RESET THE KAZAKH WAY

Actually, it has been clear since January 2019 that the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev would dismiss the government soon, when he publicly criticised the ministers, calling them "cowards." The Cabinet and the National Bank were severely reprimanded for failing "to fully create real incentives and tools for a qualitative growth of the national economy." Nazarbayev emphasized that the government could not fulfil his order to improve the public welfare, GDP growth was mainly provided "at the expense of raw materials," many social issues were resolved purely formally, just for a tick, and in general, officials were not able to work with the population, listen to people's problems, explain their position to them. That is why Prime Minister Bakytzhan Sagintayev and some of his colleagues lost their seats on February 21.

The heads of the ministries of foreign affairs, internal affairs, defence, justice, health, culture and sports, energy, and finance (who also became Deputy Prime Minister) retained their positions. At the same time, new ministers of labour and social protection, education and science, agriculture, and national economy were appointed. The Ministry of Information and Communications was abolished and replaced with the Ministry of Information and Public Development. The head of the National Bank was also changed.

The new prime minister of Kazakhstan is the former first deputy head of government, 53-year-old Askar Mamin. Mamin previously led the national railway company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, was the mayor of Astana, and minister of transport and communications. It is said that he enjoys great confidence of Nursultan Nazarbayev. Mamin is also considered a talented and experienced manager.

"Socio-economic situation in previous years was stable. This is definitely a positive thing. However, this is not enough now... Positive changes have not been observed in many sectors of the national economy, despite the adoption of many laws and government decisions," Nazarbayev said as if declaring the main task of the new government. There is a clear intention to strengthen the social sphere, with an emphasis on regional development, tangible improvement in the quality of life, and the creation of social infrastructure. At the last convention of the Nur Otan Party, which coincided with the 20^th anniversary of this political organisation, Nazarbayev also proposed measures to strengthen social support and improve the quality of life in Kazakhstan.

Immediately hot on the trail, Askar Mamin ordered to speed up the development of the next stage of the Nurlyzhol program for 2020–2025, again noting that its main task is to improve the quality of life of citizens. Nurlyzhol is a state program for infrastructure development, including the strengthening of housing infrastructure.

The ongoing events can be viewed as a kind of reset, aimed at solving the accumulated social problems caused by falling incomes and rising prices and tariffs, increasing unemployment, and stagnation in small and medium businesses. Some events of the last year, especially such resonant ones as the tragic death of the Olympic champion, figure skater Denis Ten, also sharply raised the need for reforms in the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time, any reboot is impossible without at least a partial update of the system's components. That is why now in Kazakhstan there is a process of updating the political elite.

Another crucial moment of Kazakhstan’s domestic policy, which is increasingly popular both in and out of the country and closely associated with this process, is a claim that the establishment of a new cabinet is the first stage of preparing the ground for the transit of power. Remarkably, it was Nazarbayev himself who gave rise to such thoughts, when in early February, he suddenly asked the Constitutional Council to clarify paragraph 3 of Article 42 of the Constitution, which specifies the terms for the termination of presidential powers. The powers of President Nursultan Nazarbayev will expire in 2020 with the next presidential election scheduled for April. According to the constitution, Nazarbayev, as the first president of Kazakhstan, can be elected to this position an unlimited number of times.

However, the president then made a special statement that there would be no early presidential election, and his appeal to the Constitutional Council was a routine one, for the Constitution of Kazakhstan does not explicitly specify the terms under which the president can leave his post voluntarily or resign. Indeed, according to local experts, the Kazakh constitution states that in case of early leave of office, there is no procedure such as the resignation of the president for personal or political reasons. President of Kazakhstan can leave his post earlier due to either "sustained inability to fulfil his or her duties due to illness", or in the case of resignation for treason. There are many comments on this subject, but it is still not clear whether Nazarbayev has the right to leave the office for personal reasons. "Yes, the president has the right to declare early elections by law, but we do not need to worry about it. Let's calm down and work normally," president reassured everyone. But doubts in the expert community still remain.

One of the popular questions these days is why then did the president need to appeal to the Constitutional Court? It is clear that he has made numerous requests before and this is indeed a routine procedure. But the issue itself is not. It seems that the authorities has intentionally made the issue public with a specific goal in mind. It is possible but still unlikely that Nazarbayev simply wanted to emphasize that he would like to leave the office himself but he cannot. Even less likely is the assumption that elites, who understand the inevitability of the transfer of power, are trying to secure a place in advance for the next leader of the country and therefore can now push the incumbent president to some steps that the public does not understand. However, given the scale of political figure of Nazarbayev, it is doubtful that he would make moves following someone else’s plans. Rather the opposite.

It seems that Nazarbayev is exploring the situation to prepare a solid stage ground. In particular, last year the chairman of the Senate of the Kazakh Parliament, Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, in his interview with BBC said that it was likely that Nursultan Nazarbayev would not take part in the next presidential elections scheduled for 2020. Then Tokayev quickly recovered, noting that his words were taken out of context and initially had a completely different meaning. Yet, apparently, some people showed their real face — someone whom the president wanted to test. As to the stage ground, then last year’s change in the status and authority of the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the introduction of a lifelong presidency of Nazarbayev indeed look like the construction of a fairly solid foundation.

Further scenarios of what may occur in the political field of Kazakhstan vary, and it is clear why. Yet the following one seems to be the most realistic one: Nazarbayev is re-elected in 2020 keeping his successor in mind. During this time, that individual will have to strengthen his position and authority both among the elites and, most importantly, among the people, in order to become the next president of Kazakhstan. Then Nazarbayev can choose a good moment and voluntarily resign, continuing to control everything as chairman of the Security Council, as well as the Chairman of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan and the Nur Otan party.

Obviously, Nazarbayev understands that he alone is the most important decision maker in the country. At the same time, the new president, whoever he is, will not have, at least initially, the same authority that Nazarbayev has. Thus, like any good leader, Nazarbayev makes the right move trying to unload the system in a multi-vector way so that it does not freeze when the lead actor leaves the stage. It would probably be more appropriate to say that Nazarbayev is not trying to secure himself a successor (after all, he will be elected by popular vote), but rather the continuity of the vertical of power he has built for many years and all its mechanisms, as well as foreign policy. To implement this plan, it is required to ensure economic stability and consensus within the ruling elite. That is exactly what the president and government of Kazakhstan are doing now.