YEMEN FAULT LINE

Shia Houthi rebels of the Ansarullah movement have seized power in Yemen. At the request of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Saudi Arabia has started carrying out air strikes against Houthi positions. Nine countries have linked up with Saudi Arabia: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and Sudan.

Sergey Serebrov, a senior research associate at the Centre for Arabic and Islamic Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, shared with R+ his thoughts about how this conflict might develop.

- Yemen is now the third country after Syria and Iraq where a war is being waged between the proponents of inter-religious Islamic sects. How will the conflict in Yemen develop, bearing in mind that troops of other Arabic countries are taking part in the fighting against the Shia rebels?

- The situation in Yemen is different because the Ansarullah Zaidi movement has moved from the position of an outsider to join the ranks of the leading political forces in the Yemen, having gained the upper hand over the Muslim Brotherhood Salafi rebels and the powerful group of tribes of the Sheikh al-Ahmar clan of the al-Islah Party. This came as a complete surprise during the UN Security Council-monitored peace process on a settlement to the crisis in Yemen, which began in 2011. This scenario was evidently not a part of the plans of the US and Saudi Arabia. Just as unforeseen was the birth of the fanciful (because of their completely opposing objectives) alliance between Ansarullah and the bloc of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who remained leader of the country's leading party GPC (General People's Congress) and also maintained great influence over the elite units of the Yemeni army. The former enemies were united by rivalry against an even more dangerous enemy - the al-Islah Party, solidarity with which was declared by AQAP (al-Qa'eda in the Arabian Peninsula).

It should be pointed out that the Zaidi community, in the heart of which the Houthi clan was formed in the 1990s, constituted the nucleus of the Yemeni state from the 9th century until 1962. Through its religious doctrine Zaidism is regarded as the closest school to the Sunni doctrine in the Shia branch of Islam.

Important events preceded the spiral of political tension which created the situation of diarchy in Yemen. The first was President Hadi's statement of voluntary resignation on 22 January 2015, together with a similar statement by the head of the new cabinet of ministers. The second was the start of negotiations under the aegis of the UN to create new temporary power bodies to fill the vacuum. At the same time, the Houthis created their own administrative bodies for the period of the power vacuum and the conducting of a dialogue - the Supreme Revolutionary Council and the Supreme Security Committee (headed by the defence minister from the last government). The third event was the sudden return to power of President Hadi on 21 February and his move to Aden.

While all this was going on negotiations were continuing in Sana'a in the presence of the UN's special envoy in Yemen, Jamal Benomar. But simultaneously Saudi Arabia was going full steam ahead with its preparations for a strike against Yemen and responding to Hadi's call to begin an invasion, which he made from Aden.

This move de facto cancelled out the UNSC's mission and the whole plan for a peaceful settlement which al-Riyadh had sponsored. But who sanctioned this invasion? President Obama's expressed support for the military operation points to the fact that the US' authorities were well informed and apparently gave the go-ahead: but not the UN.

- There are sizable Shia communities in Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait and even Saudi Arabia itself. Is there not the threat of a major war between the Sunnis and the Shias which would encompass the whole Middle East region and involve the Central Asian countries?

- The expansion of the Shia-Sunni battle line has already led to a humanitarian and political catastrophe for many countries of the Middle East. Peace has been observed for many centuries in Yemen between the Zaidis and the Shafiites, the two leading traditional communities in the country who make up 97 per cent of the population. I believe the Yemenis have drawn lessons from the events which have led to a maelstrom of religious strife in the countries. The focus on al-Qa'eda as the catalyst for the stirring of such a conflict in Yemen has not so far been justified, and this scenario could die out there.

However, the risk is still there, but the instigators are playing with a double-edged sword.

There is an increasing likelihood of Iran becoming directly drawn into a conflict with Saudi Arabia over the strike against Yemen, and this would be a real catastrophe not just for this region and the whole Islamic world, but for the continent in general, too.

