THE SCORCHING "SUN" OF FEBRUARY

During the last 10 days of February, 10,000 soldiers from the elite units of the Turkish army re-crossed the Iraqi border, launching an anti-terrorist operation codenamed "The Sun". The troops, under the command of General Hasan Igsiz and supported by aircraft, carried out hundreds of strikes on the bases of members of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The troops moved 15 km into Iraqi territory. Although the surprise factor made it possible to wipe out hundreds of terrorists in the first few days, the following days were less "productive". The reasons being the weather and the unfamiliar environment. The troops had to wait for air support which was constantly delayed by thick fog. This allowed terrorist leaders to retreat into the depths of Iraq territory and their mobile groups to cement their grip on mountain bases. The strikes concentrated on Mount Kandil, where most terrorist bases are located.

But what is interesting is not so much the course of the Turkish army's ground operations as the political and psychological outcry they aroused. Of course, the Turkish military invasion of northern Iraq allows a number of political conclusions to be drawn.

First, the continuation of the military operation implies that Washington has changed its policy, with regard to Ankara's plans against the PKK, in favour of Turkey. At the end of last year, the White House, which had opposed the idea of trans-border operations in Iraq, expressed its open political support for Turkey for the first time. This support will probably be reinforced by Turkey's solidarity with the USA in recognising Kosovo.

Second, frequent visits to Ankara by top officials of the US administration prove that the friction which emerged after Turkey refused to allow US troops to use its territory to invade Iraq and which strengthened after discussions on the fictitious Armenian genocide in the US Congress, has now become a thing of the past, although this may be temporary.

And finally, the hard work of Turkish diplomats has yielded positive results, for criticism from the world community turned out to be "minimal". No-one paid any attention to statements by Iraqi Kurds about "the forthcoming occupation" of northern Iraq. Washington's loyalty to the Turkish army's operations in northern Iraq makes it possible to say that the PKK is no longer supported by certain circles in the West.

The psychological aspect of the issue is even more interesting. Specifically, Ankara has almost neutralized the propaganda campaign about a possible "worthy response" to the Turkish troops by armed formations of Iraqi Kurds (peshmerge). Armed Kurds led by Masud Barzani did not dare to confront Turkish army units, although they took wounded terrorists to hospitals in northern Iraq, while local Kurds refused to hand them over to the Turkish side.

Operation Sun proved that northern Iraq is no longer a "safe heaven" for Kurdish terrorists. It is also clear that PKK plans to carry out spring operations in Turkey will fail. They will need a long time to restore their forces.

Of course, any military operation entails certain risks. Specifically, Washington has left a "loophole" for potential "support" for members of the PKK. No-one can rule out the Kurdistan Workers' Party getting American-made weapons from another Kurdish organization - Pejak, which is fighting Iran and which is not on the US list of terrorist organizations.

Nor can it be ruled out that PKK members will become more active in major cities in Turkey itself. Events which took place during the first days of the operation confirmed these fears. Mass protests in Diyarbakir and other cities of south-eastern Turkey gave further proof.

Terrorists may also use civilians as a "human shield". A confrontation between the peshmerge and Turkish soldiers is also possible, and would be extremely undesirable for Ankara. This would allow the terrorists to strengthen anti-Turkish feeling in Iraq and extend the term of Operation Sun. Bombing errors or an accidental skirmish with local residents could also cause the conflict to grow.

The deeper the Turkish army goes into Iraq territory, the more casualties it will suffer and the more the international image of Ankara will be at risk. For this reason, the Turkish general staff has said that "the military mission is short-term". Indeed, the biggest risk for Ankara would be to "get stuck" in Iraqi territory and to become involved in conflict with local Kurdish leaders. In this context, the invitation sent to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, who is Kurdish in origin, could help prevent a possible consolidation of anti-Turkish forces in the region and in the Iraqi government. It is not known what further action Ankara will take. One thing is clear - it is impossible to eradicate the problem of the PKK by purely military means, and Turkey realizes this full well.