"GREXIT" DEFERRED

The dramatic events in Greece and surrounding her affects the fates of both the country of Ancient Hellas as well as the whole of the European Community. What will become of Greece, which is bogged down in debts of inconceivable size to world creditors? And in what form will the European Union come out of the Greek crisis? Will it be a stronger continental structure capable of successfully overcoming internal problems or an amorphous organisation deprived of any prospects of long-term unity, just a puppet in the hands of the bosses of global politics and business?

The fate of Greece whose foreign debt exceeds 312bn euros was decided at a eurozone summit in [the Belgian capital] Brussels. Few people expected any kind of breakthrough from this forum. For, in spite of the will of the leading European Powers and the "troika" of creditors (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund), the results of the referendum which took place in Greece demonstrated the lack of desire by most of the country's population to accept the ultimatum proposed by the Western financial institutions' on extending the loans in exchange for cuts in social programmes. The head of the left-wing radical Greek government, Alexis Tsipras, assessed these results as indicating that they had received a mandate from their own people, which he promised to make use of as far as he could in the negotiations with the creditors.

Nevertheless accords were reached at the eurozone summit in Brussels which boil down to the following: the European countries and financial institutions will continue to render support to Greece, which will however have to meet the hard-hitting conditions of the creditors all the same. The accords envisage the impermissibility of allowing Greece to go bankrupt and the need to retain the country in the eurozone. Both the majority of Greek and European politicians are convinced that both Greece and the European Union have a vital interest in the latter. The agreement envisages the advancement of a programme for Greece of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) containing "in-depth reforms and financial support".

Within the framework of the programme, Greece will be assigned 82-86bn euros over three years. Of these 35bn euros will be allocated for stimulating economic growth. It is proposed that another approximately 50bn euros should be made available in exchange for Greek assets in the form of land and property, which will be auctioned off. At the same time, Athens has agreed to the setting up of a 50bn euro fund, 25bn euros of which will be used for recapitalising the Greek banks.

As a condition for receiving the bailout, Athens has to urgently carry out a number of hard-hitting structural reforms in the national economy, which presuppose a substantial reduction in benefits and may, as consequence, lead to a drop in living standards for a considerable part of the Greek population. Therefore the following question is quite reasonably being asked: can the accords achieved in Brussels be regarded as answering the interests of Greece and its people? You see, the conditions of the bailout which will be granted to Greece by the European Union, are no easier than the measures stipulated in the agreement between the "troika" and Athens proposed up till now, which resulted in the protest  by the majority of Greeks in the referendum? 

It is not surprising that Athens was gripped by protests immediately after the Brussels' summit. Those attending the rallies complained that Greece was being blackmailed, being turned from a country into a "colony of capital and state debt". Their own government, which they accused of "betrayal of the Greek people", was the target of the protesters' criticism. The protesters are indignant that Tsipras and his cabinet first found out the opinion of the people who responded with "no" to the demands of the creditors, but then the summit in Brussels ignored the results of the Greek referendum, subjecting Tsipras to their will.

In Brussels the Greek prime minister was undoubtedly subjected to extremely strong pressure on the part of the creditors, who made him understand that in any case Greece should repay its debt and the results of the referendum meant absolutely nothing to them by the same token. It is not accidental that Tsipras admitted that his country had simply been forced "to go down a one-way street". So, in desperately trying to show the mighty creditors all the strength of the Greek opposition, he had to give up. Tsipras was not able to influence the radical change in the programme proposed by the creditors, the purpose of which was repayment of Athens' debts by a policy of "austerity".

Nevertheless, the fact that he managed to prevent the catastrophic impoverishment of large groups of the population and the collapse of the country's banking system by retaining Greece in the eurozone can be counted among his assets. Moreover, Tsipras himself does not conceal the fact that, even with all the compromises that he has made, he does not believe that the bailout measures proposed by the European leaders to save the Greek economy will be effective, although he is prepared to implement them. He even said that he took upon myself the responsibility for all the mistakes he had made, he took responsibility for the text he had signed, although he did not believe in it.

