CURTSIES TO NORMALISATION

Of late, there have been signs of certain progress in the Russia-Georgia dialogue. What is really remarkable is that they emerge against the background of upheaval in Ukraine which has thoroughly shattered the status quo that existed heretofore in the European part of the former Soviet Union.

Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili is quite open in expressing his concern that the "global order is being violated, and the policy of Russia indicates that there are areas of its special interest - the territory of the former USSR." In his opinion, "what began in Georgia in 2008 and deepened in Crimea in 2014 calls into question global agreements according to which more than 200 countries around the world develop a relationship with each other."

Meanwhile, Margvelashvili says that the government is working on the issue of putting relations with Russia on a rational basis. He is convinced that at the moment, there is no direct threat to his country from Russia.

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili also did a curtsy to the northern neighbour saying that his government is ready to make everything in its power to improve relations with Russia.

Optimistic statements of the Georgian leadership regarding the prospects for normalising relations with Russia are supplemented by specific developments in the negotiation field. A number of slippery issues that existed in the Russia-Georgia dialogue have been solved at a regular meeting in Prague between Grigory Karasin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, and Zurab Abashidze, the Georgian Prime Minister's Special Envoy for relations with Russia. Soon after the talks, journalists of the Georgian TV-3 television company detained on charges of illegally crossing the border with breakaway South Ossetia were released thanks to the intervention of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, Russia released from prison Zaza Herkeladze, a Georgian citizen, who was sentenced in 2010 to 11 years in prison for espionage, and let him return to his homeland. Herkeladze was the third Georgian citizen freed as a result of negotiations between Moscow and Tbilisi within the framework of the Prague process (a diplomatic dialogue between the two states). Earlier the Georgian side recognised as political prisoners and released from prison four Russian citizens convicted on similar charges.

Grigory Karasin's statement that Russia is not going to exert any pressure on Tbilisi in connection with the signing of an association agreement between the EU and Georgia scheduled for June this year should also be regarded in the context of certain reduction in the heat of the Russia-Georgia dialogue. Until recently, Tbilisi was afraid that on the eve of formalising the EU association agreement by the Georgian side Moscow would certainly resume trade embargo; in particular, it would once again prohibit imports of Borjomi mineral water, Georgian wine and agricultural products.

The possibility that Russia would take steps aimed at sabotaging Georgia's movement in the European direction cannot be rule out completely even now. As demonstrated by the EU association agreements of Armenia and Ukraine, which either failed or were postponed, Moscow reacts jealously and extremely tough in response to any attempt to formalise the Western presence in post-Soviet countries. The association of Georgia and the EU - in addition to what promises to be a significant step towards the integration of Tbilisi in the Euro-Atlantic community - can also weaken Russia's influence in the South Caucasus. Therefore, the probability of Moscow's increased pressure on Tbilisi remains in force.

Meanwhile, certain political processes taking place in Georgia may well contribute to increased tension in the country. Thus, a recent interview given by Georgia's Minister of Internal Affairs Alexander Chikaidze to the Prime Time weekly, in which he claimed that he possessed information about the preparation of riots in the Georgian capital by the "destructive forces" in accordance with the scenario used in Kiev, sparked a massive public outcry. Chikaidze said that opponents of the Georgian authorities were strenuously training "activists" including with the assistance of instructors invited from Kiev. As reported by the Georgian media, the latter include Ukrainian journalist Stanislav Fedorchuk, who allegedly works for the secret services of Ukraine and recently arrived in Georgia for organising an action similar to Euromaidan in Kiev.

To this end, one can recall demonstrative activity of Georgia's ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili and members of his party United National Movement (UNM) [Georgian: Ertiani Natsionaluri Modzraoba (ENM)] during the peak of the protests in Kiev. Saakashvili repeatedly addressed the protesters on the Maidan, urging Ukrainians to fight for the Europeanisation of the country and its liberation from Russian influence. Close associates of the Georgian ex-president were directly involved in armed clashes in the Ukrainian capital. Given Saakashvili's support of Kiev's Maidan, it is not surprising that Alexander Chikaidze's statement gave the UNM party ground to accuse the current leadership of Georgia of solidarity with Russia against Ukraine. In particular, Saakashvili's associates blamed the official Tbilisi for the refusal to introduce provisions in the parliamentary bills providing for sanctions against the Russian Federation, as well as for the fact that none of the Georgian ministers visited Kiev during the "European revolution."

Actually, there are no compelling reasons to suspect the official Tbilisi of pro-Russian aspirations. And not only because members of the ruling Georgian Dream coalition made very tough speeches against Russia at the PACE sessions, demanding to protect the interests of Ukraine. A relatively restrained reaction of the official Tbilisi to the overthrow of the former Ukrainian regime and attempts of the new Georgian leadership to establish a dialogue with Russia do not negate the fact that President Margvelashvili and Garibashvili's government are committed to Georgia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic space. And, unlike Ukrainian President Yanukovych who removed himself from the political scene, they are in no way going to refuse to sign the association agreement with the EU. Hence, to speak of the possible "Maidan" in Tbilisi now is at least inappropriate.

It appears that disputes between Georgia's political forces "on a given topic" is no more than an intriguing component of the next election campaign, as the country is preparing for elections to local governments to be held in the middle of June. The struggle between the Georgian Dream and the United National Movement is going to be quite serious, but apparently it will have no effect on European aspirations of a significant part of the Georgian political elite and Georgia's official position on the issue of integration into the Euro-Atlantic space. Thus, there is every chance that the Maidan will not take place in Georgia though the country may still face problems but not of the "pro-European revolutionary" origin.

In this regard, the issue of destabilisation, which has already become conventional in the South Caucasus, deserves particular mentioning. The fact that the internationally recognised borders had been changed again, as exemplified by the Crimean drama staged by Russia and Ukraine, thoroughly stirred the Armenians. A number of Armenian political forces acting both in Georgia and in Armenia continue to implement the planned activity aimed at annexation of the Georgian region of Javakheti, its actual and formal removal from Georgia. But the Armenians would not be Armenians if, in an effort to take over someone else's land, they would not take advantage of external factors. It is not surprising, therefore, that as soon as the events which led to the establishment of Russian control over Crimea began to unfold, media reports began to speak of ethnic Armenians of Javakheti applying for Russian passports on a massive scale. The official Tbilisi tries to discreetly play down the acuteness of this problem, if not deny its very existence.

Meanwhile, Russia may well use the Armenian separatism as a resource to destabilise the situation in Western-minded Georgia. The official Yerevan, while being interested in maintaining the loyalty of Georgia as a transit country ensuring Armenia's communication with Russia, is not avert to using the ongoing crisis in Russia-Georgia relations in the spirit of aggressive ambitions of "Great Armenia." Suffice it to recall the recent statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the congress of heads of the MFA central staff and diplomatic missions of Armenia: "We must make a serious effort to provide possible assistance to the Armenians of Georgia."

Yerevan's actual support to the growing separatist movement in Javakheti threatens to turn this area into a new source of tension in the South Caucasus. This prospect is totally unacceptable to the region, as its implementation will involve the notorious external forces which pursue exclusively the interests of geopolitical dominance in the South Caucasus.