter and YouTube.

It would seem that after such high-profile disclosures a reduction in the proportion of electoral votes for Turkey's ruling party was inevitable. But despite the zeal of the mudslingers, the ruling party still won a resounding victory. What is more, when you consider that at the previous municipal elections in 2009 the AKP was restricted to just 38 per cent of the vote, the current 45 plus per cent was more than a victory. And this was more a victory for Erdogan than his political party as a whole.

Alone in a field of wars

After a continuous 12-year rule, the results achieved by Erdogan's party could be considered an impressive victory in any country, especially as the degree of vote-rigging, which the government is being accused of even with the revelation of irrefutable proof, could not affect the overall result.

Besides this, a crushing blow was also dealt to the expectations of Erdogan's opponents, who were hoping to the last for a completely opposite outcome to the elections. And it should be borne in mind that with the start of the "Big Bribe" process, Erdogan's political associates generally left him alone, forced to wage a struggle together just with the head of intelligence Hakan Fidan and Interior Minister Efkan Ala.

It remains a mystery as to what kind of magic wand Erdogan possesses that all these exposures failed to stop him winning after a keen struggle.   

At the height of his political career back in the mid-1990s Recep Tayyip Erdogan recognized a number of realities about Turkish society. In those days the majority of the Turkish population lived below the poverty line. Because of the political crises that followed one after the other, the country's economy entered a state of turbulence. And this, in turn, hit the disadvantaged sections of society. Apart from the poverty, they often had no elementary primary-school education. Such groups of people lived mainly in the depths of Anatolia, and even more often in the dormitory suburbs or outskirts of large towns. Earning a pittance, these mainly naive people often noticed that, unlike them, there was another, rather sparse section of society which, after the liberal economic reforms of Turgut Ozal, could afford the luxurious life of Olympian gods.  But politicians often do not share their warnings and demands and generally use words they do not understand, thinking about their electorate only when the next elections come around. Consequently, many felt "alienated". And any oppressed person is automatically turned for disadvantaged citizens of the same country into an object of empathy. It should also be borne in mind that a significant section of Turkish society are practising Muslims. They may not worship Islamic fundamentalism or be as radical as their fellow-worshippers in other countries but they are still quite a sizeable force. And as far as they are concerned, the feelings of the Muslim fraternity and the oppression of their brothers-in-worship are not empty words. 

Among the educated section of the population there are also a number of people with conservative views who openly yearn for the old days of Turkish world domination when the Ottoman Empire possessed vast territories covering three continents simultaneously. The symbiosis of this social order also gave a boost to Erdogan's meteoric career. When he was Mayor of Istanbul he was popular among the aforementioned sections of Turkish society because he did not come from a wealthy family and considered himself to be oppressed. Acting as "his own man" down to his roots, and openly abiding by the canons of political Islam, he made no secret of his love for his "great Ottoman forefathers". And at the peak of his fame he rose up and was given ten months in prison for excessive love of patriotic verse.

After ascending to the political Olympus Erdogan did not forget his own electorate and their preferences. His condemnation of Israel's policy, his public laments at the fate of the Palestinians, the marginalization of the secular section of society, the arrest of the generals and accusations against the country's army and scientific elite, who as usual believed themselves to be the defenders of Kemalist secularism, calls to venerate historical memory and repeated and unambiguous statements that the "New Turkey" is the successor of the Ottoman Empire enabled him to rally the aforementioned sections of society around him.

Apart from everything else, despite the fact that Erdogan and his associates have been in power for many long years, they still use the rhetoric of opposition and the principles of a war against evil.

And there is no let-up in the solidarity of the prime minister's supporters around him, as the results of the latest elections have shown. Their main argument is that even despite the corruption scandals, the ruling party still cares about the people, its needs and its aspirations. Here, of course, it would also be timely to mention the fact that in the twelve years of the AKP's rule Turkey has reached definite heights, especially in the economy. It has implemented immense economic and infrastructural projects which naturally had a hand in the ruling party's victory.

Analysts believe that their opponents' weakness ensured the AKP's victory to some degree. The opposition camp is in acute need of a charismatic leader. The CHP and the MHP also failed to organize a productive election campaign. "Obsessed" with criticism of the authorities in the wake of the corruption scandals, they failed to offer the people an effective plan of action in the event of their being elected.

Even if the MHP was able to win a couple of per cent more votes than at the previous elections they generally need a change in their rhetoric, because a rigid political policy and ignoring the changes and challenges of today will not allow the MHP to even reach the 20-per cent level. And the CHP, apart from everything else, has lost a certain section of their supporters who accused the leadership of a separatist alliance with Gulen's movement. Gulen's movement, or rather its defeat, was the biggest surprise of these elections. Of course, the movement did not openly and officially take part in the elections, but the anti-government actions of its supporters strengthened the hopes of the government's opponents that this would strongly affect the outcome of the elections. But as the results showed, the strengths of Gulen's movement were grossly exaggerated. Naturally, this would not have happened but for the fact that the main wave of Erogan's criticism was directed at Hizmet. The public accusations of the US and Israel of supporting the movement also had their effect.

It's all just beginning

The municipal elections are over and Turkey is already preparing for the next ones - the presidential elections scheduled for August. The results of the recent elections give Erdogan strength and advantage. But the AKP's party rules do not allow it to stand for election more than three times, and so consequently the incumbent prime minister has two options left: either to stand for president or, by changing the party's rules, to occupy the premier's seat for another five years after the 2015 parliamentary elections. But will it be as easy for him as it seems? It's hard to say.