"THE HONEYMOON IS OVER"

With Georgian-Russian relations gradually normalizing, news that the parliament of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia has introduced for consideration the draft of a new treaty of alliance with Russia struck like a bolt from the blue. Agreements on the new treaty between the leaders of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia were reached on August 27, while the draft of the treaty reached the Abkhaz parliament on October 13. Mollified by the opening of the Russian market to Georgian goods, the Georgian authorities reacted to news of a new treaty by announcing that they would give Moscow an "aggressive response." We asked political scientist and former Georgian deputy foreign minister Sergi Kapanadze what the growing tension between two of Azerbaijan's neighbors might mean forthe region.

- What does the new treaty from the Russian Federation have planned for the break-away Georgian region of Abkhazia?

- This treaty provides for the complete integration of Abkhazia with Russia. It stipulatesintegration in all spheres: political, economic, defense, etc. Although Georgia does not recognize Abkhazia's independence even without that, webelievethatafterthesigningofanewtreaty of alliance Sukhumi will lose all elements of independence and will become a region completely controlled by Russia. We believe that this step is an act of annexation. It is an attempt to legally formalize the occupation of Georgian territories begun in 2008.

- What is stipulated in the treaty's clause on military cooperation?

- Inthe military sectorthe treaty proposes the conversion of the Abkhaz armed forces to Russian standards, the creation of a joint Russian-Abkhaz military force, joint border guard units, military cooperation in the event of an attack on Abkhazia, etc. The last clause is distinctly aimed against Georgia, and might be used as blackmail. In the political sphere Russia is obligated to contribute to the legitimization of Abkhazia's independence in every way it can, guarantee Sukhumi's accession to various international organizations, etc.

All of that is in the draft of the treaty. But in Abkhazia itself there are opponents of this treaty who are trying to stop it from being signed and adopted. The issue is that Abkhazians themselves understand that this treaty will not bring Abkhazia prosperity or development. The Abkhazians will simply be assimilated into Russia. Chances that this project will be rejected in parliament are miniscule, however. Russia has established strict control over the economic, financial, and political system of Abkhazia. If Moscow insists, then the Abkhazian parliament will have to ratify the treaty.

- The treaty provides for the strengthening of Russian control on the Georgian-Abkhazian border. Doesn't that mean that the Georgian-Abkhaz border in effectbecomes an external border of the Russian Federation with the ratification of the treaty?

- That's absolutely right. The trendtoward the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been especially visible lately. Forexample, inTskhinvali there are no long any political forces that would oppose integration with Russia. Andin Abkhazia, after the presidential elections and the events preceding them, utterly pro-Russian forces came to power. Theprocess of establishing complete control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia began to gain momentum after Russia was able to painlessly annex the Crimea. Before Tbilisi had managed to keep a policy of non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia fairly well. If Abkhazia and South Ossetia are an nexed, everything changes. It would be very difficult to continue the policy of not recognizing these regions. This is a challenge not only to Georgia, but to the international community as a whole. It will be very difficultf or the administration to keep the break-away regions in the status of unrecognized territories.

- The decision to sign anew treaty was made as relations between Tbilisi and Moscow were normalizing. Perhaps Tbilisi did something to annoy the Kremlin? For example, Georgia is, as before, aspiring to NATO membership, and has announced the opening of NATO training bases…

- The improvement of Georgian-Russian relations was just an illusion. Therulingcoalition, GeorgianDream, even before the elections said that if they won the vote, they would reestablish relations with the Russian Federation. Yes, Russia did open its markets to Russian goods, including wine and mineral water, and Georgian exports again switched their focus to Russia. But that only increased Georgia's dependence on exporting goods into Russia. Russia gained additional means of pressuringTbilisi.

Now Georgian authorities are declaring that they will keep a hard line with Russia. This policy should have been continued two years ago. Perhaps to some extent this stated policy will allow us to withstand Russian pressure.

Georgia's NATO aspirations have nothing to do with it. Euro-integration is not a whim of the administration - it is the choice of the Georgian people. In the situation Georgia finds itself in, it is impossible to be an independent government and not aspire to NATO membership. This doesn't suit Russia, naturally. Not only, by the way, in the case of Georgia, but also with other neighboring countries. However, we have no alternatives to integration into European bodies.

- What specific steps can the Georgian administration take?

- Unfortunately, we missed an entire year of prime chances to restore Georgia's territorial integrity. While all the world's attention was fixed on the Crimea, we could have connected the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the Crimean issue. We should have shown the world that what happened in the Crimea had already happened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and could happen with other countries. The Georgian government made a mistake in not joining these two issues. In an interview with foreign media our prime minister announced that the annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had nothing in common.An important political moment was lost then. Now we have to bring to bear the entire diplomatic arsenal.We will have to make up for the passivity of Georgian diplomacy for the past two years, focus our attention on the occupation of Georgian territories. The issue of the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia should return to the agenda of international forums and meetings. This applies especially to filing suits with various international courts. Efforts to lower Georgia's economic dependence on Russia will also have to be taken. And, mostimportantly, wehavetosenda clear message that the "honeymoon" in Georgian-Russian relations has ended, and relationsare returning to the situation of 2008. That is the strategic line in the defense of Georgia's territorial integrity for the moment. Tactically, theremightbedifferentoptions.

-Yesterday Zurab Abshidze, the Georgian prime minister's special representative for ties with Russia, announced that Russia has on several occasions raised the issue of restoring the Abkhaz section of the railroad connecting the Russian Federation and Armenia. Abashidze said that the administration is not going to discuss that topic with Abkhazia, but is ready to carefully consider the Russian side's proposals…

- I don't think that the issue of restoring the railroad will appear on the Georgian government's agenda. It's a very risky project that Russia and Armenia need, but that doesn't promise Georgia anything good. Once the former Georgian primeminister Bidzina Ivanishvili showed some interest in the railroad from Abkhazia to Armenia, but then everyone quickly forgot about that transport route. Now no one in the administration is working on that issue, and it doesn't interest anyone in Georgia.Although during a recent regularly-scheduled meeting in Prague state secretary and deputy head of the Russian foreign ministry Grigoriy Karasin raised the issue of the Abkhazian railroad, he was given a clear answer - Georgia does not consider the restoration of that railroad possible.