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Turkish-Syrian reconciliation: what does bring them together?

Author:

15.01.2023

One of the significant events of the past year was the summit of the defense ministers of Turkey and Syria, Hulusi Akar and Ali Mahmoud Abbas, held just a few days before the New Year in Moscow. The Russian Federation, as a host country, was represented by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Along with the ministers, the meeting was also attended by the heads of intelligence organisations of Turkey (MIT) and Syria.

 

Top level negotiations

Incidentally, Hakan Fidan (MIT) had already been in contact with Ali Mamluk, vice president and former head of the Syrian intelligence service. However, the Moscow summit of defense ministers indicates the transition of the negotiation process to a new phase.

A statement issued after the meeting said the ministers discussed the Syrian conflict, the problem of refugees and the joint fight against terrorist groups in Syria. Statements from the Syrian and Turkish sides underlined, albeit with some discrepancies, that the meeting was held in a positive atmosphere and expressed respect for Syria's territorial integrity and sovereignty. According to the document, the negotiators agreed to ensure regional stability and, most importantly, to continue dialogue in a similar format.

Shortly after the talks in Moscow, the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers had a telephone conversation. They discussed the outcome of the Moscow summit and agreed on the date of the next meeting.

 

The end of long-standing animosity

Relations between Turkey and Syria were suspended 12 years ago during the so-called Arab Spring, when protests in Syria turned into an armed confrontation. Ankara's attempts to mediate in the initial stage of the protests turned to be unsuccessful, especially after the failed visit of the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to Damascus. The crisis in Syria came to a boil at the end of 2011, pushing the first Syrian refugees to the Turkish territory. At the same time, Ankara became involved in the international opposition coalition Friends of Syria, while the once friendly relations between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Bashar al-Assad slipped to hostility and had an extremely negative impact on bilateral state relations.

The international coalition's attempts to overthrow the Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad proved futile thanks to the support of Russia and Iran. Moreover, under the leadership of Assad, Syria could return the territories lost after 2013. The emergence of ISIS coupled with the strengthening of Kurdish separatist groups in northern Syria forced Ankara to change its priorities regarding this Middle Eastern country.

In August 2016, Turkey for the first time deployed its troops into Syrian territory and successfully ousted the ISIS and YPG terrorist groups from the border areas. In the following years, the Turkish army has successfully cleared a significant part of the Turkish-Syrian border from the terrorist groups.

The Idlib agreement reached by Turkish and Russian leaders in September 2017 established joint control over the last stronghold of the opposition groups, the province of Idlib, and ensured trilateral cooperation on the Syrian issue between Iran, Russia and Turkey. However, the February 2020 conflict in Idlib between the joint Syrian-Russian troops and the Ankara-backed opposition groups uncovered serious differences between the parties, particularly on the situation in northern Syria, the fate of the opposition and the situation along the Syrian-Turkish border. In March 2020, Turkish and Russian presidents met in Moscow and reached yet another agreement on Syria, except on the issue of fighting terrorist groups in Syria because of the different interpretation of the term terrorist organisation. Thus, Russia and Syria consider all Islamist armed groups fighting against the central government, as well as most of the opposition groups to be terrorists. Turkey, on the other hand, has a different approach to defining a terrorist organisation. That is why the agreements reached in Sochi and Moscow have not been implemented in full.

Either way, the situation in Syria had changed, and it was clear that any attempt to remove Bashar al-Assad from power was no longer realistic. On the other hand, Ankara had had more urgent issues to deal with—Kurdish separatism and refugees.

Currently, the separatist Kurdish organisation PYD and its armed wing YPG control a large part of the Turkish-Syrian border. The coalition better known as the Syrian Democratic Forces and consisting mainly of Kurdish troops controls more than 20 per cent of the Syrian territory and is virtually independent of the central authorities. Moreover, the deployment of US troops in Kurdish-controlled territories prevents Damascus and Ankara from holding combat operations in these regions. In 2018, it was the US military that gave a tough response to Russian mercenaries from Wagner PMC during an attack on a Kurdish-controlled gas plant in the province of Deir ez-Zor. This prevented similar attempts by other groups in the region in the following period.

