Author: NURANI
Experts regard the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Garabagh conflict as the most 'old' one in the former USSR and one of the longest in the world. It is generally accepted that there has been a ceasefire regime for more than twenty five years - since the spring of 1994 - with the 'centre of gravity' having been moved from the battlefield to the negotiating table.
In fact, little changed in the status-quo in 2019. There were not major military clashes similar to the one in spring 2016. The ceasefire is maintained, and the mediators from the OSCE Minsk Group, as well as the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, considered it necessary to underline this positive fact. Negotiations are ongoing, albeit their extent is still an open question. But…
Red lines of Azerbaijan
Perhaps, the 'minor steps' taken by the parties in the humanitarian sphere should have hit the headlines as a means to settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Ironically, in April 2019, Minister Lavrov was talking about possible exchange of journalists between the conflicting parties. In October, he confirmed that such an exchange was underway. In November, the exchange took place indeed. Now the parties are considering the possibility of similar visits by parliamentarians, public and cultural figures. For the first time in recent years, the Armenian delegation attended the summit of the ministers of TRACECA member states held in Baku. Unfortunately, the exchange of POWs did not take place, but the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, confirmed that work was ongoing in this direction.
However, a closer look at the situation shows that the main accomplishments in the Garabagh settlements in 2019 were not the exchange of journalists and not even the visit of the Armenian delegation to the TRACECA forum. A 'diplomatic reboot' in the region was more important than the above two. Azerbaijan drew 'red lines' in the region and made it clear that it would remain committed to them. Moreover, these 'red lines' completely fit into international law and the legal background of the Garabagh settlement.
Even during the minor humanitarian steps and the mutual press tour, Azerbaijan engaged a new mechanism - contacts between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Nagorno-Garabagh, primarily in the unofficial sphere.
This diplomatic manoeuvre of Azerbaijan fully fits into the regulation of negotiations on Garabagh, approved by the OSCE in Budapest in 1994. There are two sides to the conflict in Garabagh - Azerbaijan and Armenia, and two stakeholders - the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Garabagh. This manoeuvre came just at a time when the current authorities of Armenia demanded as an ultimatum "to allow the Garabagh people to negotiations." Moreover, "the Garabagh people" means exclusively the Armenian community - the self-proclaimed authorities of the region occupied by Armenia. But now Baku reminds that the residents of Garabagh may participate in the negotiations, but, first, on the terms of equality of two communities, and secondly, within the framework of certain OSCE and international laws. This is a strong blow to the position of Yerevan. It is not surprising that the representatives of the self-proclaimed Armenian authorities of Khankendi immediately declared that the dialogue between the two communities was "categorically unacceptable".
In addition, just before the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council held in Bratislava in early December, Azerbaijan issued a memorandum presenting its position on a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Garabagh conflict. The authors noted that the Republic of Azerbaijan is still committed to resolving the conflict by political means within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group: "Resolution of the conflict is possible only on the basis of the norms and principles of international law stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act, with full respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders." Azerbaijani diplomats also noted that Baku has taken a phased approach to resolving the conflict, which is based on UN Security Council resolutions and OSCE decisions, in particular, on the decision adopted at the 1994 Budapest Summit. The first step should be the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the Nagorno-Garabagh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan, followed by the return of the forcibly displaced Azerbaijani population, subject to all necessary security measures, as well as the opening of communication lines in the region. The next step should be the determination of the status of the Nagorno-Garabagh region as part of Azerbaijan in accordance with the Azerbaijani Constitution and legislation. "The determination of status should take place in peaceful conditions within the framework of a legal process with the direct, full and equal participation of the population of the Nagorno-Garabagh region of Azerbaijan, namely, the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities and their interaction with the government of Azerbaijan exclusively within the framework of a legal and democratic process," the memorandum reads. Most importantly, it is emphasized that Azerbaijan does not see a political solution to the conflict outside the framework outlined above. That is, Azerbaijan outlined its "red lines" and openly declared that it would not depart from them.
More advantageous position of Baku
The following may seem a risky and shocking parallel for some, but the ongoing "Garabagh diplomacy" somehow reminds the battle near Moscow in 1941, when the Red Army not only managed to prevent the capture of the capital of the USSR, but, more importantly, it changed the very nature of the war. The Germans were still in Khimki within reach of Moscow, seeing the Kremlin through binoculars, but they failed the blitzkrieg scenario.
Azerbaijan has an undeniable legal advantage: territorial integrity, respect for borders, UN Security Council resolutions are the achievements of Azerbaijani diplomacy. While Armenia continues to occupy 20% of the Azerbaijani territory, the balance of power in the region is far from the same as it was in the early nineties and even at zeros. Azerbaijan, as it became clear in April 2016, has achieved confident military superiority. In addition, Baku successfully implements international economic and logistic megaprojects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. These accomplishments make Azerbaijan an important and valuable partner for Russia, for the West and for the East. Azerbaijan contributes a lot to the establishment of a new transport and communication network in the region, which Armenia does not have access to. As a result, even Armenian experts admit that today Baku leads in diplomacy.
What about Yerevan?
Armenia is rapidly losing the sympathies of the world community. Experts in Yerevan note that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan makes conflicting statements on the most important issue for Armenia. On the one hand, he says that he cannot negotiate on behalf of Garabagh, but then he makes a directly opposite statement such as "Garabagh is Armenia, period" and refers to Bako Sahakyan, calling him "the president of Nagorno-Garabagh", "respected head of local authority". Moreover, in response to the Azerbaijani "red lines", Yerevan is in no hurry to propose its own.
All these factors show that Armenia, in fact, is trapped in its own populism.
Local politicians, political scientists and experts can make maximalist statements like "Artsakh will not be part of Azerbaijan!" in Armenia, but voicing such statements in the international arena is too risky. Admitting in the local political arena the subject of ongoing negotiations is even more risky. This means incurring charges of "betrayal of the Armenian case", etc. This would be dangerous for any government. For Nikol Pashinyan, the risk is many times higher, and populism is actually his only resource. Moreover, a year and a half after the "barbecue revolution", the new government has practically nothing to present to its citizens. We should not forget about the traditions of political terror existing in Armenia.
At the same time, postponing the solution infinitely is impossible either. Baku favours a peaceful solution, but warns that if negotiations fail, Azerbaijan reserves the right to use other means under international law. Finally, Armenia continues to pay political, social, economic and demographic costs for the Garabagh conflict. We can just hope that the Yerevan leadership still has the wisdom and political will to make real steps toward the settlement.
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