HOPING FOR 2023

The year of 2022 has been one of the most dynamic in terms of the development of the negotiation process on normalising relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The talks have been actively pursued along three international and three thematic tracks mediated by Moscow, Washington and Brussels (preparation of a peace agreement, border delimitation and demarcation process, the unblocking of communications and economic links).

Unfortunately, the frequency of negotiations is not indicative of their effectiveness. Because the Armenian side, with the help of its patrons, has done its best to disrupt the ongoing process, although Azerbaijan liberated its lands from Armenian occupation two years ago.

Armenia as a brake

At the beginning of 2022, the European track of negotiations seemed the most promising, with four meetings held between the president of Azerbaijan, the prime minister of Armenia and the president of the European Union. Charles Michel was so active that it seemed likely that by 2022 the sides would be able to agree a peace agreement and even sign it, possibly in Brussels. However, towards the end of the year, at a critical moment in the process, French President Emmanuel Macron intervened, making a number of absurd accusations about Azerbaijan and then announcing that he was ready to mediate (!) at another, already fifth, meeting within the Brussels format.

The meetings was due to take place on December 7, but Baku understandably rejected the offer. European diplomacy, on the other hand, could not explain to the French leadership the inadmissibility of its actions and its obnoxious interference in the negotiation process so carefully conducted by the European Union. Thus, the European track ended in a complete collapse.

Due to the hostilities in Ukraine since the beginning of the year, Russia has been away from diplomatic activity. By summer, however, Moscow realised that its passive approach as a moderator in the negotiations between Baku and Yerevan could cost it the loss of the initiative by its Western partners, as the Kremlin preferred to call them.

To prevent this situation, the format of the co-chairmen of the commission to unblock communications was resumed in the summer and continued with some frequency until the end of the year, although also without much result.

Only by the end of the year Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan vaguely hinted at some progress after the talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the CSTO summit in Yerevan. However, this was soon forgotten, as the situation on the ground made it impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of this progress even remotely.

On December 23, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov made a working visit to Moscow, which was essentially held in a bilateral format, although the original meeting was planned in a trilateral format between Bayramov, as well as his Russian and Armenian counterparts, Lavrov and Mirzoyan. However, at the very last moment, Mirzoyan refused to go to Moscow because of disagreement with the actions of the peacekeepers and the Azerbaijani side in the Lachin corridor. This move was against the organiser of the meeting and derailed the trilateral talks.

Thus, the Armenian side has already disrupted the negotiations twice. First the Brussels talks and now the one in Moscow, hindering the achievement of sustainable peace in the region.

By the way, the Moscow ministerial meeting was to be the third meeting in a series of talks on the peace treaty. The previous ones were held in Geneva (October 2) and Washington (November 7).

Armenian side's demarche may have been planned to impress Western mediators, who have successfully weakened Moscow's position in the talks. It is no coincidence that on the same day Ararat Mirzoyan had a telephone conversation with the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, Toivo Klaar, discussing with him the current situation in the region.

The search for peace amidst controversy

However, this did not stop the Russian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers from discussing the situation. In particular, Moscow and Baku actually agreed that dispatching any observation missions to the region, which Yerevan wanted to do unilaterally, was ineligible. This was after a statement made by the EU High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, on Brussels preparing to deploy a long-term civilian mission on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

Brussels' intention contradicts the agreement reached at the Prague meeting of Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders mediated by the EU heads of state, according to which the mission was to end its activities on December 19.

Interestingly, the Prague agreement was reached with Baku's participation, while the current decision was taken without taking into account Baku’s opinion.

We can assume that European diplomacy is under the influence of France, particularly President Macron, who proposed the idea of sending an EU mission to Armenia. The idea was supported by Yerevan and rejected by Baku, which agreed only to cooperate with the mission if necessary.

It is important for the Armenian political leadership that the mission balances Russian influence in the region. Pashinian had earlier rejected a proposal by the CSTO secretariat to send its observer mission to the border. We can thus assume that the interests of the French-Armenian tandem has two goals: to oust Russia from the resolution of border problems with Azerbaijan and to increase pressure on Baku so that the latter agrees to concessions in negotiations with Armenia in existing directions.

This approach is unacceptable for Baku and Moscow, which assess the situation from different perspectives.

According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, as "agreed in Prague on behalf of both Azerbaijan and Armenia, the work on the peace treaty will be based on a number of key principles, including the UN Charter and the December 1991 Almaty Declaration. With this in mind, and we also talked about this today, I do not see a big problem to start finally the professional preparation of a peace treaty, as this statement contains all the necessary components.”

Baku is generally not against this approach either. However, Yerevan's position, which is to bargain for more favourable terms for itself by playing on the contradictions of mediators, introduces considerable uncertainty into the future of the negotiation process. 

Final summit

Like the previous summit in Astana in October 2022, the informal CIS summit in St. Petersburg held on December 26-27, took place amid extreme turbulence both at international level and within the Commonwealth's area of responsibility.

Unresolved relations between Yerevan and Baku, the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war make the CIS agenda critically challenging.

Experts have long compared the CIS to a club where the leaders of former Soviet republics meet to discuss current political and economic topics. But often these discussions take place in a difficult environment, with a mix of rather harsh remarks about each other and formal phrases about the need for cooperation.

At the last CIS summit the President of Azerbaijan harshly criticised the position of Armenia, which is dragging out the negotiation process within three main tracks: the signing of a peace treaty, the demarcation and delimitation of the state border and the unblocking of communications and economic links. Despite the observed dynamics along all these tracks, there was no tangible results in any of them because of the active intervention of external forces supporting Armenia, especially France, and the excessive ambitions of Yerevan itself, which is trying to prevent large-scale processes in the South Caucasus after the 44-day war. Like the creation of new trans-regional transport links and the new 3+3 format of cooperation.

Despite less focus on the post-conflict settlement at the last informal CIS summit compared to discussions in Astana, it is likely that the issue was actively discussed on the sidelines of the event. However, it is difficult to assume that given the current contradictions the sides have been able to find a common ground.

It was the Russian President Vladimir Putin who made the only brief statement on the results of the CIS summit in St. Petersburg. According to him, leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been able to talk.

"The three of us have managed to talk. Of course, the key issue is the settlement of the situation in the South Caucasus, Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and everything related to Garabagh. As agreed, we will discuss all these issues in detail," Mr. Putin said at his meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Later, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitriy Peskov clarified that there were no plans to hold full-fledged trilateral talks. Everyone was communicating on the sidelines of the event. There was no full-fledged communication [between Putin, Aliyev and Pashinyan]," Peskov said.

Meanwhile, amid problems with European and Russian mediation, Americans were in a better position. Not only did Washington retain the ability to actively engage with Baku and Yerevan, but, taking advantage of the stalled talks with Moscow and Brussels, it actively invited the sides to talks, hinting at its own involvement. In late December, US National Security Advisor to President Joe Biden, Jake Sullivan, contacted the Secretary of Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan and Assistant to President of Azerbaijan Hikmet Hajiyev by phone. He exchanged views with them on the latest escalation and urged his colleagues to continue working to reduce tensions.

We yet to know whether the parties discussed another meeting between the foreign ministers or other issues, but we cannot rule out this option. Either way, it is clear that the region is entering another year of uncertainty due to Yerevan's destructive behaviour. We will find out soon how the developments affect the normalisation process.