A "DIASPORA CRISIS"

The process of forming a new government is being completed in Armenia. However, it would be stretching a point to describe it as new. In actual fact, only three ministers have been replaced: the minister for sport and youth affairs, the finance minister and the economics minister. Tigran Sarkisyan continues to hold the office of prime minister and many other members of the cabinet have retained their jobs. The diaspora minister, Granush Akopyan, has also kept his post. This was a big surprise to many people in Yerevan, and not just there, since Armenia's "diaspora policy" has been a complete failure.

The biggest wave of criticism was raised to a considerable extent because of the civil war in Syria where the local numerous and influential Armenian community found itself exposed. As many critics point out, the Armenian authorities were unable to organize the evacuation of ethnic Armenians from Syria. Things even reached the point where, at the height of the mass exodus, "Armavia" even jacked up its prices "in a Syrian direction". It must be said that the Armenian public is not so much concerned at the fate of its compatriots as such - local politicians are more alarmed at the collapse of the latest policy to solve its own demographic problems with the help of the Syrian Armenians or even to resettle them on occupied Azerbaijani lands. But the Syrian Armenians in Armenia did not hang about. Now, something else is worrying the experts in Yerevan. As representatives of the Syrian Armenians stress, most of them are supporters of Bashar Assad. That is understandable. When his father Hafez Assad was in power the situation of ethnic Armenians in Syria was much more comfortable than, for example, the Turkomans. But today - and this is also recognized in Yerevan - there is virtually no chance that when the civil war is over the political situation in Syria will remain the same.

For Armenia this means a real political disaster. The presence in Syria of an influential Armenian diaspora was in many ways the foundation on which inter-state relations between the two countries was built. And if this "prop" now disappears, the consequences for Armenia could become precarious, because there is no other foundation for Armenian-Syrian relations.

Strictly speaking, through the prism of the local Armenian community, Armenia's relations with France, the USA and many other states are built in exactly the same way. It is possible that in the first years after the collapse of the USSR, the presence in Armenia of such an influential and politicized foreign diaspora was perceived as a unique preferential advantage. Armenia proved to be the only one of the former Soviet republics which had such a divergent structure abroad, possessing its own information and lobbying levers. It also had its own millionaires who, no-one in Yerevan doubted, would delight their country by making generous investments…

But what were considered unprecedented preferences in the first year of independence, now, over 20 years since the collapse of the USSR, are perceived quite differently. The diaspora has allowed the first contacts to be established and the first steps to be made, but 20 years is a period of time in which full-fledged inter-state relations based on mutual interests, especially in the economy, should have been built up.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey could be seen as a classic example here. In the first years following the collapse of the USSR affinity of language and culture and historical ties were virtually the main basis of bilateral relations between Baku and Ankara, and political experts of many countries were perhaps amused by Turkey's attempts to build a diplomatic strategy at Turkish vocational schools and in television broadcasts. But today what began with vocational schools and concerts by Turkish performers has been given a "foundation" in the form of pipelines, factories, railways and large-scale investment programmes.

In the case with Azerbaijan, political technologies, based on real investment potential, a sound political strategy and much else besides, intervened in the proceedings. And it was they which ensured the inflow into the country of investments not only from Turkey, but also the US, Great Britain, Norway and other countries.

But in Armenia the situation proved to be quite different. As a result of its own aggressive policy the country simply dropped out of regional economic and infrastructural projects. The increase in crime in the country also did nothing for its investment potential. As a result we see in Armenia a catastrophic level of migration, increasing social problems and a third of the country below the poverty line. And the diaspora has proved incapable of replacing the real political and economic factors. For example, France, where politicians never miss a chance of making political curtseys to the local Armenian community, especially in the run-up to elections, is already one of Azerbaijan's biggest economic partners. French oil companies operate in Baku, the AZAL state-run concern is acquiring the latest Airbuses, and even a French missile has placed an Azerbaijani communications satellite into orbit…

And the worst thing for Yerevan is that these "political" realities have begun to take shape in its relations with the diaspora. Today many experts are saying that Armenia is going through a real "diaspora crisis". Hopes for help from their compatriots abroad have, alas, not been justified. The majority of Armenian entrepreneurs have proved to be businessmen first, and Armenians second, and before investing money in their homeland, they have wanted an answer to the question: what's in it for me? And as a result the diaspora, contrary to hopes, is in no hurry to invest - some of them have perhaps been persuaded to make one-off gestures of assistance. But today, fearful of the scale of crime, many Armenian benefactors are closing down their programmes in their historic homeland. Kirk Kerkorian and Charles Aznavour are the most well-known examples, but the list doesn't end there. The potential of the "Armenian lobby" in Yerevan has also proved to be considerably overestimated. Its activists can, of course, create a nervous atmosphere in relations between Paris and Ankara, but they are no longer capable of forcing the whole country to act against its own interests. To put it another way, today Armenia is essentially losing its own main and only political resource in the shape of the diaspora, a potential which has simply been overestimated here.