TURMOIL IN KOSOVO, AGAIN...

Kosovo is once again at the epicentre of European and international politics. Tension in this province, which unilaterally declared its independence in 2008 but continues to be regarded by Serbia as an integral part of its territory, has put the Western Balkans at risk of hostilities. Traditional geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia also contributes to the confrontational scenario.

Situation north of the Ibar River

At the heart of the conflict is the confrontation between Serbia and the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, whose independence is recognised by some 100 UN member states. However, other countries, including Azerbaijan, continue to consider the predominantly Albanian-populated Kosovo as part of the Serbian territory. Baku thus stands in solidarity with Belgrade recognising the de facto separation of the province from Serbia as an illegitimate act.

The secession of Kosovo supported mainly by the US and European countries has exacerbated tensions in the province also populated with over 100,000 Serbs. The epicentre of the conflict between the Serb minority and the Albanian majority of the province is northern Kosovo, north of the Ibar River. Four municipalities located in this area accommodate almost exclusively Serbs (about 60,000 people), most of whom do not recognise the independence of Kosovo and refuse to obey Pristina. They have ten guaranteed mandates in the Kosovo parliament and two ministerial portfolios in the government. But that does not change the essence of the matter: the Kosovo Serbs are in fact a part of Serbia, acting as an agent of Belgrade's policies and interests.

The situation periodically exacerbates up to the point of explosion. It has escalated since the summer of 2022. The reason was Pristina's decision to ban the car number plates issued by the Serbian authorities and to replace them with those of Kosovo. And the violators of the new regulation were threatened with fines. The Serb representatives of Kosovo then boycotted the decision. Mayors of the four predominantly Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo, as well as the members of the National Assembly, judges, prosecutors and a group of the officers of the Kosovo Police resigned from their posts.

Pristina responded by announcing elections in the four municipalities slated for December 18, 2022. This further exacerbated the situation, which had already been unstable since late November. Serbian activists erected barricades and blocked the main highways in the north. The Kosovo authorities increased police patrols in the Serb-majority areas. There were even exchanges of fire between protesters and the law enforcement forces.

One of the most serious points of contention involved a Kosovo policeman of the Serb nationality, Dejan Pantic, who was among the 600 police officers who resigned in protest. His arrest by the Kosovo security services on suspicion of committing a terrorist attack on the electoral commission in North Mitrovica increased the intensity of protests. Belgrade even threatened Pristina by announcing its intention to send troops into northern Kosovo.

In fact, under the 1999 UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244 adopted after the NATO attacks on Serbia, Belgrade has the right to dispatch law enforcement to Kosovo. But it is limited by the consent of the international military mission of KFOR, a NATO-led  contingent. That is why the Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was sceptical about the odds of obtaining such consent, when he was talking about the possible dispatch of troops. Nevertheless, Belgrade's position indicates its readiness to use all opportunities to assert the rights of Kosovo Serbs in confrontation with Pristina.

Ongoing tensions, as well as the pressure from the US and EU unwilling to create yet another hotspot in Europe, forced the Kosovo leadership to postpone local elections to April 2023, as well as abandon a plan to fine the holders of Serbian number plates. The Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti called on the KFOR mission to remove Serb barricades and guarantee freedom of movement in the northern part of the self-declared republic. And warned that otherwise the Kosovo police would intervene. "We are waiting for the removal of barricades as soon as possible. Otherwise we can do it ourselves," Kosovo Interior Minister Xhelal Sveçla stated bluntly.

Meanwhile, Serbs continue protests in northern Kosovo. Protesters have sent a message to Albin Kurti saying that "Kosovo is not his property, but the land of Serbs".

In such an explosive situation, NATO forces (KFOR) as well as the EU judicial and police mission in Kosovo (EULEX) confirmed their readiness to prevent possible clashes. It is obvious that Western institutions will do everything in their power to prevent the outbreak of a new Balkan war. Apparently, they are considering a plan for the final incorporation of both Serbs and Kosovars into the Euro-Atlantic community in order to ensure the complete and final ousting of Russia from the region. The growing confrontation between the West and Russia amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war makes this mission more urgent and relevant.

Future options

The West failed to ensure the international recognition of the independence of the province separated from Serbia through the so-called Kosovo precedent created in 2008. Kosovo was recognised by most Western states. Yet there are some European countries, such as Spain and Greece, which have refused to do so given their own problems with separatist regions. But the main obstacle to the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the UN is the position of Russia and China, veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council and friends of Serbia. Therefore, Euro-Atlantic centres understand that the success of Kosovo’s legitimisation in the international arena will anyway depend on the development of its relationship with Serbia.

Interestingly, the Western media outlets report about a so-called plan initiated by France and Germany to conclude a treaty between Belgrade and Pristina, with a model of the 1972 treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the then German Democratic Republic taken as a basis for this plan. Based on the provisions of that treaty, it is believed that Serbia may not recognise Kosovo, but it should not obstruct its membership in international organisations. As an incentive for both Serbia and Kosovo, they are suggested an imminent membership in the European Union.

Although the EU enlargement to include the Western Balkan states appears to be a distant prospect, Serbia is already officially a candidate country for the membership. In mid-December, amid the escalation of confrontation between Belgrade and Pristina, Kosovo applied for the EU membership. However, the Serbian Foreign Ministry regarded the application as a ‘parody’, as Kosovo is not a state with internationally recognised borders. Nevertheless, the EU agreed on the text of a visa liberalisation document for Kosovo. According to the document, the holders of Kosovo passports will be able to travel to the EU without visas and stay there for up to 90 days starting from January 1, 2024.

In general, it has long been known that the West supported the Albanians of Kosovo in the confrontation between Belgrade and Pristina. The same is true for the recent escalation. In particular, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrel called on Kosovo Serbs to dismantle the barricades immediately. Meanwhile, the pro-Kosovo stance of the US, EU and NATO in recent months can also be explained by their intention to prevent Serbia's efforts stemming from its traditionally friendly relations with Russia.

Thus, Belgrade has not joined the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the West. Serbian President Vucic called on the EU and European Parliament to address energy and inflation issues, rather than formulating resolutions recognising Russia as a ‘state sponsoring terrorism’.

As a pre-condition for Serbia's accession to the EU, Brussels demands from Belgrade the recognition of Kosovo's independence and the support of sanctions on Russia. Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic pointed out the contradictory nature of Belgrade's demands to give up its own territories and at the same time condemn Russia for its actions in Ukraine. In other words, on the one hand, they urge Serbia to accept the violation of its territorial integrity and, on the other hand, expect it to condemn Moscow for violating the territorial integrity of the internationally recognised state of Ukraine.

In fact, another verbal dispute between Belgrade and Pristina has emerged out of their attitudes towards Russia. Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti accuses Serbia of trying to restore ‘Serbian peace’ in the region, similar to the idea promoted by Moscow to establish and spread the ‘Russian peace’ in the post-Soviet space. In turn, Serbian President Vucic calls Kurti ‘Little Zelensky’ because of the similarities in the behaviour of both political leaders.

All these nuances only demonstrate the complexity of the conflict, which has long gone beyond the borders of Serbia and its breakaway province of Kosovo. Internal, territorial and geopolitical factors are intertwined in this confrontation, making it practically impossible for Belgrade and Pristina to reconcile their positions. By and large, only the degree and direction of international pressure can keep the dispute from spiralling into a new armed conflict in the Western Balkans.