There are a few political groups in Washington loyal to Syrian Kurdish separatists. They justify their position by the Kurdish support to the US in its fight against ISIS. It is no coincidence that former US President Donald Trump's statement about the withdrawal of the American troops from Syria met stiff resistance from the Kurdish lobby in Washington, hence remaining on paper only. Now everyone understands that as long as the US troops remain in Syria, the use of any military force against the Kurds is virtually impossible. Therefore, the Kurdish issue is a factor that brings Ankara and Damascus closer together, as the latter does not have intention to grant autonomy or any other equivalent status to the Kurds. Ankara is confident that after gaining independence the Kurdish separatists of Syria, also thanks to their connections with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), will become a serious force able to strengthen terrorism in Turkey.

On the other hand, there are currently 3.5-4 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey. This number is constantly increasing, leading to quite considerable social problems in the country and becoming a heavy social burden for the government. To solve this issue, Ankara is trying to negotiate with Damascus. A plan proposed in 2019 by the Turkish president to the UN to accommodate a million refugees in northern Syria was rejected. But the refugee problem remains and is increasingly troublesome for Ankara, forcing it to seek common ground with Damascus.

Certainly, we should not forget the factor of Turkish-Russian relations. Moscow plays an instrumental role in Turkey's reconciliation with Syria. After his return from Turkmenistan, President Erdogan told journalists that it was his own initiative to propose to his Russian counterpart the start of negotiations with Syrian officials. According to Erdogan, the agreed action plan provides for holding the first meeting between the heads of intelligence of both countries, followed by the talks between the defense and foreign ministers.

Most of the negotiation process is over. Apparently, contacts between the presidents of Syria and Turkey are likely soon after the talks of the foreign ministers of both countries slated for this spring. This was announced back in November 2022, when the presidents of Turkey and Egypt met in Doha after a break of nearly nine years. "There is no resentment in politics. I can meet with Bashar al-Assad as well”, President Erdogan said after the meeting with his Egyptian counterpart.

 

No easy way for reconciliation

Many Turkish analysts claim that Erdogan and Assad may see each other before this summer, i.e. before the presidential elections in Turkey. An indirect evidence of this is the course of the negotiation process. However, there are still quite significant differences between Turkey and Syria. For example, on issues such as the fate of the Syrian opposition and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria.

According to the official Syrian media, Ankara has agreed to withdraw its military contingent from the country. However, it is obvious that in parallel with the withdrawal of the Turkish army deployed in Idlib, Afrin and Azez-Jarablus it is necessary to ensure the safety of the Syrian opposition in these areas. This implies the provision of guarantees to tens of thousands of armed men mainly backed by Turkey.

Immediately after the meeting in Moscow, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar made a statement and promised not to leave the Syrian opposition alone no matter the outcome of negotiations with Damascus. "We have not taken and will not take any action that could create problems for our Syrian brothers. Everyone should be aware of this and act accordingly," Akar said.

It is clear that it is the Syrian opposition that is most concerned about the Moscow summit and the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation, for its future also depends on these developments. In early January the Chairman of the Syrian High Negotiations Committee Badr Jamus, the Chairman of the Syrian National Coalition Salim al-Muslat and the head of the transitional government of Syria Abdurrahman Mustafa visited Ankara to meet with the Turkish government officials, including Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu.

Mustafa said that in Ankara the delegation had been briefed on the course of the Moscow talks, which was mainly focused on technical issues, namely the fight against terrorism and the PKK, as well as the territorial integrity of Syria. He added that they were not concerned about the negotiation process because the opposition is currently focused on the results of the Geneva talks. In parallel, the Syrian opposition will continue to cooperate with Turkey, as they are also concerned with the issues of the territorial integrity of Syria and the return of refugees. In short, the Syrian opposition does not currently intend to hinder or oppose the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation process.

But Washington. "We will not normalise or support other countries that are improving relations with the Assad regime. Damascus has done nothing that deserves normalisation or improvement of relations with the partners (the US) and other countries," the US State Department spokesman Ned Price said in early January.

But it is clear that Washington has no means to influence Turkey's decisions in this matter. The US ban on Turkish military operations in northern Syria and support for Kurdish groups caused deep divisions between Ankara and Washington on the Syrian issue. Therefore, it is unlikely that the US can hinder the process of reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus.

But it would be naive to think that Turkey and Syria would immediately find common ground and reconcile. As noted above, there are still very deep ideological differences between the two countries. Although the initiated process offers opportunities for solving no less serious problems, including the prevention of the rise of Kurdish separatism in Syria, reducing tensions in the region due to a possible military conflict between the two countries, eliminating the problem of refugees. In this respect, the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation can have important implications for the entire Middle East region.



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