
UKRAINE ELECTS A PRESIDENT
But even Petro Poroshenko can't promise the country a "chocolate" future
Author: Irina Xalturina Baku
Elections have taken place in Ukraine for all that. The profound political and economic crisis, the legal and administrative chaos in the country, the armed confrontation in the south-eastern regions have served as the backdrop against which the people could express their will. But for all that, it did not stop many Ukrainian citizens from going to the polling station and casting their vote; according to the exit polls and almost half of the counted ballot papers (at the moment the magazine went to press), the self-nominated candidate, businessman, Petro Poroshenko, was confidently in the lead with 54.05 per cent of the vote. It is known that on the night of 25-26 May many of his colleagues and rivals and even some foreign leaders managed to congratulate him. The USA and Great Britain have stated that they are "prepared to work" with Petro Poroshenko.
It is important to recall that, after the removal of the former president, Viktor Yanukovych, there was a return to the former variant of the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the president is invested with fewer powers. Further, it is planned to turn the country into a parliamentary republic altogether. As a result, in the view of many observers, the main function of the new president will be to uphold the transfer of powers. In these circumstances, it is much more important who becomes prime minister, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk may remain prime minister.
The authorities in Kiev immediately called the elections a model of good organisation and transparency. According to the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, it is the first time in the country's history that an administrative resource was hardly applied, since neither of the candidates was in power at the time of the election.
Of the 21 actual candidates standing in the Ukrainian presidential election, the rating of half of them was so low that no one could refer to them as realistic candidates. Right from the start, the three standing for leader consisted of Petr Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Serhiy Tihipko.
Who would have thought that the oligarch and owner of "Roshen" and "Channel 5" TV channel, 48-year-old Petro Poroshenko, whose ratings had previously not been very high, would become the main candidate for the presidential throne? Sponsor of the "orange revolution", in 2004 he managed to become the minister of trade and economic development and the foreign minister, as well as the chairman of the board of the National Bank, serving under different governments. Under Yanukovych, Poroshenko was regarded as the chief inspirer of Ukraine's movement towards the European Union and NATO.
In second place was Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of the "Batkivshchina" ["Fatherland"] party, twice former prime minister, previously imprisoned for the so called gas deal. Before the elections the well-known "lady with a plait" changed her favourite hair style, replacing it with a less striking one, which turned out to be in vain. Her new look did not bring her victory.
But Yulia Tymoshenko's second place is noteworthy for a number of reasons all the same. If only because she is the enemy of Poroshenko, in all senses moreover. There was a time when Tymoshenko would not apparently have given the "chocolate king" even a single political chance. But things are different now in Kiev. How they accused each other of "aiding and abetting the Kremlin" during the election race was particularly entertaining. What's going to happen to Tymoshenko now? For it would be na?ve to think that she was in prison solely at the wish of Yanukovych. It is now even more interesting to observe those who fought for her release. One thing is clear and that is that the ever-returning Yulia Tymoshenko has not completely played her hand yet. All the more so, since she has stated quite plainly that there might be "a third round to the revolution", although after the news of Poroshenko's victory, she toned her language down a bit, becoming less radical. There can be no doubt that Tymoshenko is capable of surprises. It is doubtful whether exhausted Ukraine is capable of them. Although it is quite possible that Lady Yu. will now withdraw to the side-lines, leaving her rival with a heap of problems, and will calmly wait there for his political demise.
One of the main post-electoral intrigues right from the start was Russia's reaction. In either event, the future attitude of the countries of the West to Moscow would have depended on the attitude of the latter to the new authorities in Kiev. Moreover, judging by the reports on Twitter and Facebook, on the night of 25th to 26th of May, the Europeans were busier with the results of the elections to the European parliament than they were with what was going on in Kiev.
As far as Russian President Vladimir Putin is concerned, he, with the Belarusian president at his side, was watching the Russian team win at the world hockey championships. The Kremlin's boss said a few days earlier during the economic forum in St. Petersburg that Russia would work with the new president of Ukraine, if the two conditions set at the forum were met, namely that the gas debt should be repaid and the anti-terrorist operation in the south-east should be stopped.
If mention of the "blue fuel" is a completely separate subject, then as far as the antiterrorist operation is concerned, the issue is the extent to which the new president of Ukraine is capable of controlling the staff of the Interior Ministry and Ministry of Defence. Will the fighters of the "Right sector" agree to disarm? It is understandable that the radical Ukrainian movements are striving for complete legitimacy, and also possibly to unite; they have no intention whatsoever of leaving the political arena completely. In general, to what extent will Poroshenko be in a position to control the forces that were opposed to the elections? To what extent are the special services and the army subordinated to him? Lastly, to all appearances, not everything is as it should be when it comes to discipline and co-ordination; otherwise how can the events outside Volnovakha in Donetsk region and near the town of Lisichansk in Luhansk province shortly before the elections be explained; a video posted on the Internet beat records for its number of hits.
The media were peppered with broad hopes that Poroshenko will be capable of coming to an agreement with Russia. He himself has already managed to state that there are "enough formats" for resolving the differences between Russia and Kiev.
Another, probably extremely important issue, is to what extent the new president will be legitimate, if half the country actually did not take part in the elections, and, according to various media, this was true of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.
On 24th May, the so called Novorossiya [New Russia] was announced, which consists of the self-proclaimed "Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics. According to the head of the "Lugansk republic", Valeriy Bolotov, this was a union of two "independent republics". He said that other regions might join the union in the very near future, as soon as referendums on independence took place there. Martial law was declared in the "Donetsk People's Republic" on 26 May.
But what's going to happen to Ukraine now? For it is obvious that nothing is going to end with the election of the new president, but one might say that this is just the beginning.
The only way out would appear to be federalisation, state status for the Russian language, and neutrality (on the part of the Western media, the proposal "tossed in" on "Finlandisation"), that in its status Ukraine should not be attached to any bloc.
Poroshenko promised to make his first official trip to the Donbass [Donetsk region], stressing that Ukraine would be "a single country and not a federal one". He also noted that one of the main points in the presidential programme will be putting an end to the fighting and stabilising the situation in the country. But once again, by what means can that be achieved? It is obvious that mediators are needed for talks in Ukraine, where should they now be taken from, if the main players in the unfolding crisis are contriving to create the conditions of a new cold war.
But the country's economy gives the greatest cause for concern. Only general proposals were heard in all Poroshenko's election promises, but neither he nor incidentally the other candidates explained as they went along how in the current conditions in Ukraine they could simultaneously cut taxes, spend more on "social needs", pay off debts for gas, make preparations for the coming winter season and so forth. Unfortunately, most of the plans are unrealistic.
Therefore, the "new Maydan" may not be a figment of the imagination, this time for specific social reasons. In this case, especially taking into account the south-eastern regions which are not yet under control, there is a risk of full-scale sliding towards a Middle Eastern scenario. If this turns out to be the case, then it is advantageous to some kind of external forces to have everlasting chaos in Ukraine, so the rivalry between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko fits in well with this scenario.
The new president will have to take upon himself the responsibility for all that is happening in the country. But, as mentioned above, this unknown in the Ukrainian equation directly depends on the extent to which the hands of the new president are tied in taking decisions. As recent events are demonstrating, it is at this stage that anything is likely to happen.
RECOMMEND: