GAMES OF THE ARMENIAN AUTHORITIES

Judging by the visits of the Russian political elite to the region of the Karabakh conflict, after the four-day April war, the Russian Federation began active shuttle diplomacy to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The visits to Baku and Yerevan by Russian Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave rise to different kinds of assumptions and forecasts about the imminent end to the most bloody ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union - the Karabakh conflict. The initiative to resolve the situation was taken by Russia after Baku moved from words to deeds, broke through the defence of the Armenian troops in several areas and strengthened its positions in the liberated lands. Moreover, Azerbaijan demonstrated its modern weaponry and conducted combat operations according to modern methods of non-contact warfare. This is evidenced by the destruction of command posts and military equipment of the Armenian Armed Forces by drones of the Azerbaijani armed forces. All this led to various kinds of versions and forecasts in the press about the future settlement of the Karabakh conflict. In this connection, R+ asked the well-known Russian political scientist Sergey Markov, director of the Institute for Political Studies, to answer a series of questions about the current situation and prospects for the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

- How close have the sides to the Karabakh conflict come to the conclusion of a peace treaty? Are there tangible prerequisites for this?

- Yes, there are such prerequisites. I should note that in 2011 the sides to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, through mutual compromises, were very close to the conclusion of a peace agreement on the basis of the Kazan formula for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Unfortunately, all fell through at the last moment. For some time, disappointed in this, the Russian government practically distanced itself from the peace process. I want to emphasize that in 2011, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia actually reached agreement, but as they say, stopped short of making a deal. The negotiations on the Karabakh settlement have an objective nature. Azerbaijan wants to get the territories back, while Armenia wants to have the blockade lifted, communications opened, and economic development opportunities. Now Russia is more interested in settling the conflict, as the Russian Federation has more motives for it at the moment. For example, firstly, Russia wants to get rid of the burden of economic support for Armenia. Moscow seeks to make sure that Yerevan itself deals with its economic problems. Secondly, the Russian Federation does not want new conflicts on its borders. There are too many conflicts on the borders of Russia. To this we must add that the current president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, has a greater political weight than Dmitriy Medvedev, who was president in 2011. All this stimulates Russia to be more involved in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict than during the meetings in Kazan in 2011. And, accordingly, the sides have more prerequisites and willingness to agree than in 2011.

- According to the press, the settlement involves the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force in the conflict zone. According to some versions, it is a condition of Moscow's mediation mission...

- It is not Russia, but Armenia that sets the deployment of Russian peacekeepers as a condition for the signing of the Kazan formula as a kind of guarantee to prevent hostilities. The Kazan formula proposes "peace in exchange for territories". But what the Armenian side offers is "incomplete peace in exchange for the incomplete return of the territories". That is to say Armenia states that they do not want to be in a more difficult position as a result of the return of territories, so Yerevan needs guarantees that fighting will not resume. Such guarantees are the following: the territories handed over to Azerbaijan should be demilitarized, peacekeepers should be deployed in the conflict zone and an agreement on non-use of military force should be signed. Therefore, the initiative to deploy peacekeepers belongs to the Armenian side, and Russia agrees with Yerevan's logic in this case.

- In Armenia, anti-Russian rallies and demonstrations are gaining momentum. Can the anti-Russian hysteria in Yerevan thwart the attempts to finally resolve the Karabakh conflict?

- Of course, the situation in Armenia may be inflamed, but there are no broad, mass anti-Russian rallies and sentiments there. In Armenia, there is always a pro-American anti-Russian component. In Yerevan, even an attempt was made to organize a Yerevan Maidan. These forces are linked to former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, they are always there and orient themselves to the United States. Now they have become active and been joined by mentally unbalanced and politically active users of social networks. I think that there is also an element of a game by the Armenian authorities in this. They want to tell the Russian leadership: "Anti-Russian sentiment is growing in Armenia. So we cannot make concessions in the Karabakh issue ... so do not push us too much." Such a game is often used in politics. For example, Kiev often resorts to it when they want to show that they cannot fully implement the Minsk agreements. As if nationalists are exerting pressure on the government. But in fact, Kiev stimulates the nationalists so that they put pressure on the authorities. I think that the same game is being played in Yerevan.

