THE TIMES OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS

After the general parliamentary elections of 7 June 2015, the 13-year period of one-party rule in fact ended in Turkey. The coalition government, which had already become something nostalgic, became a reality again. Despite the fact that after the 7 June elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan instructed Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoglu to form a government, negotiations on forming a coalition with such political forces as the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) failed. As a result, guided by Article 116 of the Constitution, the president of Turkey scheduled a new election for 1 November 2015, returning the country to the pre-election atmosphere.

Despite the fact that 16 political parties announced their participation in the upcoming elections, in reality the fight will take place between four of them, who are able to overcome the 10-per-cent barrier. It is the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the abovementioned MHP and CHP, as well as the pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party (DPN). After analyzing the political atmosphere, the results of the last four parliamentary elections and the policies and propaganda of the parties seeking to get into the parliament, we can come to the following conclusion. Firstly, many parties other than those listed go to the polls in order to receive financial support from the state if they overcome the 3-per-cent threshold. Secondly, participation in the parliamentary elections is a great opportunity for them to make themselves known or remind the public of themselves.

Wounded, but still strong

The most ambitious of the four main parties and the most significant on the Turkish political scene is the AKP, which has ruled the country for 13 years. Although in the last parliamentary elections, the AKP won the majority of votes (40.87 per cent) and became a leader, it was unable to form a government alone. This happened for the first time since 2002, when the AKP made its debut in the general elections. Approaching the new elections with such a negative psychological stress, the AKP is first of all trying to regain its former strength. Having control of the key positions in the government and 13-year experience of government, the AKP aims to get enough seats in parliament to control the government alone, as it was before the last election.

To do this, two conditions are necessary. Firstly, the Kurdish DPN should not pass the 10-per-cent threshold so that according to the law, its votes go to the ruling party, the AKP, which has the second highest rating in Turkey's Kurdish-populated areas. In this case, the ruling party can receive an additional 55 seats and will be able to form a government. However, this option seems unlikely, since, according to polls, the DPN has no problems getting into the parliament.

Secondly, the AKP needs to regain the votes of the central and western regions of Turkey "reclaimed" by nationalists in the June elections. The reason for the loss of votes by the ruling party was the democratic packages of the government for the Kurds. These packages, according to the nationalists, helped to strengthen terrorists of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Meanwhile, due to the futility of the first option, the AKP leadership is inclined to implement the second one. By strengthening the rhetoric against pro-Kurdish activists and tightening anti-terror operations against PKK terrorists, the authorities won the sympathy of nationalistic Turkish citizens. At the same time, against the backdrop of the pre-election campaign, the positions of the AKP seem not as strong as before. The main reason for this is that after his election as president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan cannot directly lead the party. On the one hand, the AKP officially lost a legendary and charismatic leader, and this vacuum has not been filled. On the other hand, the participation of President Erdogan in the AKP campaign events under the pretext of public ceremonies does not receive a response from voters, which the party needs.

Another negative point for the AKP is the absence from the party of such important functionaries as Bulent Arinc, Cemil Cicek and Ali Babacan. They cannot participate in the elections because of the statute of the AKP, which forbids its members to be elected to parliament for more than three times. The lack of two names, who stood at the origins of the AKP, is being felt especially strongly - former President Abdullah Gul and former Parliament Speaker Bulent Arinc. We should not forget also about the sharp struggle between the AKP and the movement of preacher Fetullah Gulen and attacks on the AKP by the media controlled by supporters of the latter. Since the AKP and the Gulen movement were allies until recently, the struggle that is unfolding between them cannot but negatively impact the AKP.

Growing violence and terror, as well as deteriorating economic indicators in recent years have created two prospects. In the opinion of the electorate, this is the result of the fact that after the June election, the AKP is unable to rule alone. In other words, if the AKP does not have power, the state will plunge into chaos. The other part of the electorate is confident that it is the AKP that is to blame for the growth in all these problems.

Less ideology - more promises

The Republican People's Party looks to be the most prepared for the elections. The behaviour of the party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu during the negotiations on forming a coalition after the last election and his attitude towards terrorist attacks allow the CHP to strengthen its positions. Even if the CHP leadership does not intend to gain most of the votes, like other opposition parties, it will try not to allow the AKP to create a government alone. In this context, the intensive programme of rallies prepared by the CHP through a media campaign and social media seems to be quite successful.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that the CHP, which is considered to be a party with a leftist ideology, is focused not on ideological appeals, but on specific social and economic promises to the poor, which cannot but play into its hands. In the run-up to the June elections, the ruling party was sceptical about CHP promises to pensioners and others in need of social packages, but began using this rhetoric itself after the election. At the same time, the right-wing views of the MHP are a serious obstacle in its way to victory no matter how hard they try.

Uncompromising...

Ahead of the elections, the opposition Nationalist Action Party maintains its position as an ideologue of statehood with an emphasis on Turkish identity and tough anti-terrorism rhetoric. The main problem of the party was the negative attitude of the masses to its leader Devlet Bahceli.

His speeches and statements after the June elections showed him as "a person who says no to all", which seems to reduce the number of votes in favour of the MHP in the November election. Rejecting all possible coalitions, Bahceli is faced with misunderstanding in some circles within the party, which has long been in opposition. Later, the MHP leader spoke about possibly joining the coalition under several conditions, to which the AKP reacted negatively. This point slightly toned down the image of Bahceli as a "universal denier", but he is still known as an uncompromising person. As for the factors that play in favour of the MHP, the main one of them is the failure of the democratic package prepared by the government that promised more opportunities for the Kurdish minority. Initially, being a staunch opponent and critic of the project, the MHP was trying to get the maximum bonus from the political fiasco of the government, arguing its case. It position was strengthened by the self-criticism of the ruling party and, to a certain extent, recognition of errors in the implementation of the democratic package.

Successful newcomer

The main opponent of the MHP - this is precisely how we can characterize the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). As a continuation of the party of the Kurdish movement, this political organization ran in elections for the first time on 7 June. Despite the debut, the pro-Kurdish party was able to overcome the 10-per-cent barrier, gaining 13.12 per cent of votes. Before the last elections, the HDP demonstrated a leftist ideology rather than an ethnic pro-Kurdish one. But immediately after the election, the rhetoric of the party became only Kurdish with a separatist slant. Not only did the HDP not deny its connection with the PKK terrorist organization - its co-chairman Figen Yuksekdag openly declared that the party relies on Kurdish militants in Turkey and Syria, thereby revealing the essence of the ethnic rhetoric. Statements by President Erdogan and the AKP about the freezing of the democratic package enhance the link between the HDP and the Kurdish population of the country, especially in the eastern and south-eastern provinces of Turkey. The target audience of the HDP in the upcoming elections is the Kurds and some marginal groups. Adhering to such an electoral strategy, the HDP risks losing the votes of the left, who have already defected to it from the CHP. However, the strengthening of positions among the Kurdish electorate will most likely allow the HDP to overcome the 10-per-cent threshold and enter the parliament.

Repeat of the scenario

Almost all studies and polls indicate that after 1 November, the Turkish parliament will not be very different from the previous one. Even opinion polls conducted by companies close to the AKP say that the ruling party is unlikely to gain the required number of seats to create a government.

In conclusion, we can say that on the morning of 2 November, a parliament of four parties likely awaits Turkey. And even if the AKP gets most votes, this will not let them establish a government on their own. Meanwhile, the CHP will slightly increase the number of votes and become the main opposition force in the country. The losers in the future elections will probably be the MHP with a loss of several seats and the HDP, which will retain the tendency towards marginalization. As a result, we can assume that a coalition government awaits Turkey.