GEORGIA LIGHTS A NON-OLYMPIC TORCH

The crisis in relations between Tbilisi on the one hand, and Moscow, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali on the other, which has deteriorated in the recent period, entered its decisive stage as a full-scale armed conflict on the territory of South Ossetia.

Georgia had earlier put its troops on high alert in order to demonstrate the seriousness of its intentions, while Russia moved from a defensive policy to an offensive one, carrying out two-week (from 15 to 30 July) military exercises "Kavkaz 2008" on the territory of 11 regions of the Southern Federal District. The total number of troops which took part in them was about 8,000. Almost in parallel with Russia, Georgia held its own exercises "Immediate Response 2008" at the military base in Vaziani (about 25 km from Tbilisi) on 15-31 July. The exercises were attended by US, Georgian, Ukrainian, Armenian and Azerbaijani servicemen. The exercises were held within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. The exercises which began on 15 July focused on "scenarios of interaction in peacekeeping operations in Iraq". It must be noted that the preparation and holding of these exercises were totally financed by the USA. All in all, 1,640 servicemen - 1,000 Americans, 600 Georgians and 10 officers from the Azerbaijani, Ukrainian and Armenian armies each - took part in the exercises.

As it turned out, all these military exercises were a prelude to the forthcoming war in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone. The full-scale Georgian military offensive on South Ossetia began on the night of 8 August. It is notable that this was preceded by an evening statement by the Georgian president about a unilateral cease-fire. Two hours later, the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, came under fire from three sides from artillery guns and Grad installations. After that, the Georgian troops started an offensive on the city. By the morning, they managed to enter the southern part of the city, and fierce fighting began in Tskhinvali. The Georgian government named the operation "restoration of constitutional order" on the territory of South Ossetia. Moreover, the Georgian president announced national mobilization of reservists.

Previously, the escalation of the "war of statements" and artillery fire into an armed conflict involving Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia was regarded as unlikely as the USA and the EU had given Moscow clear signals that such an option would not be supported and would get a negative reaction. But everything was the other way round - the "war of statements" and the military exercises escalated into a war of tanks and planes. Many military experts unanimously said that the level of the Georgian army's preparedness and equipment had increased considerably in recent years. In this regard, they thought that victory over South Ossetia and Abkhazia was quite possible. However, Russia's quick military interference upset their plans. Objectively, the new Russian leader did not really need a deterioration of the regional confrontation as he has reputation as a balanced politician inclined to make careful and legal decisions. For this reason, Russia could resort to a conflict with Georgia "behind the back" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia only in the worst-case scenario. This scenario happened on the night of 7-8 August. If previously the forcefulness of Russia's policy with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be regarded as a signal to members of NATO, which were planning to give Georgia and Ukraine the NATO membership action plan at a session of the alliance's foreign ministers in December, in the current situation - in connection with the humanitarian catastrophe in Tskhinvali after the Georgian storming and artillery fire, Moscow has no more doubts. What is more, Russia's authority as a great power which claims a special role and responsibility in the Caucasus was also in question. As a result, the Russian authorities decided to use the experience of the United States which initiated a NATO operation in former Yugoslavia without a UN sanction, substantiating it with ethnic cleansing against the Albanian population. Moscow and Tskhinvali spoke about genocide and ethnic cleansing. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia's interference was triggered by ethnic cleansing against the Ossetian population.

The international situation was also quite favourable for Moscow's interference. It is exactly the lack of consensus on South Ossetia among the leading Western powers that can be regarded as Russia's main success. The fact that the UN in fact proved to be helpless untied Moscow's hands in order to solve the conflict as it wants. At an emergency meeting of the Russian Security Council on 8 August, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev blessed Russia's interference in the conflict, saying that in South Ossetia "the Georgian troops in fact committed an act of aggression against the Russian peacekeepers and civilians and that according to the constitution and federal law, as president he must defend the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are". At this moment, the Russian troops were already entering South Ossetia. At a meeting with Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and Russian army chief of staff Nikolay Makarov on 9 August, the Russian president said that a peacekeeping operation would be held in the conflict zone. "Our peacekeepers and the units under their command are currently carrying out an operation enforce peace on the Georgian side. They are responsible for defending the population. We are dealing with all this at the moment," the president said. Later, at a meeting on humanitarian aid to the republic, Dmitriy Medvedev said that "people who are responsible for this humanitarian catastrophe should be held to account for what they have done, including the international-legal aspect of this problem".

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin made an even tougher statement, questioning Georgian statehood. "A deadly blow has been dealt to the territorial integrity of Georgia itself, which means tremendous damage to its statehood. The actions of the Georgian authorities in South Ossetia are a crime, of course, and first of all, a crime against their own people," the premier said. After all this, the prime minister does not imagine how Georgia will be able to persuade South Ossetia to be part of the Georgian state. Putin in fact made it clear to Tbilisi that Russia intends to dismember Georgia as was the case with Yugoslavia.