- How high is the probability of hostilities resuming between Azerbaijan and Armenia?

- I think that if there is no progress in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, of course, we should expect the situation to deteriorate on the front line.

- The media has spread information that five of the occupied districts of Azerbaijan on the perimeter of Nagornyy Karabakh will be liberated almost very soon. They say this is a question of the near future...

- The proposal to withdraw from five districts comes from Armenia, and Azerbaijan speaks about the liberation of six and a half districts. Armenia wants to keep control over Lacin and have Kalbacar in reserve. Azerbaijan insists on the return of all districts and believes that a corridor in Lacin District with a width of two sniper shots is enough for Armenia. I think that a compromise between the two options can be achieved. Withdrawal from five Azerbaijani districts is the minimum.

- Is the question of the future status of Nagornyy Karabakh a subject of the negotiations with the mediation of Russia?

- Now everyone agrees that the issue of the status of Nagornyy Karabakh should be postponed for the future. For the time being, the terms of how the status of Nagornyy Karabakh will be determined are being discussed. Armenia suggests solving it with a simple referendum. The Azerbaijani side notes that refugees need to participate in the referendum. Either the process of returning Azerbaijani refugees should begin or they should be allowed to vote in the referendum. Baku also considers it logical to include a reference to the well-known four UN resolutions in the preamble. The Armenian side does not want this, because the resolutions point to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Nagornyy Karabakh. That is to say the parties to the talks want to stake out some conditions that will affect the outcome of the referendum.

- Russia has more opportunities to settle the Karabakh conflict than France and the United States. Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation have established very close political, economic, communications and other relations. As for Armenia, according to the former speaker of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov, it is an outpost of Russia. In this case, can Russia resolve the issue outside the protracted negotiation process of the OSCE Minsk Group?

- It is theoretically possible, but practically - not. Yes, Armenia is a member of the CSTO, the EAEU, etc. But decision-making in Yerevan is strongly influenced by the Armenian diaspora. It is known that there is a strong Armenian diaspora in the US and in France, but there is no strong Azerbaijani diaspora there. There is a strong Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, which balances the influence of the Armenian diaspora. Therefore, if the current settlement process is blocked, it will most likely benefit Armenia. And the process will be blocked by the US, but through the Armenian diaspora in America. It should be noted that the radical position in the Karabakh issue is taken not by the population of Armenia but by the Armenian diaspora in the US and France.

As for the OSCE, as far as I know, the United States and France support the Russian initiative on the Karabakh settlement. Now the UN has many other global problems. In terms of domestic policy, France and the US are ready to hand over the initiative to Russia in this matter.

- What can we expect in the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the coming months?

 - I think that difficult negotiations, first and foremost, will be held in Yerevan. In the current situation, in relation to the Kazan formula, the Armenian government will have to convince their population more than the Azerbaijani authorities. Talks will also be held in Baku, but in Yerevan, they will be more intense. Russia will have to put a little more pressure on Armenia.

- Recently, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan made a controversial statement. On the one hand, he talks about the need for security guarantees, but at the same time, he does not consider it possible to deploy a Russian peacekeeping force. He notes the importance of the settlement, but does not trust the negotiations and so on. What does it all mean?

- The Armenian authorities have not yet determined their strategy in respect of the current process of the Karabakh conflict settlement. Apparently, President Serzh Sargsyan is trying to develop a strategy, and so he has just decided to take a break. On the one hand, Azerbaijan exerts pressure on him, and on the other, Russia pressurizes him and suggests that the Armenian president sign the Kazan draft agreement, and there is also pressure from his own Armenian population. Moreover, the pressure of the Armenians comes from three directions: from the Armenian population, from the Armenians of Nagornyy Karabakh and from the Armenian diaspora. Such numerous and different kinds of pressure do not allow President Sargsyan to formulate a common policy. But in any case, he will have to work out some kind of certainty.