STRUGGLE FOR STATUS

By the early 1980s, the Soviet Union fell into a deep socioeconomic crisis. In the main indicators of the quality and standard of living: life expectancy, mortality and providing the population with goods and services, the Soviet Union was far behind not only developed capitalist countries, but also many developing countries. However, not only did Soviet leaders refuse to reduce spending on military bases abroad, support for friendly regimes and other measures to maintain the necessary attributes of a superpower, they even increased it. Military and political activity increased in South-East Asia, Mozambique, Angola, Yemen, Nicaragua, etc. The last link in this activity was Afghanistan.

On 26 December 1991, the Soviet Union was no more. On 13 January 1992, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that the Russian Federation continues to exercise rights and fulfill obligations under all agreements concluded by the Soviet Union. The international community recognized the Russian Federation as a successor to the USSR.

The socialist bloc collapsed, and there was no money to support the economies of ill-assorted and possible "friends". But the desire to be a "superpower" remains. Journalist and political analyst Vitaliy Tretya-kov once remarked that "under Yeltsin, when the draft state budget of Russia was sent to Washington for approval, the United States called Russia a great power". According to him, the Americans publicly entertained the vanity of Yeltsin so that he did what they wanted.

It would seem that Vladimir Putin agrees with the new rules of the game, which has no place for a bipolar world. In his message to the Federal Assembly in 2013, he stated that Russia does not claim the status of a "superpower", which is "understood as claims to world or regional hegemony". Well, as usual, helpful "political analysts" immediately placed a "theoretical basis" under this remark: Russia "currently not only has no global superproject, but, perhaps temporarily, there is no need, and most importantly, no desire to create this kind of project".

But US President Barack Obama should not have believed it and claimed a few months later, in March 2014, that Russia has become a "regional power", whose influence extends only to its immediate borders. This was a clear miscalculation of his advisers who believed, apparently, that it was time for psychological and propaganda pressure on the Russian leader.

For Putin, it was a direct challenge. And he accepted it. In a short time, Russia made several attempts, though unsuccessfully, to establish itself as a great power. The Ukrainian events caused a sharp negative reaction from the world community. And besides, this is still the post-Soviet space. He failed to boost relations with China in the right direction. Processes in the Eurasian Economic Union are moving forward, but very slowly. Moreover, no member country of the EAEU and the Customs Union supported Russia in its confrontation with Western sanctions. And here comes the sharp, as it seemed to many, turn towards the Middle East.

A strong signal to Western analysts was the words of the Russian leader uttered during the International Economic Forum in June: "They are constantly trying to impose on us their standards and decisions that are not consistent with our understanding of our own interests. We are, in fact, told that the United States knows better what we need. Let us define our own interests and needs based on our own history and our culture." This was said in the context of not only the events in Ukraine, but also the unsuccessful struggle of the US against the Islamic State terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria.

Therefore it is very strange to hear all sides assess the reaction of the West to the beginning of Russia's military operation in Syria as "shock" and "awe". Although experts doubt the effectiveness of the bombings by the aerospace forces of Russia, Russia's interference in the protracted conflict allowed it to break international isolation and offer cooperation to the West, and not with an outstretched hand, but from a position of force. Russia managed to force the West to cooperate. If not a common strategy, then coordination is planned, and a search for mutually acceptable positions is under way. The negotiations on the Syrian issue are continuing almost uninterruptedly. For example, Lav-rov and Kerry are discussing the Syrian settlement on the phone on a daily basis. Iran's invitation to the meeting on the Syria settlement, which was held on 30 October in Vienna, too, can be considered a victory for Moscow.

But a big question mark is still hanging over whether the current consultations, largely imposed on the West, will turn into full cooperation between Russia and the United States and its allies. The US is unlikely to accept broad cooperation for many reasons, including the events in Ukraine. Although what is happening in this country has no connection with the war in Syria, a further improvement or deterioration in the situation there will directly affect the attitude to Russia's actions in Syria.

There are no prerequisites for this on the part of Russia, because despite all talk about the dangers of terrorism, the Kremlin believes that the main threat to the country is colour revolutions. It is noted in the new edition of the national military doctrine presented in December last year. Moscow directly links the origin of these colour revolutions to the actions of the West.

