ANOTHER SNAP ELECTION

No-one doubted that the main pro-European parties would win the early elections to the Supreme Council held in Ukraine on 26 October. The only interest was in the figures and they showed that, despite a collective success, all Ukraine's politicians in fact lost. On the other hand, I suppose, a common victory was achieved. As the results came in, many commentators pointed out that Ukrainian society was more united and patriotically minded than it has ever been. This was reflected in the unanimous support for the "politicians from the Maidan", hoping for a better future, in the ubiquitous colours of the national flag and the "vyshivanki" [traditional Ukrainian national shirts], which have become very popular. But this was not reflected in the turn-out, which was 52.42 per cent, the lowest ever. It should also be noted that Ukraine is still divided into two halves. The majority of the people of Eastern Ukraine - Kharkiv, Zaporizhiya, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (the last two regions are accountable to Kiev) - opted for the "opposition bloc".

The West described the Ukrainian elections as democratic and transparent. Although they were not held "on all Ukrainian territory", Russia, too, recognized the new parliament.

So, the new Ukrainian parliament consists of Arseniy Yatsenyuk's People's Front (22.16 per cent); the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (21.83 per cent), Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyy's Samopomoshch [Self-Help] (10.98 per cent); the Opposition Bloc (9.40 per cent), Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party (7.45 per cent) and Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchina [Fatherland) (5.68 per cent). 

One of the main outcomes of the election was the fact that Oleh Tyahynbok's radical Svoboda [Freedom] Party won only 4.71 per cent of the vote and failed to enter parliament. And the communists also failed to get in for the first time. However, Pravyy Sektor [Right Sector] leader Dmytro Yarosh will be in parliament as he triumphed in a single-seat constituency in Dnipropetrovsk Region. Another striking outcome of the elections was the virtual failure of Batkivshchina, or rather its leader, the country's former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko. The electorate made it clear that they have become tired of this politician, with or without her plaits. Incidentally, the Radical Party, which was tipped to come second, also failed to some extent. Poroshenko also received far fewer votes than his bloc expected. And compared with the presidential elections, it could be said that the head of state has lost the confidence of a substantial section of the electorate. In fact, it is very difficult to name an outright winner of the elections, although Yatsenyuk/Turchynov's People's Front fared best.

As a result, Ukraine can expect bargaining with respect to the post-Maidan coalition, which Yatsenyuk proposes calling "European Ukraine". It will be intriguing to see how and on what conditions the president and the prime minister will reach agreement. Yatsenyuk is demanding places for himself in the government and the post of speaker (Turchynov), as well as the head of the Foreign Ministry, but this is unlikely to suit Poroshenko who, incidentally, will have a minority anyway. The conditions in which the other parties join the coalition are another question. Some reports say that Lyashko was immediately invited to talks on participation. Self-Help, which came third, should also be part of the coalition. But Batkivshchina and, especially, Opposition Bloc are hardly likely to.

Meanwhile, no elections were held in Crimea and in half the districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. Furthermore, the authorities in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR) have no intention of abandoning their own parliamentary elections, although Kiev is insisting that, according to the law on the region's special status, they must take place on 7 December and be organized by the centre. Kiev asked Russia to use its influence on the leaders of the DPR and the LPR in an effort to persuade them to refrain from this non-consensual expression of the will of the people. However, Moscow replied that it has no such "boundless levers of influence", but it does, of course, recognize the results of the local elections in the disfavoured regions. Russia is confident that the elections are provided for in the Minsk agreements, but the law signed by Poroshenko on the special procedure of self-administration in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions runs counter to these agreements. For their part, the USA and the EU immediately made it clear they do not recognize the elections in South-East Ukraine and have threatened the Kremlin with a tightening of sanctions. What, then, is the price of the Minsk agreements which were either not fully agreed or their provisions not completely clear to one of the sides, or is someone deceiving their partners? Not to mention the fact that hints keep popping up in the media about certain verbal agreements - very important, but for some reason not meant for the ears of the general public.

 Remarkably, literally immediately after the parliamentary elections - on 30 October - representatives of Moscow, Brussels and Kiev signed a protocol setting out the conditions of gas supplies to Ukraine until the end of March 2015 at a price of 385 dollars for 1,000 cu m. It was signed by the Russian and Ukrainian energy ministers, Aleksandr Novak and Yuriy Prodan, as well as the Vice President of the European Commission Gunther Oettinger. An additional agreement was also signed between Gazprom and Naftohaz. According to the documents that were signed, Ukraine will pay a debt of 3.1bn dollars to Gazprom before the end of the year. In addition, Russia will supply another 4bn cu m of gas before the end of the first quarter 2015, for which Ukraine will have to find an extra 1.5bn dollars. At the same time, differences remain on the size of the gas debt. Russia is insisting on payment of 5.3bn dollars, but Ukraine recognizes only 3.1bn, which it has agreed to clear. The Stockholm Arbitration Court is due to decide the question of debt.

Moscow has clearly played for time, awaiting the outcome of the parliamentary elections and with whom it was going to negotiate. Will Russia be able to use gas to intervene in the process of the distribution of power in Kiev? It is quite possible that this winter Ukraine will get its heat not only at nominal cost. There can be no doubt that Moscow is counting on using the energy whip. This is at least perceptible from reports on Russian television where nearly every news bulletin talks about the people in Kiev practically freezing.

And the Ukrainian crisis itself is still a long way from even the start of its conclusion. The destiny of the new parliament is unlikely to be more fortunate than many of its predecessors - it will have to take too many unpopular decisions. Besides, relations between Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk are in many ways similar to those we remember between [Viktor] Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, and we all know what that led to. It is also doubtful that Tymoshenko and Tyahynbok, each at their own level and with their own capabilities, will be able to come to terms with such a poor result.

But Ukraine's particular problem is the wide gap on the political front - did those who voted in the eastern regions for the Opposition Bloc do so from pro-Russian positions or more because they are not happy with the policies of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk? The latter alternative looks much worse for the future coalition. So, it is in the next few months that it will become clear how strong Ukrainian identity and the national wave of enthusiasm are. Are they based solely on disaffection for Russia, as the Russian media claims, or are they really strong? In his draft coalition agreement Poroshenko speaks about the basic values of the Ukrainian Revolution: "Dignity. Freedom, Future." This same document contains a list of 13 reforms aimed at improving the life of the population, but all specific measures, unlike abstract slogans, demand time and resources. So, for the time being the citizens of Ukraine cannot expect either economic stability or calm in the political life of the country. Both the current opposition and the radicals remain dissatisfied. And the latter, despite the outcome of the elections, still has its own resources which could increase as dissatisfaction with the unpopular decisions of "European Ukraine" grows. And there is no doubt that it will.