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REVISION OF OLD LESSONS

Chisinau decides to play safe and play "friends" with Moscow?

Author:

15.02.2009

On 5 April 2009, parliamentary elections will be held in Moldova; the outcome will determine not only the composition of the new government, but also the name of the country's future president. The incumbent head of state, Vladimir Voronin, has already been elected to the post for two terms and, constitutionally, cannot run for president again. So, because Moldova is a parliamentary republic, the balance of political power hinges precisely on which party will lead after the elections and will be entitled to form a ruling coalition.

In the mean time, the ruling Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PKRM) does not doubt that it will retain its leading position. The PKRM came to power in 2001, when the Communists elected Vladimir Voronin as president. The Communists won again in 2005.

It is already known that in 2009 the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party of Moldova, the 'Our Moldova' Alliance, the Christian Democratic People's Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Moldova will participate. The filing of documents to register candidates for the parliamentary elections in Moldova lasted from 5 February to 5 March. But according to popularity ratings, all the other political forces lag behind the PKRM.

Vladimir Voronin himself does not doubt that the Communists will win the election. He is so certain that, according to unofficial reports, he named his successor at a meeting of close associates on 2 February. Reportedly, it was Vladimir Tsurkan, 54, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Legal Issues, Appointments and Immunity. Earlier, the president had described his "successor" as a "very worthy man, well known, experienced and skilled," without mentioning his name. On 27 January, during a Chisinau-Moscow televised teleconference broadcast, Voronin stated confidently that the next president is a "man whom everyone knows and whose qualities qualify him well for such a high position."

So, in the opinion of the incumbent Moldovan leadership, the Communists are destined to win again on 5 April. Voronin himself promised to remain in politics.  "As the chairman of the PKRM, I will remain in politics. Depending on the outcome of the elections, I will decide what specifically I will do after the election results are known, but I will certainly be a member of the new parliament," the President said during the televised Chisinau-Moscow space bridge.

Now experts are speculating about what post Voronin plans to take - Speaker, Prime Minister or Chairman of a parliamentary faction. The most popular theory in the country is that "like Putin," Voronin will head the government and monitor the new head of state closely. However, the post of Speaker of Parliament would enable him to take the same "supervisory-monitoring position."

As for the successor, Vladimir Tsurkan, he said in an interview with the Moldovan periodical Jurnal de Chisinau that nothing had been said about his candidature for the presidential elections. In the mean time, observers are worried about something else: one of the most notable facts in the future successor's career is that he was Moldovan ambassador to Russia from 2002-2005. So observers following Chisinau's moves towards rapprochement with Russia, found yet further proof of their belief that Moldova is trying again to come closer to Russia in the run-up to the elections.

Voronin, for example, stated recently that Chisinau and Moscow had "consensus and accord" on the majority of issues relating to the regulation of the Transdnestria conflict. "We have an agreement with Russian Federation President Dmitriy Medvedev, and I think that yet another meeting on the Transdnestria problem will take place in the near future. There are positive responses to our draft law on the status of the Transdnestrian autonomous entity from all participants in the negotiating process except Russia and Transdnestria. I am optimistic about a solution to the Transdnestria problem," Voronin stressed. As Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin, director of the CIS Countries Institute, noted right away, the political statement by the Moldovan president was made to demonstrate "friendship with Russia" on the eve of the presidential elections in Moldova.

"I think that normalization of relations is always the result of bilateral efforts. Several years ago, due to different circumstances, which were first and foremost linked to the Transdnestria problem, our relations left much to be desired. Those times are over, however. The economic situation has also improved; our wines and other goods produced in Moldova are sold in Russia again. Russia is our main commercial partner today," the Moldovan leader explained.

In addition, Voronin called for the development of the CIS and said that GUAM (an alliance between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was useless - a statement which was immediately picked up by the media. "We need to consider carefully what benefits GUAM has and who needs it. Our participation in GUAM is very limited because its work yields no results. There are no projects, there is no consolidating factor. At present, it has no future. There are other problems with GUAM, which I do not want to and will not discuss. But it is clear that GUAM was not viable yesterday and is not viable today," Voronin suddenly opened his heart during the televised Chisinau-Moscow teleconference on 27 November. As a result, the Moldovan president is expected to take the next logical step and withdraw from GUAM. In the opinion of many experts, this will be intended to persuade Moscow that Chisinau has a pro-Moscow position, once and for all.