This statement does perhaps seem paradoxical, even too paradoxical, for a politician who, at a critical moment, took upon himself the burden of responsibility for the further fate of Greece. Therefore, it is thought that these words are no more than an attempt, albeit somehow to a certain extent, to justify, in the eyes of millions of his fellow countrymen who have put their trust in him, Tsipras, being at the front of the vanguard of the Greeks' latest struggle for independence.

Not only has the Greek prime minister, however, expressed scepticism with regard to the Brussels' accords, but also the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is a member of the cohort of Greece's main creditors. The Fund has criticised the international agreement reached in Brussels and stated that the sum of approximately 85bn euros which will be granted to Greece within the framework of the bailout programme may not be sufficient for her. The IMF's recommendation consists in the creditors possibly giving Greece a preferential term of 30 years before she will be able to repay the debts, as well as cancelling part of them.

Nevertheless, the so-called bailout has gone ahead. Neither Greece itself nor the European Union are preparing to reject the conditions in the agreement, to judge from the results of the parliamentary vote conducted in that country. The majority of the deputies in the Greek parliament supported the bill on urgent measures to hold talks and conclude the agreement on the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM)", submitted by the government, the adoption of which was a condition for the start of the new bailout programme to save the country's economy. The bill was supported by the majority of deputies on the right of the SYRIZA party and other factions, with the exception of the Communists and the ultra-right-wing "Golden Dawn" party.

Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that the implementation of the European plan managed to go ahead without any kind of political excesses occurring in Greece itself. It is not just that fresh demonstrations might occur, but protest moods within the SYRIZA party government itself are gathering strength. At any rate, as practice shows, Greece is an unpredictable country that is able to come up with surprises.  The bosses of the European economy and politics know this all too well and not just from hearsay.

Moreover, problems within the European Union itself which directly affect the prospects for euro-integration have once again come to light owing to the events surrounding the Greek crisis. Yes, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, called the accords reached in Brussels "a typical European agreement" representing a "compromise in which there are no winners and no 

losers". But the vigilant observers and experts could not fail to spot the serious contradictions between the two locomotives of European unity, namely France and Germany. France is obviously concerned about the strengthening of not only Berlin's economic positions (this has long become a fact), but also about its claims to absolute leadership in Europe. 

Germany is one of the leading creditors, to Greece among others, and this circumstance is influencing the Germans' striving to obtain a guarantee that the debts will be repaid. Germany is effecting an undisguised political dictate as a tool 

for bringing pressure to bear on Athens, the like of which Europe was last faced with during the Second World War. Therefore, although standing on ceremony with German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the eurozone summit in Brussels, French President Francois Hollande unexpectedly demanded that the issue of Greece leaving the eurozone should not be discussed. That is, he opposed the step that the Berlin politicians, in particular Germany's influential finance minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, were ready to undertake, insisting on "Grexit", Greece's temporary exit from the eurozone. French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, calling upon the deputies of the country's National Assembly to approve the apportionment of a new bailout package to Athens, stated that the 'Everyone for himself" cannot be the language of Europe and that they should not give up on Greece and the Greeks, adding that Greece's place was in the eurozone and in the European Union." Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi joined Paris in this view, stating that Italy was a country which was also paying just as much attention to Germany's leadership aspirations in the European Union.

The USA is in a winning situation in the conditions of growing contradictions within the European Union. The political and financial elite in Germany and France and other leading countries in Europe are ultimately calculating precisely on the patronage of the United States as a key buttress in the Euro-Atlantic space. The weight of Europe's problems appears to be an excessive burden to its main players, even if individual states like this same Germany are striving to be the first among the first.

This factor considerably heightens the probability of a Trans-Atlantic agreement being concluded, which would envisage the integration of the European and American economies under the aegis of the USA. So, the influence of this same "Trans-Atlantic" circumstance may well affect the further development of the notorious Greek crisis (and perhaps it will be overcome it following a recipe of the Old and New Worlds).