SO IT IS MEDVEDEV…

As soon as the outcome of the State Duma elections was clear, politicians, businessmen and the Russian and foreign media became impatient for a conclusion to the intriguing scenario around the transfer of power in the country.  The results of the recent elections have proven convincingly that President Putin remains very authoritative and is in full control of the country, reasserting thereby his status as "national leader."  The United Russia and A Just Russia parties which, with the support of the incumbent head of the Kremlin, won 315 and 38 seats in the new Parliament respectively, are now in a position to introduce amendments to the Constitution, laws and the composition of personnel in the top leadership of the Russian Federation.

Like an artful director of a thrilling detective TV series, President Putin has unwound several versions of the development of a political scenario at the same time, making diversionary moves, and in general, he has created a situation in which politicians, analysts and journalists, having realized the futility of their attempts to predict the course of developments, simply had to wait for the announcement of the key name.

Putin proposed that the new Parliament should hurry and assemble before the legal deadline of 30 days after the vote.  The first session might take place as early as 25-28 December.  Before then, a congress of the United Russia is to be held, where the winning party should not only announce the names of the leader of the parliamentary faction and the candidature for the post of State Duma speaker, but also name the party's candidate for president.  So, any further procrastination in naming his successor no longer made sense, and Putin named him.  It was Dmitriy Medvedev.

The scrum

Dmitriy Medvedev's candidature was nominated simultaneously by four parties:  The United Russia, A Just Russia, Civil Force, and the Agrarian Party of Russia.  The meaning of the nomination is simple:  Medvedev is formally not affiliated to any of the parties.  The leaders of the above-mentioned parties brought their initiative to Putin, who expressed his full approval and support for Medvedev's candidature in front of the TV cameras.  It is clear that the decision was made by Putin himself, and the parties only had to sort out the technical paperwork.

Officially, the candidate for president will be nominated at the United Russia congress on 17 December, but the propaganda campaign was set in motion long before that date.  The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church voiced its support for Medvedev, and the Patriarchate spokesperson, Georgiy Ryabykh, said that the nominated candidate has a full understanding of the need to preserve Russia's spiritual and cultural traditions and that he has an understanding of the role of traditional religions.  Then, one after another, prominent representatives of the Putin regime began to publicly express their approval and support for the decision, praising Medvedev as the optimum candidate.  It is quite possible that expression of these feelings is not entirely false.

After all, although Dmitriy Medvedev does not leave an impression of being a charismatic person, there is nothing about him to stir negative emotions in the majority of the population.  Little is known about the personal qualities of the potential president.  He is small in stature, but athletic, intellectual, lighthearted and even-tempered.  Apparently, Vladimir Putin decided Dmitriy Medvedev can not only continue his policy, but also act properly on the advice of his current boss in the future.  Medvedev seems absolutely loyal to Vladimir Putin, less inclined to be an independent player and a safer bet than, say, [Sergey] Ivanov.  Obviously, Medvedev will not be able to establish control over the "siloviki" from the very outset, because he is an outsider to them.  Therefore, the security agencies will remain Putin's domain, at least initially, and so will the function of ultimate arbitrator in the complex relations between rival groups within the ruling class.

The liberal, civil wing of the establishment welcomed Medvedev's candidature with open satisfaction.  This group includes Finance Minister Kudrin, Minister of Regional Development Dmitriy Kozak, Minister of Economic Development Elvira Nabiullina and Minister of Health and Social Development Tatyana Golikova.  Outside the government, Audit Chamber Chairman Sergey Stepashin, influential former Chief of the Presidential Staff Aleksandr Voloshin, and some other people are considered close to Medvedev.

As for the so-called "siloviki," [defense and security officials] who are headed by the quite influential Deputy Chief of the Presidential Staff, Igor Sechin, they are not just hiding their gloomy mood, but have also been waging a secret war for a long time against Medvedev and his inner circle.  For example, about a year ago, the then General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation, Ustinov (who is seen as Sechin's man) engaged in excessive activity in this respect - and paid for this with his job.  In that round of the office war, Medvedev won and, as a result, President Putin's decree ordered General Prosecutor Ustinov and Justice Minister Chayka to swap offices.  Observers cite the desire to compromise the liberal wing as the reason behind the recent attack on Finance Minister Kudrin.  Kudrin's deputy, Sergey Storchak, who was arrested on charges of financial machinations and embezzlement on a large scale and is currently in custody, because top officials from the law enforcement bodies are striving to take control of financial flow in the country and sideline Kudrin, who resists their pressure.  The influential newspaper Kommersant was used in a retaliatory strike.  It published an interview with Oleg Shvartsman, co-owner and president of the financial-industrial group Finansgrupp, who carelessly "divulged" that his organization was created by the "siloviki" in the Kremlin administration to coerce oligarchs and businessmen who were not loyalists into ceding their assets and money to them.  A scandal erupted, inarticulate refutations ensued, but the business community clearly grew suspicious, which became manifest during Vladimir Putin's recent meeting with members of the Praesidium of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Patience is half the victory