Let us remind readers that, together with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Armenia, Moldova is a participant in the European programme "Eastern partnership," which some Kremlin politicians have already described as anti-Russian. Obviously, if Chisinau changes its course and allies itself with Russia, Moscow will likely ask it to join the CSTO as further proof of solidarity; CSTO members recently reaffirmed the military-political status of the bloc by creating its own armed forces.

The Transdnestria conflict, where peace is currently maintained by joint peacekeeping forces (with Russian, Moldovan and Transdnestrian contingents), remains the main lever of pressure on Moldova for Russia.  Populated predominantly by ethnic Russians, the so-called Transdnestrian Moldovan Republic (PMR) is the most industrialized part of Moldova which seceded after armed conflict in 1991 and which continues to press for independence, although Chisinau takes a firm position on the country's territorial integrity.

In the mean time, Russia clearly wants to exclude the United States and Ukraine from the negotiating process (the "5+2" format, in which Moldova and Transdnestria are parties to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine are guarantor countries, the OSCE is a mediator and the EU and United States are observers).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is due to arrive in Chisinau in the second half of February, and it will become clear after his visit whether or not talks between Russian Federation President Dmitriy Medvedev, Vladimir Voronin and PMR "President" Igor Smirnov will be held this spring, at which the Kremlin will probably exert the utmost pressure on its partners.

According to the results of the 17 September 2006 plebiscite in the self-declared PMR, 97% of Transdnestrians want to link their future to Russia. But Moldova itself might begin issuing signals that it wishes effectively the same, up to possible accession into the union state of Russia and Belarus.

So Russia may try to resuscitate the Transdnestria conflict regulation plan proposed in late 2003, using the plan developed by Dmitriy Kozak, deputy head of the Russian Federation Presidential Adminis-tration and which was dubbed the "Kozak memorandum." The document envisaged the creation of an "asymmetrical federation," in which central power would belong to Moldova, whereas Transnestria would acquire the broadest possible autonomy.

However, Voronin has yet another important reason to look to Moscow with hope in the run-up to the elections. The Moldovan president recently stressed the threat of the republic being swallowed up by neighbouring Romania and he made it clear that Chisinau would not allow this. His point was that the new Moldovan Parliament might include a considerable number of pro-Romanian groups. For example, the majority of representatives in the top 10 of the of the Liberal Party of Moldova's electoral list for the parliamentary elections also have Romanian citizenship. The pro-presidential media in Moldova immediately started to broadcast Romanian President Traian Basescu's words that more than half a million Moldovan citizens had filed applications for Romanian citizenship. "Bucharest claims that Romania advocates Moldova's accession to the EU in Brussels. But we have made it clear that we do not need assistance and older brothers. We will walk the path of European integration on our own. The Moldavian leadership is pushing for the signing of a bilateral agreement and a treaty on borders with Romania as soon as possible. Only after that will we be ready for equal dialogue with Bucharest, which should not view us as a younger brother or its province," Voronin said. Incidentally, Romania also hinted recently that it would not mind joining the "5+2" negotiating process.

However, there is every reason not to take Chisinau's pro-Russian stance at face value. In 2001, the PKRM promised before coming to power that it would make the Russian language official and join the union state of Russia and Belarus. And in 2005, the Communists started talk of European integration. Essentially, neither was accomplished. So the Moldavian Communists have already demonstrated how credible their words are. Perhaps Voronin simply wants to bring his party to power again by using pro-Russian rhetoric. In addition, a number of observers take note of Tsurkan's position - although he was ambassador to Russia, his position on Transdnestria is firm, and he is not particularly fond of Moscow. The possibility cannot be ruled out that relations between Russia and Moldova will become even more tense. At the same time, the Olvia-Press news agency wrote: "Experts say that after the parliamentary elections in 2009, Moldova will enter some kind of transitional period, which will bring a new generation of politicians and diplomats to power. And for them, Transdnestria will not be so pressing and valuable."

In the mean time, according to the latest opinion polls, more than half of Moldovan voters will support the PKRM in the upcoming parliamentary elections. All the opinion polls show that the Communists will secure no fewer than 60 of the 101 seats in the future Parliament. And if the PKRM begins to cooperate with smaller parties, it will be guaranteed a stable future.


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