MEDIATORS' DOUBLE STANDARDS

Typically, summer is not too full of political events. But this summer is an exception in this regard due to several events, one of which is the intensification of the negotiation process on the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict.

Despite the Kazan failure, the countries co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group made another effort in July. As was expected, the main initiator was Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, who, among the three leaders of the co-chairing countries, is directly involved in the settlement of the conflict.

Visiting Yerevan and Baku, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan a message from Dmitriy Medvedev which, according to official reports, contained further proposals to the parties to the conflict.

Most likely, "Medvedev's new plan" includes some new positions on technical details without touching on the essence of the basic Minsk principles.

During his visit to Moscow, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov handed the response of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Medvedev's proposal on the Karabakh settlement. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan also officially responded to the message from the president of the Russian Federation.

Meanwhile, from 11 to 18 July, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group visited Moscow, Vilnius, Baku and Yerevan. During their meetings in Baku and Yerevan with the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the co-chairs noted the importance of agreeing on the basic principles and stated that it was time to show the political will necessary for a lasting peace, security and reconciliation between the peoples of the region.

The presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work on the latest wording proposed for the framework document and the importance of continuing to work with the co-chairs and co-chairing countries on the process of finding a peaceful solution. The co-chairs, along with the personal representative of the OSCE chairman-in-office, Andrzej Kasprzyk, also met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and discussed contacts within the Minsk Group to resolve the conflict peacefully. At the meeting in Vilnius with the OSCE chairman-in-office, Lithuania's Foreign Minister Audronius Azubalis, the co-chairs briefed him on the steps taken after the meeting in Kazan and the peace process. This issue was also discussed at a meeting between US State Secretary Hillary Clinton and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

All this hype is evidence that in a bid to prevent a military solution to the problem, the co-chairs are trying to change the status quo. The question is how and what kind of leverage they are willing to use to achieve this goal.

In Armenia, the Russian president's message caused a peculiar reaction. The leader of the opposition Heritage party and ex-foreign minister of Armenia, R. Ovannisyan, demanded that the authorities declassify the text of the document discussed at the tripartite meeting of the presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in Kazan, as well as the message from the Russian president. According to Ovannisyan, to ensure that the occupied territories around Nagornyy Karabakh do not become a bargaining chip in the negotiations with Baku, Armenia should urgently populate them.

In view of such sentiments prevailing in Armenian society and different interpretations of the basic principles by the parties to the conflict, it is quite obvious that without a prior agreement on technical details, the signing of a "road map" is very problematic, not to mention its unconditional implementation.

One of the key aspects of the Madrid principles, which the Armenian side has been emphasizing all the time, is the parties' obligation to resolve the conflict peacefully.

This proposal by the mediators is unwittingly reminiscent of some moments in the history of world wars. At a certain stage of the First World War, the Keiser's Germany, and during the Second World War, Nazi Germany, which had occupied large areas of their opponents, made a proposal to cease the hostilities and initiate peace talks. In both cases, the countries of the Entente and the anti-Hitler coalition emphatically rejected those suggestions, rightly considering that such consent could be seen as encouraging the aggressor. It is surprising that the co-chairing countries that were members of the anti-German coalition in both cases hold the opposite view on the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, giving Armenia a carte blanche and the opportunity to continue to take a destructive position in the negotiation process.

The mediators explain the inadmissibility of resuming hostilities by the fact that the current situation is a result of the war in the early 1990s, which must be avoided today. The question is what prevented them from neutralizing the aggressor at the time? It is strange that the co-chairing countries, which inertly watched the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenia, step up their peacekeeping mission precisely at the moments when Azerbaijan's economy and the combat readiness of its army strengthen.

The Bishkek protocol on the ceasefire was signed at the insistence of the co-chairs precisely after a successful winter campaign by the Azerbaijani army in early 1994 in Fuzuli and Horadiz and the failed April offensive by the Armenian armed forces in Tartar in the same year. We should agree that the co-chairs' forcing the parties to the conflict to cease fire looks more like loving care of the aggressor rather than an attempt to resolve the conflict under international law.

And today, prioritizing only a peaceful solution to the conflict, the co-chairs, one way or another, condone the aggressive appetites of Armenia.

Nevertheless, Baku, showing political will, is giving its agreement to this, but with one important caveat: "This process must have a time limit." That is the peace process should not drag on indefinitely, on which Armenia and its supporters count. Azerbaijan, which is capable of liberating its occupied territories independently, does not intend to be bound by that obligation in the long term. And Baku has a good reason for that.

Now, with the four UN resolutions demanding Armenia's unconditional withdrawal from the occupied Azerbaijani territories and the real possibility of renewed hostilities, the co-chairs are endlessly talking about a lack of leverage to put pressure on the aggressor. It is unlikely that the co-chairs' speculative statements will change after Azerbaijan commits itself to an exclusively peaceful settlement of the conflict. As long as Azerbaijan has not received firm legal assurances in the form of a special appendix to the Madrid principles about the duration of the peace process for the conflict settlement, the signing of an agreement on the "road map" is unlikely to become a reality.

And this document should contain not only a timeframe for the implementation of a provision of the Madrid principles, but also a list of sanctions to be applied in relation to the side that undermines the agreement. Otherwise, this will mean making no headway.

The statement Mammadyarov made during a joint press conference with Lavrov in Moscow is direct proof of this: "The principles that are now being discussed are in fact a political document and are not legally binding. I think that we should start discussing a legally binding document, which is the peace treaty."