- The Saudi-led coalition is already carrying out air and naval operations against the Yemeni rebels. If there is a successful outcome to the military campaign in Yemen, will the coalition go on and continue to fight in Syria?

- In the event of a rapid success in Yemen this coalition, led by al-Riyadh, will undoubtedly try to consolidate itself as a new realistic force as a counter to Iran and it is very likely that it will take part in overthrowing Syrian President al-Assad.

But at the moment it is hard to see even the objectives of this invasion apart from an attempt to physically wipe out the Ansarullah leaders and completely eliminate the military infrastructure of this, the poorest country in the Arab world. The main objective of the task force, against whose camps strikes are now being carried out, is the struggle against AQAP, into which the US has invested colossal sums since 2002.

Many people in Yemen may be happy that such an enormous blow has been inflicted on the Houthis at the start of this operation. But, at the same time, many Yemenis will certainly be aware that a strike has been aimed against the defence capability of the whole country. Then the Yemenis may start to protest and an unforeseen scenario may begin that rules out an easy victory for the interventionist coalition.

Al-Riyadh's position could also deteriorate and then a reverse prediction would have to be made. It is too early to say. The main thing is that the operation began when the peaceful prospects of a solution to the crisis had not yet been exhausted and ways could be seen for a practical entry into the final stage of a settlement. The military operation has also created extremely high risks for the whole oil region and for peaceful transport corridors.

[Q] How can you explain Saudi Arabia's hasty reaction to the formation of an "Arab NATO" and the instantaneous start of the hostilities by the military coalition? Do you get the impression that the Saudis have perceived the events in Yemen as a challenge from their main rival Iran?

- Al-Riyadh started to react immediately after the Houthis entered the capital Sana'a on 21 September 2014 and proposed stepping up the implementation of the decisions of the GPC. The Peace and National Partnership Agreement that was signed at the time enhanced the role of Ansarullah and the Southern Peaceful Movement (al-Hirak) in the settlement process. In previous agreements they appeared as outsiders of the political process. This was the main reason for the concern of al-Riyadh who saw in this a threat to their age-old interests in Yemen. Washington, too, sensed a danger to its interests.

However, the US found itself in a rather difficult position because overt action against Ansarullah would place them on the same front line as AQAP, which has declared a Jihad against Ansarullah. Such a turn in American politics would be extremely difficult to explain to public opinion in the US and in Congress.

The initiative for the strike belonged to Saudi Arabia, but their objectives are defined by the joint American-Saudi headquarters set up in al-Riyadh. This, evidently, constitutes the logistical and intelligence support for the operation from Washington, which President Obama spoke about. In this connection, the fact that the coalition is striking precisely at the anti-terrorist infrastructure - i.e. Yemeni task force bases which the Americans themselves prepared for the fight against al-Qa'eda - appears very strange. They are controlled not by the Ansarullah movement, but probably by former president Saleh, whom the US regarded as the backbone of the anti-terrorist campaign for nearly ten years!

Why is it necessary to destroy the military infrastructure targets which are needed to oppose al-Qa'eda, undercutting the fruits of the whole of the US' long anti-terrorist campaign in Yemen? This, too, is a sticky question. Will this not untie the hands of the extremists in Yemen when the campaign is over?

As far as Europe and Russia are concerned, they have already demanded an immediate end to the coalition strikes against Yemen.

- Turkish President Erdogan has directly accused Iran of stirring up a civil war in Yemen…

- The members of the coalition see Ansarullah as a proponent of Iran's interests on the basis of the frequent contacts between their representatives and the signing of trade and economic agreements. But didn't al-Riyadh refuse to continue financial aid to Yemen which didn't even have the money to pay the wages of its civil servants in February? Iran was ready to come to the aid not so much of the Houthis as to rescue statehood in Yemen, which could hardly be interpreted as turning Yemen into an Iranian puppet.

