NEW TRENDS

- During his visit to Azerbaijan, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani suggested creating a transport corridor from Iran to Europe via Azerbaijan and said that Baku can use Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf. In addition, there were very promising proposals on trade, finance and other fields. How feasible are these proposals in the light of the economic and political sanctions imposed by the West against Tehran?

- Firstly, the Iranian president is in favour of developing relations with Western countries and establishing closer ties with neighbouring states. It was with this sort of political agenda that Hassan Rouhani came to power. Today, the main task of the Rouhani government is the lifting of sanctions. An active negotiating process is under way, and therefore, the process of lifting the sanctions will continue in one form or another. For the time being, there are no barriers standing in the way. Secondly, Rouhani, like Erdogan once did, promised "zero problems with neighbouring countries". That is to say by eliminating conflicts and tensions and expanding economic ties with neighbouring countries, Iran wants to get broad access to foreign markets. Thirdly, an important point of Rouhani's foreign policy strategy is the focus on regionalism. He is in favour of strengthening regional organizations and an initiator of creating a coordinating centre of Caspian states with broad authorities. Rouhani supports the idea of not only economic, but also political unification of Caspian countries, demilitarization, increasing the security of the Caspian Sea and so on.

Over the period of his presidency Rouhani has had four meetings with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. His statements in Baku are fully consistent with the foreign policy strategy of Iran. We must note that any export of goods, including the export of Azerbaijani oil through Iran, is clearly economically beneficial to Baku. Even before the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, studies showed that the shortest path to international sea routes and international markets for Azerbaijan runs through Iranian territory. Rouhani's proposal to create a transport corridor by merging railways with Azerbaijan is also very promising. Iran is currently completing the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway. The merger of Iranian and Azerbaijani railways creates an Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia railway corridor that will be very simple and profitable for all participants.

- How will an agreement on Iran's nuclear programme affect the prospect for expanding cooperation between Tehran and neighbouring states?

- European countries are waiting for the official go-ahead. Even at a time when negotiations are under way, EU countries obviously have an interest in the Iranian market. Russia is doing the same. A year ago Moscow was considering the possibility of expanding ties with Iran. At the same time, the project of Iranian oil exports to Russia in exchange for some goods and services was born. According to the memorandum signed in August, Russia may purchase a certain amount of Iranian oil and re-export it. Thus, this Iranian oil is not subject to sanctions. In exchange, Russia offers Iran goods and services.

Given the geopolitical role of Iran and the situation in the Near and Middle East, it is obvious that without Iran's participation it is impossible to solve the problem of ISIS, end the war in Syria, stabilize the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and address other regional issues. Objectively, the US and the EU understand that. For example, the United States has contacts with Tehran without publicly announcing them, has partially unfrozen Iranian assets in banks and has allowed Iran to sell a certain amount of oil on the international market. The French are negotiating with Iran to stabilize the situation in Lebanon. By the way, the UN Security Council did not impose oil sanctions on Iran, they were imposed by the United States, Canada and several European countries. These sanctions are bypassed in various ways. Here it should be emphasized that the sanctions do not relate to interaction in terms of railway construction.

Even if the process of lifting the sanctions is postponed, we can find some corridors in the proposals of Rouhani and develop projects that will not be affected by the sanctions.

- In the recent past, Azerbaijan and other countries were at odds with Iran on the issue of dividing the Caspian Sea. In Baku, Rouhani proposed using the wealth of the sea together with Azerbaijan. What does that message mean?

- Iran has always talked about the equal division of the Caspian Sea. It is, relatively speaking, the division of the seabed and water into equal 20-per-cent shares. Now the radical nationalist forces in Iran have been replaced by moderate and pragmatic politicians. The political elite and society understand that it is impossible to review and refuse the agreement on the division of the Caspian signed by the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In Iran they realize that they have to bilaterally agree on the division of the Caspian Sea with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. At the Astrakhan summit, it was agreed that a 25-mile zone will be in the area of economic and national jurisdiction. Iran agreed to this proposal.

- Does the 25-mile zone for Iran exceed what Tehran had under the Soviet-Iranian agreement on the Astara-Hasankuli line?

- Yes, the 25-mile zone is more than stipulated by the Soviet-Iran agreement concluded in the 1940s. Under the agreement with the USSR, Iran received about 13 per cent of the sea area. But in Tehran they believe that the agreement on Astara-Hasankuli says that the Caspian Sea is divided equally between the two countries, the Soviet Union and Iran. By the way, no documents have anything specifically about the maritime border with Iran. The Astara-Hasankuli line was first mentioned in Soviet documents in the late 1930s, when the NKVD ordered border guards to protect the line as the border of the Soviet Union. It was not an agreement with Iran. Drawing a line between the coastal towns of Astara and Hasankuli, where the land border with Iran begins, was an internal decision of the Soviet government. As the Soviet Union had a strong Caspian fleet and was a powerful state in general, Iran never disputed the border with the Soviet Union. No one asked for Iran's opinion about the border, and Tehran never had a navy in the Caspian Sea in the modern sense.

- Rouhani offered broad cooperation in the energy field. In particular, he noted the prospects of the Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia economic axis. In fact, Tehran, Baku and Moscow are competitors on the energy market...

- Objectively, the demand on the market of hydrocarbons is so high that there are enough customers for everyone. There is a good example of coordination of actions between oil exporters within the framework of OPEC. The latest crisis with oil prices showed that the closer oil exporters cooperate and the more there are agreements on volumes and single export policy, the easier it will be to conduct a common energy policy. A sound policy for the future is a very good thing. We can engage in sensible competition.

- Can Iran play any positive role in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict?

- Any conflict in the Caucasus has a negative impact on the situation in Iran, as the country has a large Armenian diaspora and a huge Azerbaijani community, which has tens of millions of people. From this perspective, the "smoldering" conflict on the northern border cannot but disturb Tehran. Iran has economic relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia, and of course, it is interested in ensuring peace in the region.

- You mentioned Azerbaijanis in Iran. In Azerbaijan, some circles believe that Tehran is not particularly interested the Azerbaijan Republic being a prosperous and developed nation.

- The reasonable and pragmatic Iranian political circles have never expressed a negative attitude to Azerbaijan's right to independence and self-rule. Iranian Azerbaijanis, whose number exceeds all other ethnic groups living in the country, are incorporated into Iranian society. Suffice it to say that Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is Azeri. Among the highest political elite you can find a lot of Azerbaijanis. I have lived in Tehran for a long time, and there are a lot of Azeris in major Iranian cities. According to our observations, among ethnic minorities, although the Azeris can hardly be called a minority, and among the various ethnic groups, there is opposition to the Iranian government, separatism and centrifugal sentiment, but in the whole country opposition organizations and groups account for 10-15 per cent of the population. The main part of the population orients itself to Tehran. With the advent of Rouhani, new trends appeared in the national policies of Iran. If the former authorities sought to unite the whole population of the country on the basis of Shiism and Persian language, they have now come to the conclusion that it is necessary to recognize the cultural diversity of the Iranian population. They have started speaking openly about it. Rouhani has a special assistant for affairs of national minorities.

The country has developed a Code of Civil Rights, which stipulates that the country should recognize its cultural and linguistic diversity. Rouhani raised the question of opening national schools where teaching is conducted in both languages. But we must realize that building a full-scale system of education in minority languages requires personnel, finances, time, and other factors. That is to say the Iranian authorities are gradually moving away from the suppression of national identity and recognize national diversity.