THE STRENGTHENING OF THE OUTPOST

In the first month of the New Year, another Russian-Armenian trick became known, which caused a wide range of interpretations among experts. The issue is about the order of Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold talks with Armenia to sign an agreement on the development of military-technical cooperation.

This news, as expected, delighted most Armenian analysts who consider the military-political sphere to be the most important parameter of Russian-Armenian relations. According to them, the new agreement will promote the development of the military-industrial complex of Armenia in close cooperation with enterprises of the Russian defence industry. In this context, the development of Russian-Armenian military cooperation may involve the delivery of various types of weapons to Armenia and cooperation in the sphere of production.

Armenian Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan noted in this connection that it will have a positive influence on the development of Armenia's military-industrial complex in general. Without confining himself to the assessment of the Russian initiative, he also spoke out in favour of dispersing the weapons of the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri throughout the country - according to the Russian-Armenian agreement, this base, along with military installations, is responsible for the security of the Armenian state. Ohanyan also said that after the repeal of the lease of the Qabala radar station by Moscow, Armenia would not mind having a Russian radar station on its territory. It is quite clear that taking this opportunity, Yerevan is trying to give an anti-Azerbaijani slant to the development of military-technical cooperation with Moscow.

Of course, the very word "cooperation" means that the interests of Armenia are taken into account here. But this does not mean that Moscow sees the agreement on the development of military-technical cooperation as an instrument aimed only at ensuring the interests of Yerevan, especially its aggressive policy against Azerbaijan. The Russian military presence in Armenia is primarily intended to protect the strategic interests of Moscow itself in the South Caucasus and the surrounding region.

As part of the new Russian-Armenian agreement, we can expect Armenia's border infrastructure at the border with Turkey and Iran to be modernized and centres for training border guards, as well as for emergencies to be established. A protocol on these intentions was signed during the visit to Yerevan by Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev in February last year.

According to sources in the Russian Defence Ministry, the defence industry of Armenia should also be capable of producing some types of ammunition and armoured vehicles with the help of Russia, as well as creating local repair facilities not only for weapons of the ground forces, but also for those of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces. However, given the limited capacity of Armenia as the most economically backward country of the region, it is unlikely that Moscow will establish serious joint military production with it. Under the new contract, the outpost can count mostly on traditional military "gifts" from its patron. The development of military-technical cooperation will be aimed, according to experts, mainly at strengthening the Russian military base in Gyumri, which Moscow started last year.

By 15 January of this year, the Russian Defence Ministry fulfilled a plan to staff the 102nd military base in Gyumri with contract soldiers, doubling their number within six months. At the same time, the number of staff at the base remained the same and is about 5,000 soldiers. Some experts connect such rapid transfer of the 102nd base to a professional basis with the probability of hostilities breaking out in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, while others suggest that it is mainly due to the events around Syria and Iran.

"In the past, there were many examples of predominantly military and technical support provided by Moscow to Yerevan, and often it ran counter to the generally accepted rules of military trade. Putin's decision is partly because of the existing imbalance as a result of the accelerated development of the Azerbaijani defence programme. Thus, Moscow is trying to maintain the military balance in the conflict zone," Russian political scientist Aleksander Karavayev says, for example. According to him, last year, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade was considering the preparation of documents for implementing a project on integrated military facilities in member countries of the CSTO or any other partner of Russia ready for joint military-technical production. At the same time, he does not rule out Azerbaijan's participation in new agreements on military-technical cooperation with Russia as Baku will not give up advanced Russian hardware. Armenia's only advantage is that agreements within the framework of the CSTO enable it to purchase written-off or stockpiled weapons from Russia at domestic Russian prices. The actual purchase of new equipment, maintenance or joint production does not provide any benefits even if the buyer is a member of the CSTO. In other words, on the one hand, Russia demonstrates the benefits of membership in the CSTO to post-Soviet countries and on the other - encourages Armenia's entry into the Putin-backed Eurasian Union. However, it is possible that by focusing on the development of military-technical cooperation with Yerevan, Moscow is trying to sweeten the bitter "gas" pill for Armenia, which will take effect from 1 April this year. In any case, such close military cooperation between Moscow and Yerevan cannot but raise some questions in Baku.

According to the executive secretary of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, Ali Ahmadov, in fact, there is nothing new in this step of Moscow. Russia and Armenia have signed an agreement on military cooperation, the Russian armed forces are in the territory of Armenia, and even the borders of this state are guarded by the Russian border guards. Regular Russian arms supplies to Armenia are not new either. Apparently, with his last order Putin wants to put Russian-Armenian strategic cooperation on the geopolitical agenda again. In this case, Baku does not want to believe that this cooperation is directed against Azerbaijan because Azerbaijan and Russia are neighbouring and friendly countries. However, the executive secretary of the ruling party draws attention to a very important point. "How can a country that has assumed the role of a mediator in the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict link military-technical cooperation with one of the parties to the conflict and the settlement process? In that case, how will the mediator ensure an impartial approach?" Ahmadov wondered.

If we consider that any weapon given or sold to Armenia ends up or can end up in the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict zone, Azerbaijan's concern is understandable, especially at a time when Russia already regularly supplies weapons to Armenia. According to a number of news agencies, in the past few months, Armenia has received a new batch of Russian arms worth several hundred million dollars. The list includes armoured vehicles, missile systems, artillery installations, air defence and aviation technology. It remains to hope that this information is not true, because like previous cases of secret arms supplies to Yerevan, such steps do not meet the level of trust and good relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, whose territory is occupied by Armenia.