TURBULENT TBILISI

Georgia is undergoing another phase of political turbulence, significantly influenced by external factors. The unfolding events surrounding the first reading of the draft law "On Transparency of Foreign Influence," ratified by the parliament, not only mirror the intensity of the conflict between the government and the opposition but also form a segment of the escalating clash between Russia and the West in the South Caucasus.

Passions over the bill

In early April, the governing Georgian Dream party declared its plan to submit for voting a revised version of the draft law, which had been retracted the previous year due to extensive protests in Tbilisi. In anticipation of and subsequent to the parliamentary endorsement of the first reading on April 17, 2024, Tbilisi was once more consumed by demonstrations marked by clashes between the protestors and law enforcement.

The bill, eliciting a potent and equivocal response from Georgian society, mandates that media and non-commercial legal entities (non-governmental organizations) receiving upward of 20 percent of their funding from foreign sources register as "organisations representing the interests of a foreign state." Notably, in the law's initial draft, these entities were explicitly termed "foreign agents."

Organisations deemed as representing foreign interests must annually submit a financial declaration. The Ministry of Justice bears the responsibility for executing inspections to identify such organizations. Non-compliance with the law carries a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years and a fine (equivalent to ₾25,000, or approximately €9,000).

Georgia's pro-Western opposition vehemently opposes the ruling party's proposed legislation, accusing it of acting in Russia's behest. The Georgian Dream's bill, akin to the legal statute operational in the Russian Federation, is persistently portrayed by the opposition as a "foreign agents" law.

The Russian Federation repudiates any involvement in shaping the Georgian legislation, emphasizing that Moscow did not pioneer such regulatory measures. Dmitry Peskov, the spokesperson for the Russian presidency, remarked that the United States was the inaugural nation to devise a "system to combat foreign agents."

It is acknowledged that the practice of enacting and enforcing analogous laws is not exclusive to the United States and Russia but is also prevalent in other nations, including Australia and Israel. Moreover, the European Union is contemplating the adoption of this approach under "wartime conditions."

Georgian opposition demonstrators contesting the "foreign agents" draft law received backing from the nation's President, Salome Zurabishvili. In doing so, she signalled her preparedness for an intensified stand-off with the administration, a dynamic constituting the power struggle between the ruling Georgian Dream and the radical pro-Western factions. Initially, Zurabishvili was not aligned with the latter and was even perceived as a de facto nominee of the oligarch and Dream founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is regarded as the covert sovereign of Georgia. Nonetheless, Zurabishvili subsequently distanced herself from the "dreamers," who sought to reconcile the EU accession trajectory with the Russian element. The Georgian president now staunchly advocates for Tbilisi's European integration and resolutely opposes Russian influence.

"We are at the midpoint between acquiring EU candidate status and the anticipated commencement of membership negotiations this coming December. At this juncture, it is crucial for Russia to thwart Georgia's progression towards European integration," Zurabishvili articulated.

Referring to the Foreign Agents Law endorsed by the "dreamers" as a "Russian law" and an exemplar of Moscow's "soft power" and "hybrid warfare" against Tbilisi's pro-European trajectory, Zurabishvili vowed that should the bill be ratified after the second and third readings, she will assuredly exercise her veto power.

The law's ultimate ratification, despite a potential presidential veto, is expected to incite widespread protests. Consequently, it cannot be ruled out that confrontations between law enforcement and protestors may escalate. Moreover, there is a risk that Georgian Dream supporters might also take to the streets, potentially leading to severe civil strife.

The West, "Dreamers", National Sovereignty

Amidst Georgia's intensifying domestic political turmoil, the "dreamers'" bill faces stern rebuke from the US and the EU. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, remarked that enacting the "foreign agents" law would estrange Georgia from its aspirations to join the European Union. This stance reflects overt Western pressure on official Tbilisi, stemming from dissatisfaction with Georgia's sluggish EU-oriented progression, as perceived by Euro-Atlantic entities, and the Georgian Dream government's measured approach towards Russia. This latter point primarily pertains to the Georgian leadership's decision to refrain from adopting a pronounced anti-Russian position amid the Ukraine conflict and, notably, not participating in Western-imposed sanctions against Russia.

Concurrently, Georgia's incumbent party has levelled accusations at the West for meddling in the nation's internal matters. Kakha Kaladze, the Georgian Dream's secretary-general, likened the EU and the United States' influence to that of the Soviet Union, where no action could proceed without the Communist Party's Central Committee's sanction.