We can only assert with some confidence that a new "Cold War", in the inevitability of which almost everyone believed a month ago, has been avoided. This is the opinion of one of the leading Russian experts in the field of international relations, Academician Aleksey Arbatov, which he expressed during a recent discussion on the state of Russian-American relations.

The events unfolding in Syria, he said, reflected the whole difference between the current situation and the days of the "Cold War". In those years there was a clear division between supporters in the Middle East - the Soviet Union supported the Arab countries and the United States - Israel. Now there is no longer such a division.

Every conflict in the Middle East - the Suez Crisis of 1956-57, then the Six Day War of 1963 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 put the Soviet Union and the United States on the brink of a direct confrontation with the use of nuclear weapons. But, nevertheless, it was easier to reach a truce - it was enough for the two superpowers to negotiate.

Right now Russia and the US have a common enemy in the Middle East - Islamic State. They have common friends too - the governments of Iraq and Israel. There are, however, uncertain things - for example, in relation to the Al-Nusra Front. The US is taking an ambiguous position on the Syrian Kurds, primarily because of Turkey. The current situation is significantly complicated by the fact that in addition to Russia and the United States, there are other parties to the conflict in Syria, and their main opponents are different. For Turkey, it is the Kurds and Assad; for Assad - the Free Syrian Army and the al-Nusra Front; for Saudi Arabia - Iran and Assad; and for Israel - Hezbollah. Now it is incomparably more difficult even to agree on a cease-fire than during the Cold War.

"Each party to the conflict has its own logic, but it works against the reconciliation of healthy forces," says the orientalist and doctor of historical sciences, Georgiy Mirskiy. "This is the logic of the Alawites who rightly fear that the removal of Assad will mean the beginning of the collapse of all the positions of their community. This is the logic of the rebels, none of whom, even super-moderate ones, will ever agree to keep the system led by Assad, at least out of fear of being a traitor. This is the logic of the Russian leadership which fears that surrendering Assad means framing themselves and suggesting that the Kremlin surrendered its own people under pressure from America."

In this situation, experts say, participants in anti-terrorist operations need to resolve three priority tasks without damaging the ambitions of everyone. Firstly, it is necessary to agree on the definition of organizations that are their common enemies and join forces to destroy them. Secondly, the experience of Afghanistan and other conflicts has shown that with open borders, it is almost impossible to do away with the guerrilla movement. In Syria, which has common borders with five states, it is difficult to close everything, but at least with Iraq it is necessary to do it in order to defeat Islamic State formations that are located in its territory. Thirdly, in the future, perhaps the most realistic goal will be to reach agreement on a cease-fire between Assad forces and factions that are included in the coalition of the moderate opposition.

The US president is gradually inclined to believe that Bashar al-Assad is the lesser evil for the US, especially given the normalization of relations with Iran. After all, the main guilt of Assad before the West was his allied relations with Iran. Now the situation is different - the sanctions are removed, the restoration of diplomatic relations will follow next, etc. And if so, what makes Assad dangerous? Of course, this is strongly opposed by Turkey and the Gulf countries. And the Russian intervention changed everything, upsetting the cards. Now Obama is facing another dilemma - will he want to go down in history as the president of the United States who let Russia into the Arab East.

Yet Moscow, if it wants to find a common language with Washington, must try to do it as long as Democrat Obama is in power sure, Aleksey Arbatov believes. "Remember Khrushchev's relations with Eisen-hower and Kennedy, Brezhnev's relations with Johnson and Nixon, Brezhnev and his successors' relations with Carter and Reagan, Putin's relations with Bush and Obama," the expert suggested. "If a Republican comes to power, will the US policy toward us change? For us, it might be easier to deal with them. They will not be talking about human rights, about a world without nuclear weapons and about the equality of all before international law. They will treat us without excessive sentimentality as suggested by our resources, economic and military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Everything will be clear, simple and pragmatic - you have this and that, and we have this. And relations will be built accordingly."

If Arbatov is right, Moscow has one year to reach agreement with Washington.