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Armenia is not prepared to give a proper response to Turkey's goodwill gestures

Author:

17.12.2013

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to Yerevan last week to attend a session as part of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation has breathed new life into the furore over the prospects for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation which had all but died away.

The news that Davutoglu was planning to come to Armenia came as a surprise to many because such high representatives from official Ankara have not visited Armenia since 2009. Turkish President Abdullah Gul's visit four years ago (on the pretext of attending a football match between the two countries with his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan) kickstarted a policy that was supposed to get diplomatic relations between the two countries back on track.

It is common knowledge that things never went further than that but this policy became known as "soccer diplomacy". The borders between the two countries, closed by Turkey in 1993 following the start of Armenia's occupation of the areas around Nagornyy Karabakh, were not reopened but the idea of a normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations within the context of the protocols signed by the sides in Zurich in 2009 and actively lobbied by the West, remained. Against the background of Yerevan's refusal to liberate the occupied Azerbaijani territories as a first step in settling Armenian-Turkish relations, it would appear one could forget about this idea. After all, no progress has been made towards a Karabakh settlement during these four years. Armenia has made it clear that it has no intention of withdrawing its troops from Azerbaijani territory on any terms.

So the news that the Turkish foreign minister was about to visit Armenia was that much more of a surprise. There were rumours from various confidential sources in the diplomatic circles of both countries that some kind of "road map" for a normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations was being drawn up and even finalized. It is true that these plans, which were of a phased nature, differed markedly on both sides. Sources in the Armenian foreign ministry said that the "road map" presumes three specific steps: Ankara's recognition of the "genocide of the Armenians" in 1915 and its responsibility before the world Armenian community; the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Armenia; and only then Turkey's participation in the peacemaking initiatives on a Karabakh settlement.

Turkey's formulation of the reconciliation plan was quite different: Armenia liberates a number of the occupied regions around Nagornyy Karabakh (these "nuggets of information" usually refer to two regions) and then Turkey opens the border with Armenia. According to some reports, this option was agreed by Turkey and Russia and even approved by Armenia.

Both options caused heated debate in the countries of the region, and especially in Armenia, whose people turned out to be quite unprepared to accept even the possibility of a rejection of territorial claims against Turkey and the liberation of even a single Azerbaijani region. During Davutoglu's visit to Yerevan there were protest actions by angry Armenians, and according to an Armenian media report, the Turkish minister even had to enter his hotel by the back door to avoid encountering the protesters.

But this is not the only occasion where the Turkish minister has had to experience embarrassment in Yerevan which he was visiting, according to Armenian media assurances, armed with proposals for a normalization of relations with Armenia, and as if to lend weight to his arguments, he brought with him journalists of Armenian extraction. Be that as it may, Davutoglu's visit to Yerevan showed that if the Armenians are toying with the idea of options for a normalization of relations with their western neighbour, then things are not exactly going their way.

The same Turkish media reported that Davutoglu was planning to discuss Ankara's initiatives for a normalization of relations with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan. But this meeting never took place. The president's press secretary, Arman Sagatelyan, said straightaway that the Armenian president was not planning to meet the Turkish minister because Yerevan does not wish to discuss the question of a normalization of relations with Turkey in the context of a settlement to the Karabakh problem.

Eventually Davutoglu had to be content with meeting his Armenian opposite number. It was reported that during bilateral talks the sides did discuss the question of a Karabakh settlement along with the prospects for a normalization of bilateral relations. However, the decision by both ministers to meet the press separately, and not together, showed that the sides could not reach a common denominator on any of these issues. And the most interesting thing was that at the final press conference after his meeting with [Armenian Foreign Minister Edward] Nalbandyan the Turkish foreign minister denied reports spread by the Turkish side that Ankara had a plan coordinated with Armenia on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from at least two Azerbaijani districts around Nagornyy Karabakh. "All the news linked with this question is the work of journalists. All this information is based on old plans in this direction," the minister added.

On his return to Turkey Davutoglu disclosed some of the topics of his talks with the Armenian foreign minister. He said he was very pleased with his meeting with Nalbandyan, which was a frank one. At the same time, he noted that the primary aim of the meeting was not to open the Turkish-Armenian border, but to create a basis for achieving a comprehensive peace.

"It all hinges on three basic pillars. First - relations between Turkey and Armenia. Second - Azerbaijani-Armenian relations: here we are talking about achieving peace in the South Caucasus, including Georgian-Abkhaz relations. Third - relations between the Turks and the Armenians wherever they may be - in Los Angeles, Paris or Moscow. If any one of these pillars develops a crack there will be trouble. Say we open the borders with Armenia. But if war breaks out between Armenia and Azerbaijan we will again be forced to close them. The hardest thing is to melt the iceberg of the status quo. By trying to melt it we may start a war. If you try and melt the ice too quickly it could break and you could find yourself under it," the Turkish foreign minister stressed. 

So, clearly, Davutoglu's visit to Armenia, despite the expectations in some quarters, did not lead to any progress in the stabilization of the region. Judging by the statements of the two sides, each remained of the same mind. Yerevan still rejects Ankara's attempts to link the idea of a normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations to a Karabakh settlement and refuses to accept any preconditions in this regard.

All this gives rise to questions about the true motives of the Turkish foreign minister's trip to Yerevan. They could be linked not with the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict directly because the Armenian side, at least in public, has shown that it is not prepared to compromise on this question. The Turkish side may be trying at least to revive the process of reconciliation with Armenia at a time of continuing pressure on it from the West in this direction. Prior to Davutoglu's visit to Yerevan the US State Department made a verbose statement hoping that this visit would make a substantial contribution to a rapprochement between the two countries. The West is an active lobbyist of the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border, and it is by no means coincidental that during Davutoglu's visit to Yerevan a conference of US ambassadors in the South Caucasus was being held in the Armenian capital. And although the diplomats, who included the American ambassador to Azerbaijan, Richard Morningstar, have not given any details of the meeting, few doubt that the prospects for a normalization of relations between Ankara and Yerevan was a focal, if not the main issue at the meeting.

Attempts to put diplomatic pressure on Turkey as the centenary of the events in Ottoman Turkey, which Armenia obstinately considers "genocide", draws nearer will only increase. It is quite possible that Turkey, seeing no progress in a Karabakh settlement, is trying to ease this pressure in some way. That could be why Davutoglu, in a conversation with journalists following his return from Yerevan, suddenly started talking about "the deportation of the Armenians in 1915" which, he said, "was an erroneous and inhuman step". It may be that in saying this Davutoglu is trying in some way to reassure not only the West, but also certain circles in his own country, who are reproaching the Turkish leadership for the fact that Ankara's Armenian policy ends where Baku's interests begin.

How will the development of events reflect on Azerbaijan? The opening of the Armenian-Turkish border is Turkey's internal affair and Azerbaijan is not interfering in this question, the republic's Deputy Foreign Minister Xalaf Xalafov diplomatically commented on the situation. 

But Baku has its own levers of influence on the situation: Armenia cannot be involved in any projects of regional cooperation until at least some of the occupied Azerbaijani lands are liberated. Azerbaijan, as the initiator of these projects, simply cannot permit this. That may be precisely why the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister E. Mammadyarov, speaking at a session of the Council of Ministers of the OSCE countries in Kiev at the beginning of December, said that the opinion about the practicality of regional cooperation for a settlement of conflicts is nothing more than utopia.

Ultimately Davutoglu's visit to Yerevan reaffirmed that Armenia was not capable of giving a proper assessment of the gestures of goodwill from its neighbours. So Davutoglu returned from Yerevan empty-handed.



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