If the issue of succession seems to have been clarified, uncertainty about the political future of Putin himself still remains.  To all appearances, numerous scenarios are being considered.  Conceptually, he is assigned the role of "national leader" - a position somewhere in between that of the Chinese gerontocrat Deng Xiaoping and Iranian spiritual leader Khamenei.  What they are considering now is how this role should be tailored to fit Putin personally.

Before the session of the Supreme State Council of the union of Russia and Belarus, which was held on 14 December in Minsk, the mass media were making all kinds of forecasts.  Ekho Moskvy speculated that the signing of a constitutional act was expected, which would declare the creation of a state of union.  Then Putin would be able to become the president of the new union, and Alyaksandr Lukashenka would head the new state's Parliament.  This speculation was officially refuted.  At the same time, the new presidential candidate, Dmitriy Medvedev, asked the incumbent head of the Kremlin directly, in his TV address, to become the head of the Russian Federation Government immediately after the presidential election.  Medvedev noted that it is not enough to elect a president who will stay the course to ensure succession in Russia's politics.  "It is no less important to preserve the ability to perform in the team formed by the incumbent president."  Putin himself has already given us to understand that he is ready to become prime minister.  He did stipulate two conditions, however:  United Russia had to win a landslide in the Duma elections and his successor in the post of president had to be "worthy."  These conditions have been met, but Putin is in no rush to make his decision public.  Apparently, he will leave the top government post with the intention of staying in power.

As for other aspirants to the presidency, in reality the ruling elite has assigned them the role of sparring partners for the official candidate.  All of them have long been in the public arena.  Among them are Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party and Gennadiy Zyuganov, chairman of the Russian Federation Communist Party.  A candidate from the Yabloko party is also expected, most probably in the person of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy.  Newspapers write about the possible nomination of Boris Nemtsov from the Union of Right Forces (SPS), former world chess champion Kasparov, former prime minister Kasyanov and some others.  The nomination of these candidates is going to be tricky, however, because in contrast to the candidates who are nominated by the parties represented in the State Duma, all other candidates need to collect 2 million signatures in their support, which is difficult and expensive.

Sarkisyan's miscalculation

The international community is interested in the presidential election from the point of view of international politics.  Medvedev is so close and loyal to Putin that continuity in Russia's foreign political course is guaranteed, at least for the short term.  This obviously applies to Moscow's policy for the South Caucasus, and for Azerbaijan in particular, too.  For our country, Dmitriy Medvedev's candidature is most preferable.  As a lawyer, he will be more consistent in adhering to the norms and standards of international law.  Azerbaijan is quite interested in this, both in the context of the regulation of the Karabakh conflict and for the realization of our own security policy and political and economic cooperation.  The second factor is that Medvedev does not belong to the clan of "siloviki" and representatives of the military-industrial complex, who have traditionally supported Armenia's aggressive behaviour in the region.  And he is unlikely to take heed of the groups which are inclined to use threats and pressure to resolve the problems in the South Caucasus.  In addition, because he has headed the Gazprom Board of Directors for a long time now, he understands and is closely familiar with the problems of the energy sector and geopolitics, which often accompany one another.  In this sense, Medvedev is familiar with Azerbaijan's role and importance.

I presume that Putin's decision made Armenian Prime Minister and presidential candidate, Serzh Sarkisyan a little sad:  he made no secret of the fact that his bet was on Sergey Ivanov as the future president of Russia.  They had a good relationship and trusted each other back when both were defence ministers.  Perhaps the Armenians have made a miscalculation, but there is no need to exaggerate the importance of this.  There is going to be no shift in Russia's priorities in the South Caucasus from Armenia to Azerbaijan in the near future, no matter how people are arranged in power in Moscow after all the elections and appointments.