SAUDI CHALLENGES

Important events are happening in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia these days. Following the death of King Abdullah his brother Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud came to the throne. Few people are expecting any major changes in el-Riyadh's domestic and foreign policy over this. The fact that the processes that are altering the geopolitical outlook of the whole Middle East could seriously affect the situation of the Saudi monarchy is another matter.

At the first meeting of the government after he came to the throne the new king of Saudi Arabia said: "The monarchy will not deviate from the course that was laid down by the founding King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud."

In point of fact, it is precisely within this non-deviation from the original course taken when the monarchy was created in the 1920s and 1930s and based on the total control of the ruling family and adherence to the radical doctrine of Islam and claims to regional leadership that the secret of the preservation of the Saudi monarchy lies. King Salman, like his predecessors before him, is well aware that a continuation of the policy conducted by the ruling dynasty in previous decades is if not a guarantee then most certainly a key aid in the question of preserving power.

This, of course, does not negate the importance of the almost unprecedented gestures of royal benevolence, such as those demonstrated by the new King Salman bin Abdulaziz to mark his coming to power when he decreed to pay compensation to his subjects to a total sum of 30bn dollars in the form of bonuses and benefits and the cancellation of debts. When he came to power King Salman also carried out a number of major reshuffles in the cabinet, of which he is the head. Crown Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz al-Saud became deputy prime minister, and second Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef second deputy prime minister and interior minister. The latter is also head of a new department - the Council for Political and Security Affairs. Meanwhile, nine ministries, including the departments of justice, health, culture and information and Islamic affairs have simultaneously changed their leaders. 

The new government is faced with the task of finding adequate responses to a number of trends - not to say challenges - which have emerged, first and foremost, in the domestic life of the kingdom. The second decade of the 21st century certainly does not mean an end to the past, never mind the good old days when the Saudi dynasty, in the absence of any real opposition within the country, fostered the great age of the oil monarchy. Within a couple of decades an influential business class has taken shape in the kingdom, demanding consideration of its interests by allowing it to become more involved in government and in the distribution of national revenue. A section of the population has been expressing dissatisfaction with the conservatism of the ruling dynasty and its state policy, demanding a certain latitude in keeping with a western way of life. An even greater threat to the principles of the monarchy is posed by the aggressively minded clerical radicals, for whom the idea of creating a "caliphate", articulated by organizations such as al-Qa'eda and Islamic State (IS), is much more attractive than the stagnant monarchy, the ruling dynasty of which more and more in the eyes of the ultra-conservatives forfeits the right to continue to bear the title of "custodian of the two holy sites" - Mecca and Medina. 

Loyal allies of the US and the West, the Saudis, although they have long been one of the political and financial sponsors of radical Islam, none the less have apparently been out of favour with the latter. And this promises to bring them a whole number of serious problems in the future. For example, the spreading influence of the notorious IS threatens Saudi Arabia with nothing other than collapse. El-Riyadh is aware that the primary target of the Islamists is Saudi Arabia, which has every chance of finding itself in the lap of IS after they have systematically destroyed Iraq and Syria.

Then again, such a depressing prospect for Saudi Arabia has a direct bearing on the fate and fortunes of the whole regional geopolitics, in the context of which King Salman will have to rule. Apart from the expanding influence of radical Islam, there remains the factor of Shia Iran, the traditional rival of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi dynasty. El-Riyadh has had a serious headache recently over the growth of the so-called "Iranian threat" and the positions of the "Shia Crescent", which embraces not just Iran but also the Arab axis from Yemen to Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah.

Washington's attempts to come to an agreement with Tehran and the easing of international tension around the problem of Iran's nuclear programme are only stiffening the concern of the Saudis at the prospect of an extension of Iran's regional positions. Hence el-Riyadh's desire to at least get rid of Iran's main ally - the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad - as soon as possible. In this connection, a report put out by the American media concerning, incidentally, the interests of another country, which plays the role of an international supporter of official Damascus, is very significant. I am talking about Russia which, if you go by what the New York Times says, Saudi Arabia is trying to press into refusing to support al-Assad. Specifically, it concerns the possibility of el-Riyadh using its dominant influence in the world's oil market to force Russia to change its "Syrian" policy. In exchange for giving up Bashar al-Assad, Saudi Arabia, it says, is expressing its readiness to reduce oil production which could have a positive effect on the world oil price. This will be very handy for Moscow because "the Russian authorities are running a fever over the consequences of the fall in the oil price". 

The media point out the probability of talks being held on this subject during the visit by the Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal to Moscow last November. As it happens, at the meeting with his Saudi counterpart Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the oil market "should be free from attempts to influence it for political and geopolitical purposes". The possibility of a Russian-Saudi deal may well have been discussed at a meeting in el-Riyadh between Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Nuyami and Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak, which was held in the context of the funeral ceremony following the death of King Abdullah.

Moscow, however, categorically denies any such reports. The Russian president's press secretary Dmitriy Peskov described them as "nothing more than newspaper talk". But the head of the Russian State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee, Aleksey Pushkov, dismissed the report published in the New York Times as a "canard". In his opinion, "the oil market is a complex one. Would we really allow el-Riyadh the opportunity to drive prices from 150 dollars to 50 dollars because of one man? It is most likely an attempt to make capital out of this report".

It looks very much like the reports distributed by the American media are, in fact, nothing more than disinformation. But at the same time, it is obvious that these reports merely confirm the extreme interest of el-Riyadh (and Washington's, too, of course) in the swiftest overthrow of Bashar al-Assad. And directly or indirectly, a signal is being sent to Washington about the existence of the possibility mentioned by The New York Times.

Attention is also drawn to the fact that the "canard" came out at almost the same time as, for the first time since the Geneva-2 peace conference virtually collapsed at the beginning of last year, talks were held in Moscow between representatives of the Syrian opposition and official Damascus. And the list of demands formulated by the opposition contained nothing about the resignation of President al-Assad as an indispensible condition of a settlement in Syria.

There is no doubt whatsoever that the emergence on a part of the country's territory of a phantom called IS had a substantial impact on the Syrian opposition. But is it conceivable that a strengthening of the positions of IS, which equally threatens the interests of Saudi Arabia, will lead to a softening in its attitude to the al-Assad government? And another thing: what will the new king of the Saudis' "oil" policy be? Will el-Riyadh be an obedient tool of Washington in the struggle against the enemies of the West, including Russia?

In the context of the last of the questions raised with regard to the accession to the throne of the new Saudi king, a reminder by the British Guardian newspaper of the fact that in the 1980s the Americans reached agreement with el-Riyadh on a sharp increase in supplies of energy resources on to the world market comes across as quite interesting. The oil price which was reduced more than fourfold shattered the whole economy of the Soviet Union at the time. Hence the intriguing question now: "If the West wishes to hurt the Russian leader Vladimir Putin, will Saudi Arabia be able to carry out this dirty work?"

In other words, in connection with the change of Saudi monarch, the key question boils down to will el-Riyadh decide to return to a high oil price, interest in which is being expressed not only by Russia and Iran, but also other influential oil powers, for example, Venezuela? In any case, King Salman will have to substantiate or adjust the strategic ambitions of his country, which is aspiring to a leading role not only in the Middle East, but throughout the Islamic world.