
"COOL WAR"
The world community on the eve of splitting into rival blocs
Author: Sahil ISGANDAROV, political scientist Baku
In the spring of 1989, the low-circulation neoconservative magazine National Interest published a small article by a modest US State Department official Francis Fukuyama "The End of History?", which caused a serious debate in intellectual circles. It was a harbinger of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the socialist bloc, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, a military-political bloc, which had been the main opponent of NATO for 35 years. Thereafter, Fukuyama, who unexpectedly gained worldwide fame, began writing the book "The End of History and the Last Man," which was published in 1992, i.e. after serious geopolitical changes in the Eurasian space and the end of the Cold War. In economic terms, the basic postulate of these works is the statement that there is no alternative to liberal democracy. According to Fukuyama, as a result of the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War and its collapse, the last irrational state disappeared, and now global development will be based on the values of the free market and democracy. With the defeat of the Soviet ideology, the confrontation between two political and economic systems ended. The concept of "nation state" and "national interests" go into oblivion, the importance of supranational organizations sharply rises and the era of the universality of Western liberal democracy begins. In geopolitical dimension, the meaning of Fukuyama's claims means the triumph of ideas of mondialism, or to be more precise, the establishment of a unipolar world order, where Washington becomes the sole focus of decision-making on the global scale. In other words, in his writings Fukuyama creates a conceptual framework for the long-term and three-stage US fight for world domination. From the signing of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), based on the concept of state sovereignty, to the end of World War II, the system of international relations was dominated by a multipolar world order. And until the end of World War I, Washington was never considered to be one of the world centres of decision-making. Stepping into World War I in March 1917, the US launched a serious attempt to abandon the Monroe Doctrine to establish a bipolar and even better, unipolar world under its auspices. The 14-point programme, which was developed by the then US President Wilson and formed the basis of the Treaty of Versailles, pursued this goal in principle. But the then geopolitical realities prevented the full implementation of the project. Washington's long-awaited dream came true in 1945 after the signing of the Potsdam agreements, which confirmed a new balance of power not only in Europe but throughout the world after the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition over Germany and its allies. This system, which defined the new boundaries and disposition of geopolitical forces, stated the transition from a multipolar to a bipolar world order. Dividing the world into two poles of geopolitical spheres of influence, the USSR and the USA became the progenitors of two opposing blocs: these are the continental power (USSR and its allies) and the maritime power (US and its allies). Naturally, the defining role in making crucial decisions in one of these blocs belonged to Moscow and Washington. A characteristic feature of the Potsdam geopolitical era was the confrontation of these blocs and balancing between "cold" and nuclear wars. The hour of triumph for the US in the long struggle for world domination came at the end of 1991 with the signing of the Belovezhskaya agreements formalizing the disintegration of the USSR and the end of the bipolar structure of the world. From this moment, the United States became the sole superpower and a world centre of decision-making on the global scale, which was openly declared by Washington, which constantly asserts American exceptionalism. It is believed that against the background of new global challenges, most countries reacted with satisfaction and accepted the establishment of a unipolar world where the only superpower will act as a guarantor of stability and security in the world, naturally, with the proviso that its decisions will be in strict conformity with international law. However, this did not mean that some countries representing the "defeated" socialist camp are ready to accept such a state of things and will not eventually try to regain lost ground. Specifically, although Russia and China (permanent members of the UN Security Council) were forced to come to terms with the situation in view of the circumstances, for the past 20 years they have repeatedly urged Washington to consider their views and national interests when making certain global decisions. The status of a superpower placed global super-obligations on the US when everyone expects an impartial moderator in the most difficult situations. The problem is that in a world torn by geopolitical struggles of leading countries, it is not so easy to be an objective arbiter, taking into account the diametrically opposite views and interests of competing and conflicting parties. The latest ongoing processes indicate that Washington finds it increasingly difficult to manage the role of the world's only decision-making centre. And the opinion that under the guise of spreading liberal values, the US often furthers only its own national interests contributes more and more to this. In this context, the most striking example is the sharp deterioration of relations between the US and post-Yeltsin Russia. For example, in a speech at the annual Munich Security Conference in February of 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin voiced an open message to Washington, saying that Russia, for which the priority was to return to the club of strong powers, is not going to continue to put up with the unipolar world. Although just two years after that, the United States and Russia announced the "resetting" of relations with a great fanfare, the geopolitical confrontation between the two countries acquired even tighter outlines with the launch of deeper integration projects in the former Soviet space by Moscow and due to the events in Ukraine. And since Putin has declared the failure of the unipolar world twice in the past two months, tensions in relations are unlikely to subside in the short-term. Based on these realities, many analysts are already talking about the beginning of an age of "cool war". Logically, we can assume that soon the world community will split into rival blocs again and return not to the bipolar but to the multipolar system. In this context, the thoughts of famous Norwegian mondialist scientist Johan Galtung, set forth in the work "Geopolitics after the Cold War: An Essay in Agenda Theory" are noteworthy. According to him, the Cold War led to a world order, which was based on the confrontation of three superpowers constituting three blocs: 1. The Western bloc, which was controlled by the US, implied military superiority in all theatres of action and was based on democracy and the market economic system; 2. The Eastern bloc, which was controlled by the USSR, pursued a policy of military parity, based on the one-party system underlying the administrative system, and replied on planning in the economy; 3. The Non-Aligned Third World - developing countries that were not included in any bloc and were not "customers" of any superpower. Third World countries often set the two world superpowers against each other, which, frankly, is a highly controversial thesis.
The most interesting thing is that, according to Galtung, after the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the system of international relations became less predictable and more volatile, because the "defeated" socialist camp was replaced by two serious contenders for confrontation with the West. First, it is the Third World - developing Latin America, the Arab world, West Asia and South Asia. Second, it is the Fourth World - South-East and East Asia. Along with others, it includes such enormous powers like China, the two Koreas, Vietnam and Japan. Moreover, in today's world there are seven centres that claim global or regional hegemony and are not averse to reshaping the prevailing world order according to their geopolitical ambitions. In light of these realities, it can be assumed that the countdown timer is already running.
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