SEPARATIST ITCH

The decision of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo exacerbated Armenia's separatist itch. As soon as the judges mentioned the independence of the Serbian province, Armenia and its diaspora created a fuss in a bid to apply the decision to the Nagornyy Karabakh issue, by hook or by crook. And this was not the first time. Even when Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Armenia launched a noisy campaign, saying that that was a precedent for recognition of the independence of Nagornyy Karabakh. However, it is notable that, while calling on everyone else to recognize Nagornyy Karabakh as an independent state, Armenia itself is scared to give that recognition to Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, even to Nagornyy Karabakh.

There is nothing unusual in such behaviour by Yerevan. But to at least maintain the illusion of anyone ever recognizing independence for Nagornyy Karabakh, Armenia itself must first recognize independence for at least one of the secessionist entities. But such a step is not possible, because either Washington or Moscow would publicly flog Yerevan with all the consequences that would ensue.

So eventually, most of those same Armenian experts agreed that The Hague Court's decision on Kosovo's independence means absolutely nothing for Nagornyy Karabakh. Although some Armenians continue to console themselves, saying that the international community (or rather, the leading world powers) supposedly does not want to apply the Kosovo precedent to Nagornyy Karabakh solely due to particular geopolitical interests. Otherwise, in their view, the Court's decision would represent a direct precedent for other separatist entities, at least in the post-Soviet area. But even a superficial comparison of the Kosovo and Nagornyy Karabakh conflicts shows that things are quite the opposite, in both politico-legal and historical contexts.

First, the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict cannot be interpreted as the desire of the region's Armenian population to achieve self-determination, because this is not an issue of autonomy, but one of the constituent elements of a plan to create "Greater Armenia", which necessitates territorial claims not only on Azerbaijan, but on all neighbouring countries. It is no accident that the conflict in Nagornyy Karabakh began with Armenian demands for "Miatsum", which means "reunion" (with Armenia). Besides, Armenia has not repealed the 1988 and 1989 decisions made by its parliament on the merging of Nagornyy Karabakh with Armenia. The Kosovo Albanians did not intend in their struggle to reunite with neighbouring Albania to create "Greater Albania".

Second, in Kosovo's population of two million, the ethnic composition is as follows: Albanians - 90 per cent, Serbs - 6 per cent, other nationalities - 4 per cent. At the very beginning of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, the total population of this autonomous region of Azerbaijan was 192,000. Even if we go by Armenian sources, at least 30 per cent of them were Azerbaijanis. Such a big difference in the total populations and the ratios between the ethnic groupings of Kosovo and Nagornyy Karabakh should be a major factor in rejecting the relevance of Kosovo's independence to Nagornyy Karabakh, because if every region, densely populated with 100,000-150,000 Armenians, demands autonomy or independence, then very soon we will have numerous "tiny little Armenias". If we take into account the ambitions of Armenians living in Turkey, Georgia and even within their "strategic partner" Russia, it is not difficult to imagine what consequences that could have.

Third, according to documented records, the Albanians, who settled in the Kosovo province in the late 14th century, have made their own contribution to the prosperity of the region and have maintained all the historical monuments in the area. Armenians from various countries began to settle in the mountainous part of Karabakh only from the 1830s, as a result of tsarist Russia's resettlement policy - following the conclusion of the Treaty of Turkmanchay. While Kosovo's Albanian population grew naturally, the rise in the number of Armenians in Nagornyy Karabakh was mainly the result of migration from other regions and the ousting of Azerbaijanis. With regard to historical monuments, the Armenians have destroyed all Azerbaijani historical and cultural heritage in the occupied territories.

Fourth, while the Kosovo issue is inherently domestic in nature (a conflict between the state and an autonomous province which is part of the state), in Nagornyy Karabakh, we are dealing with a conflict between two republics of the former USSR (now sovereign states) based on Armenia's territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Even the current format of the talks proves that Nagornyy Karabakh is not a subject but an object of the conflict. Moreover, the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict broke out during the Soviet period and the Soviet constitution also declared the inviolability of existing borders within the state. Even international organizations have recognized the war which Armenia waged on Azerbaijan, and the UN has adopted four resolutions calling for the return of all occupied Azerbaijani lands without preconditions.

Fifth, Albania did not use its common border with Kosovo to turn the land into a den of rebels and international terrorists. Yerevan, which had no common border with Nagornyy Karabakh, occupied another seven districts of Azerbaijan surrounding the region and geographically annexed Nagornyy Karabakh to Armenia. Today, the occupied territories have become a convenient transit route for drug trafficking and a training ground for international terrorism.

Sixth, as we have already mentioned, Serbs currently constitute 6 per cent of the total population of Kosovo, and the region's leadership has promised international organizations to ensure their protection and to create normal living conditions for them. Even during the ethnic cleansing carried out in the province by Serbian death squads, the Albanians did not carry out similar operations against the Serbs in the province. They fought only Serbian troops. The Serbs were not expelled from the province and still continue to live there. Today there are 16 Serb communities with the right to self-government in Kosovo. Yerevan conducted ethnic cleansing not only against the Azerbaijanis living in the territory of modern Armenia, but also expelled all non-Armenians from the occupied Nagornyy Karabakh and the seven districts of Azerbaijan.

In their cruelty, the atrocities committed by Armenian forces during these purges were no less severe than those observed in Kosovo, and even surpassed them in some ways. The Xocali tragedy alone would be enough to take Armenia to the International Tribunal in The Hague (remember Serzh Sargsyan bragging to foreign journalists that in order to achieve their goals, they would not shrink from shooting unarmed civilians). The connivance of the international community now allows Armenia to claim the seven Azerbaijani districts surrounding Nagornyy Karabakh. Moreover, Armenia opposes the return of displaced Azerbaijanis to their homes in Nagornyy Karabakh. At the same time, Armenia itself has long since become a mono-ethnic state in a multi-ethnic area. Even the Russians number only 7,000 people in that country, while in Azerbaijan there are about 200,000 Russians.

Seventh, Serbia gained control of Kosovo in 1912 and in 1918 the province was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This suggests that there was a fairly long period between the settlement of Albanians in Kosovo (late 14th century) and the incorporation of the region into the Kingdom. Nagornyy Karabakh has, historically, belonged to Azerbaijan and has never been part of Armenia. Furthermore, even present-day Armenia was artificially created after World War I on historical Azerbaijani lands that were taken away from Azerbaijan as a result of geopolitical games between the West and Russia.

And the last point. According to the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Kosovo, which was an autonomous region within Serbia and had the same rights as Serbia, was part of Yugoslavia as a full subject of the federation with the right of veto on internal Serbian issues. Nagornyy Karabakh was never a separate entity of the USSR and had no right of veto on domestic issues in Azerbaijan.

All these comparisons provide the basis to declare that the recognition of Kosovo's independence cannot be a precedent for settling the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict and all such statements are no more than the usual political speculation. Therefore, even partial satisfaction of Armenia's territorial claims on Azerbaijan could ultimately lead to very serious consequences, which will remind the world of the 1938 Munich Agreement and the cession of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland to Hitler.