There are also some crossing points in the views of the leaders of the Houthis and Iran. Houthi ideologists regard the US' global anti-terrorist campaign against al-Qa'eda as a pretext for broad interference in the sphere of Arabic Islamic interests. They are critical of al-Riyadh's role in the Arab world following the establishment of their strategic partnership with Washington. Like the majority of leaders of the Arab world, they also accuse Washington of collusion with Israel. Indeed, the Houthis see Iran as a country which has not submitted to US' pressure and has stayed in its own socio-cultural space, preserving its Islamic identity. The fact that the Iranians are also Shias has been the subject of pride of the Houthis. But no more than that.

Having contacts with Iran does not mean that the Houthis are not interested in cooperation with Saudi Arabia. I believe that if Ansarullah started to influence the foreign policy of a future Yemen, it would be in strengthening that country's role as a moderator in relations between the IRI and Saudi Arabia and in reducing differences between them. The effect would be therapeutic, not confrontational.

Turkish leader Erdogan is well aware that the Houthis are not Iran's henchmen, but as the leader of a Sunni country which had influence in Yemen in the past, he could not stay on the sidelines. The interests of a large number of countries that want to show that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not the only contender to "special status" in this part of the peninsula have now crossed in Yemen.

- How might the war in Yemen affect oil prices?

- A third of the world's trade and a large part of oil supplies to Europe runs through the Gulf of Aden. The start of the military campaign in Yemen was a blow to the security system in this region, and that means the interests of Europe and its energy security. World oil prices have also started to increase.

- Some western politicians are drawing parallels with what is happening in Syria and Yemen and the 30-year war between Catholics and Protestants. How will events develop in the future?

- There is one more painful conflict in Yemen - the ancient and firm desire of the people of the former PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] to arrange a final "divorce" with the North (the former YAR [Yemeni Arab Republic]), with whom they were united in 1990. The southerners want their independent state back for many strong reasons. This demand has been the basic slogan of al-Hirak since 2009.

One may naturally ask: how will the foreign invasion affect the prospects of preserving Yemen's territorial integrity? I think it will definitely affect them badly. But it may not just be a splitting of the country into North and South. The long overall instability in Yemen has led to a weakening of state-run institutions, especially in the South. A threat has appeared not just of splitting the country into North and South.

How might this affect the map of the peninsula? For example, the KSA has long since shown an interest in Hadhramaut, the largest province in area in the east of South Yemen. In the past this interest consisted of creating a window from the KSA directly to the shores of the Arabian Sea, bypassing Hormuz. Now that most promising oil fields in Yemen have been discovered and are being developed in Hahramaut, this could ignite regional separatism.

So, unfortunately, the threat of Yemen breaking up into parts and regions of influence of various forces should also be taken into account. But this could occur in the event of the final degradation of the whole state system in Yemen, an important element of which is its military component, under coalition strikes.

There is also another scenario in which the military intervention of the coalition headed by Saudi Arabia would arouse the consolidation of the Yemenis to repulse the act of aggression. One has to bear in mind that in Yemen Saudi Arabia is associated not just with rich neighbours and a place of employment for hundreds of thousands of Yemeni migrants. The historical memory of today's Yemenis retains several episodes showing the negative face of Saudi Arabia because of the raids that inflicted colossal damage to the civilization of this ancient region. The historical conscience factor could have an appreciable impact on how the Yemenis act in this situation.

Pockets of discontent could emerge within Saudi Arabia where Shias and ethnic Yemenis also live. I recall that three provinces, which are now part of Saudi Arabia, were previously regarded as a part of the Yemeni vilayet of the Ottoman Empire - Asir, Najran and Jizan. They shifted to Saudi Arabia after the Saudi invasion in 1934 according to the Treaty of Taif.

If the flame of the conflict spreads to Saudi territory, the whole scenario will have to be re-written. Therefore, an immediate end to the military invasion of Yemen and a return of all the Yemeni sides to the peace process are the best solution to this situation.