After two days of fighting in the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali was totally liberated from the Georgian troops. The local militia and Russian peacekeepers were "reinforced" with tank, infantry and reconnaissance units of the 58th army and its military hardware. The particularity of the current war is that the hostilities went far beyond the conflict zone and that Russian aircraft took an active part in them. Beginning from the early morning of 9 August, Russian war planes carried out air strikes on the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti, which was totally destroyed as a result, military bases in the villages of Senaki and Vaziani, as well as on the positions of Georgian artillery and military bases near Gori and air force bases in Marneuli and Bolnisi. Later, in order to reinforce the troops that participated in the "peace-enforcement operation", units of the 76th Pskov airborne division, the 98th airborne division from Ivanovo and special purpose units from the 45th separate reconnaissance regiment were sent into South Ossetia. The world's reaction to the events in South Ossetia was extremely reserved first. Only the USA, Ukraine and Lithuania openly sided with Georgia. Other NATO members, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the EU urged all conflicting sides to cease fire immediately, but did not condemn Moscow as was demanded by the Georgian authorities. However, with the expansion of the geography of military operations by the Russian armed forces on Georgian territory, the West increased its critical statements about the Kremlin.

Western experts were more outspoken. James Nixey, an analyst at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, pointed out in this connection that the West was concerned that Saakashvili often takes too extreme actions in critical situations. He demonstrated such an approach last year when he suppressed anti-government demonstrations in Tbilisi, and now this is happening in South Ossetia. "If he starts a war, he will lose the support of many of his friends in the Wets," Nixey said. Fraser Cameron of the EU-Russia Centre in Brussels said that the West had repeatedly warned Mikhail Saakashvili that "it is not going to pull chestnuts out of the fire for him".

Azerbaijan displayed quite a balanced reaction to the events. Our country confirmed its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and urged an end to violence and all hostilities. Sources at the Foreign Ministry told us that Baku also expressed to all involved sides its concern about the security of the Georgian Azerbaijanis living in Marneuli and other settlements of Kvemo Kartli (Borcali), as well as the infrastructure of international energy projects that run through the territory of the neighbouring country.

From this point of view, it must be noted that for Azerbaijan, the growing tensions around the neighbouring country may have a number of unpleasant, or to be more precise, extremely negative consequences.

First, we have "pumped" too much power and money into neighbouring Georgia, and risks to its security and the security of the energy transport projects going through its territory have already become our risks. It is clear that a large-scale conflict in the neighbouring country does not meet our long-term interests both in the political, economic, energy and other spheres.

Second, we should bear in mind that the growing military conflict with Russia, the Abkhaz and South Ossetians may increase authoritarian tendencies in Saakashvili's domestic policy. The result of this will be that the Azerbaijani community of Georgia, first of all in the region of Kvemo Kartli (Borcali), will be in danger. Under the state of emergency, Tbilisi will also get a chance to tighten the screw on the "Azerbaijani issue". It is known what kind of "warm" feelings the Georgian leadership has for national minorities, including Azerbaijanis, living in Georgia. The refined policy of restricting their rights and freedoms has never stopped, but now it can even increase against the background of the national campaign to "consolidate the whole people against a common enemy".

The actions of the Georgian authorities allow us to say that the Georgian Azerbaijanis may share the fate of South Ossetia. Let's remember that several years ago, the Georgian authorities closed a market in the village of Ergneti, depriving residents of South Ossetia of their main source of income - border trade. At the end of 2005, they also closed a market near the Azerbaijani village of Sadakhlo on the border between the two countries. The official version for the closure of the markets was the same - the fight against smuggling and border trade. But it seems to us that the main purpose was different - to deprive the local population of their main source of income and stimulate its mass exodus to the territory of "ethnically related" neighbouring countries - in this case, Russia (North Ossetia) and Azerbaijan. In the case with Sadakhlo, this idea was successfully implemented - hundreds of Azerbaijani families in Sadakhlo, who had taken loans from banks before the closure of the market in order to start their own small businesses, went bankrupt and got into debt. As a result, the Azerbaijani population has shrunk from 15,000-18,000 to 4,000-6,000 in recent years, and this process is continuing. It is notable that immediately after the closure of the market in Sadakhlo, the Georgian authorities opened a similar market in the village of Bagratashen (the former Azerbaijani village of Lembeli) near the Georgian-Armenian border. As can be seen, the matter is not about fighting smuggling, but about the ethno-political preferences of the Tbilisi government.

Commenting on prospects for the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in an interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza said that "the Abkhaz should get four types of guarantees from the Georgian side, meaning the elimination of the threat of a military conflict, economic security and protection of their political and cultural rights. Luckily, the Borcali Azerbaijanis have not yet encountered the threat of a military conflict with Tbilisi. But the situation in Kvemo Kartli shows more and more that today the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia needs to ensure to no smaller (and maybe even greater) extent than the Abkhaz and South Ossetia minorities that their political, economic, cultural and other rights are protected both by the Georgian government and influential international organizations and countries that have their own interests in this region, including Azerbaijan.