No less urgent is the question of territorial integrity. The co-chairing countries should pay attention to the fact that independent Armenia has not yet annulled the two resolutions of the Supreme Council of Soviet Armenia "On the merger of Nagornyy Karabakh with Armenia", which legally means the annexation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Only the official cancellation of these acts may be evidence of Armenia's readiness to respect international law and show political will in the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict.

The principle of determining the final status of Nagornyy Karabakh through a plebiscite also raises many questions. Armenia adheres to triple tactics here. Initially, Yerevan demanded that Azerbaijan recognize the independence of Nagornyy Karabakh in exchange for the occupied territories around it. By the way, this is a specific example of dialogue in the language of force, of which the patrons of aggressive Armenia are unfairly trying to accuse Azerbaijan.

After it became clear that a phased plan for resolving the conflict is the only way out of this situation, Yerevan started to speculate with the results of the "referendum" held among the Armenian population of Nagornyy Karabakh in violation of international law, arguing that "the people" of Karabakh have already expressed their will.

Today, Armenia appears willing to hold a new referendum with the participation of the Azerbaijani community of Nagornyy Karabakh, but only on one indispensable condition: "The number of the Azerbaijani community of Nagornyy Karabakh and of Azerbaijanis with voting rights should be limited to the figures of 1988." We see a clear contradiction with international law here because this infringes on the rights of Azerbaijanis who were born and already have the right to vote outside of Nagornyy Karabakh because of Armenia's aggressive policy.

Azerbaijan's position on this issue, like on all others relating to the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, has remained unchanged for all these years: "The final status of Nagornyy Karabakh within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan will be decided after the return of all Azerbaijanis not only to the occupied regions around Nagornyy Karabakh, but also to Nagornyy Karabakh proper and only through the will of the whole population, as envisaged in the Constitution of Azerbaijan."

There is clearly a deep contradiction in the positions of the warring parties on the issue. And the mediators are in no hurry to specify this delicate moment, allowing the parties to interpret it at their own discretion. Meanwhile, there are similar cases in international practice. When the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs held a "referendum" on secession in territories densely populated by Serbs, the international community did not recognize their results, and only the republican referendums in Bosnia and Croatia were recognized as complying with international law. Moreover, the Serbs living in these countries were also not considered a party to the negotiation process. Only Serbia was recognized as a party to the conflict, and that was reflected in the Dayton Accords.

This question is directly related to the further fate of internally displaced persons and their security upon return to their land. Yerevan often tries to explain its intransigence by saying that withdrawal from the occupied Azerbaijani lands threatens the existence of the Armenian community of Nagornyy Karabakh. At the same time, they never mention security guarantees for the Azerbaijani community, which should return to Nagornyy Karabakh. We must say that it is a very strange argument by the aggressor, who carried out ethnic cleansing and pursued a policy of scorched earth, pillage, plunder and destruction of historical monuments of Azerbaijani culture in the occupied territories.

Unfortunately, neither the co-chairing countries, nor the world community have issued their fair political and legal verdict on these issues. But the mediators are tirelessly talking about the creation of an atmosphere of trust between the societies of the conflicting parties, without which it is impossible to achieve a final and irrevocable settlement of the conflict.

It is more than a constructive suggestion. History knows a lot of protracted wars that culminated in the conclusion of peace, which was in no small measure thanks to the lack of genetic hatred for each other between the peoples of the warring parties. Is it possible in Armenia where the population is brought up to hate not only the Azerbaijanis and the Turkic world, but all individuals and peoples opposing the aggressive policy of Armenia? Evidence of such a policy is the result of a collective study on the topic "The nationalist discourse in Armenia", which was conducted by a group of young Armenian scientists with the support of the Heinrich Boell Foundation in the South Caucasus.

What atmosphere of trust can the Armenian authorities offer if they proclaim from high rostrums that Armenians and Azerbaijanis are genetically incompatible, and have turned Armenia into a mono-ethnic country in an era of globalization? And what atmosphere of trust can there be if the president of Armenia recently made a statement, justifying not only the current capture of Azerbaijani territory, but actually encouraging the Armenian youth to conduct an aggressive policy?

Asked by a participant in the 5th Olympiad on the Armenian language, literature and Armenian studies in Tsakhkadzor in Armenia what borders future Armenia will have and whether Western Armenia and Mount Ararat (the territory of Turkey) will be returned, Sargsyan responded as follows: "It all depends on your generation. My generation, I think, has fulfilled its duty, when in the early 1990s it was necessary to defend part of our country - Artsakh - against the enemy, and we were able to do so. And I am not saying this as a reprimand. I want to say that every generation has its own obligations and it must be able to meet and accomplish them. You and your peers must spare no effort, and if older and younger generations act in the same way, our country will be one of the best in the world."

Again, oddly enough, the mediators did not respond to such statements by the Armenian authorities.

I think it will also be problematic to determine the composition of the peacekeeping contingent which is expected to enter the conflict zone. According to official reports, no peacekeeping force will be provided by the co-chairing countries. But this does not mean that everything will be decided without a hitch. Today, the mediators emphasize the serious differences that exist among the conflicting parties. But most likely, when the issue of the composition of the peacekeeping force is raised after the signing of the "road map", the mediators will have to secure a consensus not only in the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also in their own approaches to this issue. Most likely, each of the co-chairing countries will seek to include their allied countries or at the worst, countries loyal to their geopolitical interests and games in the South Caucasus in the peacekeeping force in order to prevent the domination of the opposing parties in the region.

These issues are a major stumbling block to the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict under international law. As long as there are no fundamental answers to these basic principles of the updated Madrid document, hopes for the signing of a "road map" are practically equal to zero. This, in turn, means the inevitable resumption of the hostilities, which the mediators are trying so hard to prevent.