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze justified the necessity of the bill, citing non-governmental organizations as principal instigators of radicalism and the so-called 'polarization' within Georgian political discourse. Addressing claims that the bill's true aim is to target Western-funded Georgian media, Kobakhidze stated, "Transparency is of paramount importance to all: adversaries and allies alike."

Mamuka Mdinaradze, the parliamentary majority leader, argued that "non-governmental organizations compromise national security" as a rationale for the law's enactment. He suggested that such entities are entangling Georgia in the Ukraine conflict to "establish a second front" against Russia. Hence, the Georgian authorities advocating for the contentious draft law underscore its significance in preventing Georgia from becoming another "Ukraine."

Prime Minister Kobakhidze contended that had NGOs succeeded in altering the government between 2020-2022, "Georgia's situation today would be more dire than Ukraine's." He also dismissed allegations that the bill would obstruct Georgia's European integration. "Without safeguarding state sovereignty, we risk repeating Ukraine's fate, rendering peace and European integration relics of the past. Thus, if this law serves any purpose, it is to facilitate our European integration; without sovereignty, entry into Europe is unattainable," Kobakhidze stressed.

Meanwhile, Irakli Garibashvili, the Georgian Dream chairman and former prime minister, maintained that the bill's adoption would not impede Georgia's EU accession pace, as Brussels itself is not prepared for the bloc's expansion. He posited that Georgia might rescind the law, but only upon receiving assurance of EU membership "tomorrow."

It is challenging to discern whether Garibashvili's remarks reflect a bargaining tactic with the EU or genuine scepticism regarding Georgia's prompt accession to the union. His rationale suggests that if EU membership for Georgia is not on the immediate horizon, then hesitating to pass the draft law due to concerns it might decelerate Georgia's European integration seems unwarranted. Nonetheless, the crux of the Georgian authorities' stance is the fortification of Georgia's sovereignty, which faces escalating pressure from the West—a pressure that openly supports the radical proponents of Euro-Atlanticism within the South Caucasus nation itself.

Evidently, the Georgian Dream government is earnest in its endeavour to reconcile EU and Euro-Atlantic integration with the preservation of Georgian identity and traditional values. This intent is further exemplified by the party's move to enact constitutional amendments and a constitutional law aimed at prohibiting LGBT advocacy, support for same-sex relationships, and gender transition procedures in Georgia. Specifically, the proposal includes appending a clause to Article 30 of the Georgian Constitution stating: "The protection of family values and minors shall be guaranteed by the constitutional law of Georgia, which constitutes an integral part of the Constitution of Georgia." The proposed constitutional law "On Family Values and Protection of Minors" stipulates that marriage is exclusively the union of one man and one woman, both of legal age, and that adoption or guardianship is permissible solely for married heterosexual couples. Furthermore, it seeks to outlaw any medical procedures associated with gender reassignment.

From its perspective, the West has unequivocally communicated, as in other instances of advocating for European integration, its disapproval of the Georgian government's aspirations to defend national sovereignty.

Almost there

The Euro-Atlantic centres' pressure on Georgia is a fundamental component of the geopolitical rivalry in the South Caucasus. The US and EU's exploitation of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic ambitions to achieve their specific goals in the region exemplifies this dynamic, particularly after Georgia attained EU candidate status in December 2023.

The West anticipates that Georgia, armed with this status, will actively support the overarching strategy to displace Russia from the South Caucasus. Beyond this, there looms the peril of Georgia being utilized as an instrument for external powers to advance their interests, especially concerning its relations with regional nations, notably with Azerbaijan—Georgia's closest strategic ally and neighbour.

Armenia serves as a fulcrum of pressure against Azerbaijan, which maintains an autonomous stance and is being steadily drawn into the West's sphere of influence. Georgia is designated to aid this transition, notably by allowing its territory to serve as a conduit for the transit of Western arms and military equipment to Armenia.

However, amidst the profound geopolitical shifts across the Eurasian expanse, Azerbaijan and Georgia share a critical interest in perpetuating their collaborative efforts to construct a regional security framework and foster multilateral cooperation in the South Caucasus, pivotal for nurturing integration across Eurasia. This mutual recognition, as evidenced by the recent visit of the Georgian Prime Minister to Azerbaijan, is also explicitly acknowledged by official Tbilisi.

Either way, the upcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia will clarify the future configuration within the local political circles and the resultant effectiveness of foreign pressure on Tbilisi. Therefore, the current intensity of the internal political struggle, including opposition rallies, may well be an element of pre-election preparations. The struggle between the Georgian Dream and radically pro-Western political forces continues. So does the struggle between Russia and the West for influence in the South Caucasus.